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autonomous from powerful landed interests. In the absence of local contention, however, leaders
are likely to expand rent-seeking opportunities for bureaucratic elites as a way to strengthen the
state’s control over the economy. This argument is advanced through a comparative study of several
provincial cases, based on nineteen months of fieldwork, including over a hundred elite interviews.
A quantitative analysis of land market liberalization across Chinese cities confirms that, in locales
with political leaders tied to higher-level authorities and thus autonomous from local landed interests, land conflict intensity is positively correlated with the probability of the liberalization reform.
Finally, to assess whether local elites learned to shift their position, I use data from an original survey of 346 county-level party secretaries, providing a rare large-scale opinion study of Chinese local
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Transformation from planned to market economies is demanding because it often damages powerful
interest groups. For example, price liberalization requires state planners to surrender their pricesetting power to markets. Privatization, meanwhile, forces managers of state-owned enterprises into
competitions and under hard budget constraints. As Rodrik (1996) argues, “good economics is bad
politics.” It is not surprising to see many countries are trapped in sub-optimal equilibrium. In some
post-communist regimes, rulers and their close supporters benefit from economic rents created by
state interventionist policies, using their strategic positions to block reforms at the expense of general welfare (Barnes, 2006; Hellman, 1998; Kornai, 1990; Malesky, 2009; Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 1992; Shih, 2007; Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). According to European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2016), 73 percent of the population in post-communist countries have
experienced income growth that is below the average for these countries. In developed democracies,
as Piketty (2014) finds in Capital in the Twenty-first Century, rent-seeking capital has a tendency to
captures the regulatory state and has led to a widening income gap between the rich and the poor.
So, the question is: under what conditions do politicians create efficiency-enhancing institutions
that threaten to eliminate rent-seeking opportunities?
I answer the question by examining land market reform in China. China’s sustained yet limited progress towards market economy under authoritarianism serves as an interesting case to study
economic transformation. Since the initiation of “reform and opening up” in 1978, China has ex-

1

perienced waves of economic liberalization and privatization, even without political liberalization.
According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, a widely used index to measure the effectiveness of political and economic transformation, almost three decades into economic reforms, China
is still making progress towards market economy more than most post-communist (Figure 1.1) and
developing (Figure 1.2) countries. This seems against the conventional wisdom that countries which
managed to sustain economic transformation are those with democratic political institutions.
Meanwhile, the index also reflects the fact that China’s economic transformation remains incomplete. While product markets have been well established and fairly competitive, factors markets
are still underdeveloped. Upstream sectors deemed strategic to national interest, such as energy, finance, and land, are under the control of public authorities or state-owned enterprises. The active
involvement of the state in economic activities has become more and more resilient, prompting
some scholars to conclude China is creating a model of “state capitalism” (Williamson, 2012) or is
trapped in a “partial reform equilibrium” (Pei, 2009). And this is especially so with China’s partially
reformed land regime.
Land, due to its immobility, durability, and uniqueness, is a strategic resource and a considerable asset for both states and individuals. Land regime specifies rules that govern socioeconomic
relations with respect to land, including land ownership, land use regulation, land rights allocation
and adjudication, and land valuation and taxation.1 As an important component of property rights
regime, land regime is a basic economic institution that defines how land should be used as a factor
of production or an instrument of social insurance in particular for the rural poor. In the command
economy, land is constructed as a state property, allocated by state bureaucracy without charge.
Economic transformation in relation to land aims to abolish this entire Soviet rural system (consisting of the state and collective farming sector) and introduce a land market to complement the broad
reform agenda (Wegren, 2003).2
Land market reform contains three components: shedding public ownership of land, lifting legal
1
Land rights include use rights (rights to use the land), control rights (rights to decide how the land should
be used and to benefit from the land), and transfer rights (rights to reallocate use and control rights through
sale, lease, loan, mortgage, gift or inheritance).
2
Land market reform is thus different from redistributive land reform, of which the purpose is to reduce
rural poverty by transferring the control of land to the landless (Albertus, 2015).

2

Figure 1.1: The Index of Market Economy Status of Transitional Countries
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restrictions on the tradability of land beyond administrative requirements, and building a functional
land market. Land ownership reform refers to the legalization of private land ownership, either
de jure or de facto. Land commercialization is the legalization of land transactions, including the
transfer of land ownership or land use rights via conveyance, lease, or mortgage. Land market
regulation is the creation of rules for land transactions, land finances, property taxation, dispute
resolution, land use planning and zoning, and land registration and titling.3
Unlike sweeping land privatization in East Europe or nationalization in Vietnam, Chinese reformers pursued land market reform in a way that can be characterized as gradual and inconsistent.
They first institutionalized state ownership of land in urban areas, but left rural and suburban land
as collectively owned. Villagers and their collectives had de facto rights to use, control, and transfer
rural land. Thereby, land markets emerged as local governments and collectives leased land use
3

Legalization of private ownership or land transactions does not equate to a functioning land market,
which requires a legal and regulatory framework. This paper focuses on a specific land market regulation that
reduces state restrictions on land transactions based on land ownership in China.
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rights to foreign investors and domestic entrepreneurs. But this trend of inclusive reform was partially reversed in the 1990s, when state land monopoly was created and collective land rights were
repressed. The exclusive land market reform generated revenues from state-owned land market for
local governments at the expense of the rural poor. However, some subnational governments pursued an inclusive agenda of land market reform. Figure 1.3 plots Chinese prefectural cities on two
dimensions – GDP per capita and fiscal dependency on land (measured by net income of land sales
over budget revenue) – and highlights those cities that have adopted inclusive reform policies in red.
While richer and less land dependent cities tend to be more inclusive, they vary in terms of economic
development and fiscal dependence on land revenues. This suggests that variation in inclusive land
market reform cannot be simplified to economic rationales. Given the fact that China is a unitary
state, neither can this variation be explained by formal institutions that are largely identical across
all cities.
Based on the experience of land market reform in China, I offer a theory to account for the
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inclusiveness of economic reform over time and across space. My overarching argument is that
ruling elites would supply market-enhancing institutions to benefit the poor when they learn to formulate inclusive ideology from recurring social grievance while being politically autonomous to
vested interests. In the early 80s, radical reformers learned from rural unrest from the Maoist era
and designed a land ownership that limited the state’s control over rural land. Into the 90s, conservative reformers learned exclusive ideology from recurring inflationary pressure, thereby implemented
exclusive land commercialization in reaction to potential crisis. When land-related conflicts intensified in the 2000s, central leaders learned to adopt a governing ideology that emphasize fairness,
reorienting the land reform agenda to liberalization policies that benefit the rural poor. Despite
the resistance of bureaucratic and business interests, the inclusive reform has achieved a moderate
progress in cities with intense land conflicts and autonomous leaders. This combination of politician
autonomy and social grievance, producing the mechanism of political learning, is what separates my
theory from most existing theories of economic reform that focus on top-down directives or bargains
among elites or bottom-up pressure.

1.1

A Theory of Exclusive and Inclusive Market Reform

In neoclassical economics, economic transformation is a two-fold process. The first is known as
liberalization-stabilization-privatization, which aims to reduce the state’s monopoly in economic
activities. But elimination of bureaucratic commands in allocating resources does not directly translate into a functioning market economy. This is because the state still controls resources through
indirect means such as entry barrier, assigned quota, administrative price-setting, and personnel
appointment (Kornai, 1990). So, the second part of economic transformation is legal-institutional
reform that builds market-friendly institutions, including property rights regime, competition policy,
enterprise restructuring, financial regulations, and so on (EBRD, 2004). The problem is that uneven
pace of liberalization and institutional reform creates rent-seeking opportunities for political and
economic elites to benefit themselves from market distortions. These beneficiaries will then prevent
further liberalization or institutional reforms from creating a level playing field for the majority of
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population. The benefits of reforms may not materialise if most of the population do not gain from
economic reforms.
Unfortunately, existing literature on economic reform has not taken the subject of economic
inequality and inclusion seriously until very recently (EBRD, 2016). Political economy scholars
have been putting much emphasis on efficiency and growth, creating a number of theories centered
around elite politics. Some argue that bargaining or collusion between political and economic elites
is what drives forward economic reforms (Luong and Weinthal, 2004; North and Weingast, 1989;
Schamis, 1999). Others argue that only cohesive and autonomous rulers (or a ruling coalition) can
achieve significant progress towards market economy by overriding oppositions with concentrated
interests in the status quo (Evans, 1995; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Nelson, 1993). But so
far the inclusiveness of market reform (defined in section 1.3) remains undertheorized. Despite
the importance of inclusive institutions on sustainable economic growth (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2013), the conditions under which politicians pursue exclusive or inclusive market reforms is still
not specified. Meanwhile, many scholars of democratization argue that political regime change is
driven by rulers’ fear of social unrest (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Gandhi and
Przeworski, 2006; Svolik, 2012; Wood, 2000),1 but very few have studied the impact of mass unrest
on economic transformation in comparative politics.
My theory starts with the assumption that rulers’ first-order preference is to survive from political challenges and remain in power.2 They are risk averse to anything threatening to their political
careers. To survive, rulers (or incumbent politicians) must maintain domestic order. They have
two common strategies: repression and cooptation.3 Repression requires rulers to finance security
forces by collecting tax from citizens or seeking rent from resources through extraction, whereas
cooptation usually involves decentralizing economic or political power. In choosing their strate1

Ansell and Samuels (2010) argue that democratization is not resulting from ruler’s fear of the redistributive power of the poor, but economic elites’ fear of the expropriative capacity of the arbitrary state.
2
Preferences such as economic growth, historical legacy, and monetary payoff are presumably secondorder in my theory. Stimulating economic development is a way to generate more tax and rent. Creating
historical legacy is a way to consolidate the ruler’s power. Monetary payoff may be prioritized by community
leaders, but it would be less important for rulers of many citizens.
3
Evasion or diversion is another common strategy, but it is not considered here because it delays rather
than reduces disorder. Repression includes the use of both physical and nonphysical forces (e.g., ideology
or policy) to damage the interest of the target. Cooptation can be either informal (e.g., monetary buyoffs,
particularistic benefits) and formal (e.g., institutional change, policy concession).
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gies, rulers, whose utility function is determined by the aggregate of resource-weighted citizens’
compliance, must pick losers and winners wisely. To provide a parsimonious theory without oversimplification, I distinguish two types of citizens in general: the masses and the elites. The masses
are large in quantity, but politically impotent as individuals. Their power depends on the degree of
organization and mobilization. On the other hand, elites are limited in number, but enjoy direct or
indirect access to political power.
Under difficult economic conditions, rulers would initiate economic reforms to prevent social
unrest, starting with a moderate extent of commercialization, decentralization, or liberalization.
During this process, some elites may rise as early winners, for they can take advantage of privileged status in market competition to seek rents from decentralized measures and partial liberalization. The masses, on the other hand, may be winners in absolute terms (e.g., living out of extreme
poverty), but relative losers in comparison to the elites because they are excluded from rent-seeking
opportunities.4 Exclusive market reforms may give rise to social grievance, when the masses develop a sense of relative deprivation, organize themselves, and mobilize resources to overthrow the
ruling regime. However, the masses may rationalize and internalize grievances from higher inequality in reference to the gloomy past or expectation to gain in the future (Whyte, 2010). Rulers will
only coopt the protesting masses when repression (or persuasion) is ineffective, unaffordable, or illegitimate. Under these conditions, they may push for economic reforms that eliminate rent-seeking
opportunities to provide a level playing field for the masses and elites.
What makes a market reform exclusive or inclusive? Since an inclusive market reform generates
extra costs to elites by shifting their resources to the masses, rulers must be able to prevent unsatisfied elites from taking over governing institutions. If their power is dependent on or constrained by
these elites, rulers would choose exclusive market reform. In particular, they may adapt to market
reforms nominally. Or, they may coopt a small group of the masses, while avoiding a significant
change to the existing political-economic order. This strategy suggests that, in the complex reality,
whether a market reform is exclusive or inclusive is in relation to certain subgroups of ordinary
4

This is a point different from the conventional wisdom that “winners take all.” However, in postcommunist countries where labor unions are disorganized, workers tend to be absolute losers. Similar situation can
be found in democracies with strong unions under economic liberalization.
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citizens.
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By exploiting multiple dimensions of policies or institutions in response to different sub-

groups, rulers can convert original reform goals to continue serving the interests of a few elites. This
sort of nominal or gradual reform allows elites to continue rent-seeking activities while maintaining
their privileges, thereby causing enduring social conflicts.
Facing sustained social grievance, rulers would seriously consider an inclusive market reform
if they do not depend on the opposing elites’ resources to survive in politics. That is, rulers are
autonomous to and independent from the group of elites negatively affected by the reform. Such
autonomy is derived from political institutions (e.g., democratic elections or centralized political
parties). To pacify grieved citizens, autonomous and independent rulers make credible commitments to inclusive market reforms, which require them to learn the root cause of social grievance
and to make a fundamental shift of policy paradigm. This is a political learning process, which
involves changes in not merely policy instruments, but also political ideology in public discourse.
Rulers create new policies and institutions based on a new set of ideas and values they learn from
enduring social grievance. Without this learning process induced by the threat of social grievance,
rulers autonomous to the vested interests may be captured by potential winners to adopt exclusive
measures. Therefore, an inclusive market reform is more likely to happen when rulers feel threatened by social grievance and are autonomous to and independent from the elites whose interests
are damaged by the reform. In short, this is a theory built on the interaction of social grievance and
rulers’ autonomy. Figure 1.4 illustrate the logic of my theory.

1.2

Significance of Land Market Reform in China

I evaluate my theoretical claims empirically in the context of China’s economic reform in the postMao era, with a specific focus on institutions governing land market. The significance of studying
China’s land market reform is that it provides an extreme case where rulers in a single-party authoritarian regime make credible commitment to certain property rights and economic development.
5

For example, we can identify two groups of Chinese citizens: rural villagers and urban residents. Among
rural villagers, we can further distinguish suburban villagers and villagers who live in rural areas far away
from the urban center.
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Figure 1.4: Illustration of the Theory
Ruler autonomy

Social grievance

Political learning

Market reform

North and Weingast (1989) argue that rulers can establish credible commitment by either setting
a precedent of “responsible behavior” or being constrained by constitutional democracy. But they
only discuss the latter because the former has been seldom observed. While their work inspires a
large literature of political economy on development and rule of law (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), there has been very few research on the alternative source of credible commitment.
However, a pattern of “responsible behavior” may exist even if it is seldom observed. A particular
“responsible behavior” that has been understudied is authoritarian rulers’ need for performance legitimacy or reputation for good governance. In the past four decades, China has dismantled a large
part of the command economy and continued to build a market-based economy through institutional
reforms. The ruling elites of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have been committing themselves
to economic development. This situation is unexpected, considering authoritarian rulers are not
held accountable by ordinary citizens through democratic elections or constrained by legislature or
judiciary in repressing civil, economic, and political rights. Closer examination into China’s land
market reform reveals that, even without a strong claim for procedural legitimacy, the idea of performance legitimacy, once institutionalized in the ruling party, can incentivize autocratic politicians
to pursue “creative destructions” that improve economic condition and maintain social stability at
the same time. Studying this process can help us understand how a “responsible behavior” becomes
a precedent in weakly institutionalized regimes, and thus fills a gap in the literature of political
economy.
In addition, existing theories of economic transformation in comparative politics have been

10

focusing on economic crisis, interest groups, political regime, state leadership, and international
pressure (e.g., Evans, 1995; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Luong and Weinthal, 2004; Nelson,
1993; Schamis, 1999; Wade, 1990), but not so much on social grievance. This is partly due to
the fact that these theories are derived from postcommunist and developing countries that experienced concurrent political and economic transformation. In these cases, public dissatisfaction over
economic reforms is directly channeled into institutional politics by democratically elected officials
and civil society groups. But in autocracies under economic transformation, where institutions of
accountability are weak, I argue that social grievance and unrest is a functional substitute for or
complement to civil society. My research finds that social grievance motivates Chinese rulers in the
post-Mao era to learn more about the sources of public dissatisfaction and to undertake land market
reforms to achieve both economic growth and social stability, which boost their claims for performance legitimacy and their reputations for effective governance, a key indicator for selecting local
rulers in the cadre evaluation system. A broader implication of this research is that, despite apparent
institutional differences between democracies and autocracies, incumbent politicians’ fear of social
unrest and subsequent learning of creative solutions is a common mechanism that opens pathways
to efficiency-enhancing reforms, even if these reforms, which benefit the citizenry at large, are not
in the obvious interest of ruling elites.
Finally, China’s land market reform implies a political-ideational logic of policymaking which
has been overlooked by previous studies. Existing research explains policymaking in China by leaders’ preference, factional competition (H. Cai and Treisman, 2006; Nathan, 1973; Shih, Adolph, and
Liu, 2012) and formal institutions (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1990; Mertha, 2009; Shirk, 1993).
My thesis challenges that these dominant accounts (e.g., fragmented authoritarianism) are incomplete. This is because so far few have investigated why and how the CCP leaders implement reforms
that reduce their power. In explaining economic and administrative decentralization in the 1980s,
Shirk (1993) uses the concept of “reciprocal accountability.” That is, generally speaking, rulers are
chosen by a selectorate of political elites and dominating over them once being selected. Although
new or potential rulers may curry favor to the elites, they have less reason to do so after consolidating their power. The concept, notwithstanding its importance, is not very useful in explaining

11

why the ruler reduce elites’ rent-seeking opportunities while being powerful enough to purge highranking officials. By studying China’s land market reform as a “most difficult” case,1 I offer a theory
that emphasizes the importance of governing ideology, which is the product of rulers’ autonomous
learning from social grievance in order to achieve effective governance. By mixing qualitative and
quantitative evidence in an historical-institutional framework, this study is one of the few researches
that builds ideational factors into the explanation of Chinese political economy. Substantively, I
challenge the existing argument based on rational choice institutionalism that views the Chinese
state as a predatory instrument of autocrats. Although China’s land regime has stimulated predatory
behaviors from state officials, I argue that these are unintended consequences of institutions, which
were initially created by autonomous leaders to tackle immediate governing difficulties they faced
in economic transformation.

1.3

Concepts and Definitions

I define market reform as policy or institutional changes designed to substitute market coordination
for bureaucratic commands in resource allocation. Some market reforms create or rent-seeking opportunities for elites, whereas others eliminate rent-seeking opportunities to provide a level playing
field for the masses and elites. I call the latter as “inclusive market reform” and the former “exclusive market reform.” Inclusive market reform intends to benefit the majority of ordinary citizens
from a growing economy through the provision of equal rights and opportunities, but exclusive
market reform only aims to improve economic efficiency. Under exclusive market reform, ordinary
citizens may find their properties arbitrarily expropriated by the state and themselves undercompensated. They may gain from exclusive market reform, but they could have gained more from
inclusive market reform. In other words, inclusive market institutions distribute more to the masses
than exclusive market institutions. However, I distinguish inclusive market reform from redistributive reform because both exclusive and inclusive market reform may be redistributive, but inclusive
market reform recognizes that ordinary citizens’ rights are equal to the elites while exclusive mar1

It is “most difficult” because of its complexity compared to some other reforms. Land regime is linked
with many vested interests and institutions such as finance, housing, tax, and welfare.
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ket reform does not. Because the outcomes of rights-based reform are subject to a complex set of
factors, I measure the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of market reform with the extent of granting
rent-seeking opportunities for the elites in formal rules. A market reform is most inclusive or least
exclusive if it minimizes rent-seeking opportunities for the elites among all the conceivable options.
To explain different reform strategies, I build on previous works by Schumpeter (1942), Hirschman
(1973), and Haas (1990). I conceive that political leaders may engage in three kinds of behavior
change in general: reaction, adaptation, and learning. Reaction is a process in which political leaders are pressed to carry out immediate, remedial measures to solve a problem of interest without
having a proper understanding of the causes of the problem. This scenario is likely to be observed
when politicians are facing sudden, unusual problems such as riots or crises. There is little time
for policymakers to think through the root causes of these problems and adjust their behaviors accordingly. In reaction, anxious leaders do not modify their original motivations, only producing la
rage de vouloir conclure or “the mania for wanting to conclude.” They resort to repressive measures
that would temporarily solve the existing problems, but likely to create more serious problems or
unintended consequences.
Recurring problems compel political leaders to adapt or to learn. Adaptation, according to Haas
(1990, p.34), is “the ability to change one’s behavior so as to meet challenges in the form of new
demands without having to revaluate one’s entire program and the reasoning on which that program depends for its legitimacy.” Adaptation is associated with piecemeal solution, incremental
adjustment, and muddling through. In the process of adaptation, political leaders deal with governing challenges by changing their means without questioning ultimate ends or the causal definition
of their tasks. Adaptive leaders borrow from existing ideas or instruments to solve the repeated
problems, but their understanding of the problems remains poor and superficial. This is because
adaptation does not generate new consensual knowledge, which are generally accepted understandings about cause-effect linkages of social phenomena (Haas, 1990, p.22). Adaptation resembles the
“garbage can” model, best characterized by “a collection of choices looking for problems” (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972). These choices only provide “pseudo-creative responses,” including
ad-hoc, exaggerated, hasty, half-hearted, and failure-prone policy experiments.
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Disappointing reforms and sustained problems may stimulate learning, which I define as a process in which political actors use new consensual knowledge to specify their goals and address their
concerns in new ways. Learning happens when political actors are induced by previous failures
to question the underlying beliefs of their goals such as governing ideology and policy paradigm.
They reevaluate the causes of problems and shift their cognitive decision making to factors that had
been previously neglected. Learning is not a tactical change, but a cognitive choice. The output of
learning is “creative response” to an existing problem. The acquisition of new knowledge is what
separates learning from adaptation. In Haas’ words (1990), “learning involves the penetration of
political objectives and programs by new knowledge-mediated understandings of connections.” I
measure learning with change of goals and means in governance.
Learning is more likely to happen when political actors are autonomous to and independent from
the interest groups benefiting from the status quo. If rulers are bounded or constrained by interest
groups that cause the problems of interest, they would not learn innovative ideas that have the power
of creative destruction. Building on classic political theories on individual autonomy by Kant and
Mill, neo-Weberian political scientists often apply the concept of autonomy to states that formulate
public policy in conformity with bureaucratic officials’ own preferences (Nordlinger, 1982, p.15).
I define autonomous rulers as rulers who have the capacity of making decision according to their
own preferences independent of bureaucratic and other elites’. In practice, I operationalize ruler
autonomy with the degree of concentration of power. National rulers are autonomous if their political coalition controls key governing institutions (e.g., Politburo). Local rulers in Chinese context
basically have unchallenged authority in their own jurisdictions, so I measure autonomous leaders
with their fiscal dependence on subjects and on the higher-level government.
It should be noted that the “creative responses” resulting from learning by autonomous leaders
can be either exclusive or inclusive. An important factor that shapes the result of learning is social
grievance. I define social grievance as a feeling of dissatisfaction over self-believed wrongdoings
and unfairness. Such feeling can be expressed in actions including public petitions via officially
sanctioned channels, online complaints, collective protests, demonstrations, riots, strikes, and so
on. However, large-scale social movements and insurgences which contentious politics scholars
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talk about (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015) are relatively rare in China and may be underreported due to
media bias. To measure the level of social grievance more accurately, I use indicators drawn from
both media outlets and user-generated content on the Internet. Online platforms for the public to
express discontent have increasingly become “weapons of the weak” (Scott, 1985), enabling a more
straightforward way of “everyday resistance” in the digital era. Online complaints can be seen as
a subtle form of contention from the lower strata of rural China, providing valuable information
for policymakers. As for researchers, online forums are subject to less censorship than mainstream
media, so they are good complements to traditional news reports. To distinguish these nonviolent
contentions from violent ones, I reserve the term “social unrest” for mass acts in conflictual or violent ways. In this study, I focus on social grievances specifically caused by government intrusion on
land rights, including problems with land ownership, land use, land expropriation and eviction. My
definition of land-related grievances thus does not include farming-related grievances over farmland
contracting, agricultural infrastructures, taxes and fees.

1.4

Research Design

I employ a multilevel mixed methods research design to test the theory. The main research of
interest is land market reform, which has three institutional components: land ownership reform,
land commercialization reform, and the regulatory reform of land market. Each of the three reform
components can be either inclusive or exclusive. In Chinese context, land ownership reform refers
to the legalization of state and collective land ownership. Land commercialization reform is the
legalization of land transactions, in particular the exchanges of state and collective land use rights.
Land regulation reform involves rules for land rights (such as registration and titling), uses (such
as planning and zoning), transactions, finances, and dispute resolution. I specifically examine the
liberalization of land market, which is a key reform agenda of the time.
To explain land market reform in China, this study applies the theory at various levels. First
of all, within-country comparative research allows me to control various confounding factors such
as formal political institutions and legal system. Then, by employing a Bayesian process tracing
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method, I conducted a macro-historical analysis on the origin of land ownership and the process
of land commercialization at the central level. This method allows me to draw inference from
sequential evidence in a within-case analysis. In addition, I carried out a comparative case studies
among three provinces to explain variations in land market regulation. I also compiled and analyzed
a panel data of land-related complaints and protests across Chinese cities, matched with local land
policies and other statistics. Finally, I took advantage of a unique survey data of over 300 countylevel party leaders to test the micro-foundation of the theory.
My qualitative research is based on a careful examination of archives, memoirs, laws, and policy
documents issued by central, provincial, and local governments as well as a 19-month fieldwork,
over a hundred semi-structured interviews with party and government officials, businessmen, scholars, and villagers in eight provinces or municipalities (including Beijing, Guangdong, Guizhou,
Henan, Jiangsu, Shandong, Tianjin, and Zhejiang) between 2015 and 2017.

1.5

Book Structure

In Chapter 2, I propose a macro theory of economic reform built on the microfoundation of political learning. I first critically review existing research on economic reform in the school of rational
choice institutionalism. The review leads me to identify three key variables that explain institutional changes under economic transformation: crisis, mandate, and autonomy. Then I introduce
the “spiral of politics” framework (Smith, 2014), which combines historical and sociological institutionalism, to account for these variables systematically. The framework helps to explain how
institutional contexts shape the governing ideology through political learning, as well as how ideologies and coalitional politics play into institutional reforms. In the following empirical chapters,
I employ the framework to conduct macro-historical analyses of China’s land market reform at the
national level.
In Chapter 3, I provide an overview of China’s land regime, which plays an important role in
the development of state capitalism. I show that the party-state has established a centralized, hierarchical system to manage land as a policy tool to control national economy. I introduce institutions
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that affect the function of China’s land market, especially the land use control system. I also discuss
the distribution of land income and how it gives rise to land disputes.
In Chapter 4, I examine a foundational institution that governs China’s land market: land ownership. I argue that the institutional design of land ownership was learned by the reformist coalition at
the critical juncture following Mao’s death. Reformers were deeply concerned with poor infrastructure in urban areas and social instability in rural areas, which rendered the regime vulnerable in the
Maoist era. To speed up construction quickly, they adopted state ownership in urban area, but they
did not extend it to rural and suburban areas. Instead, they maintained collective land ownership
in rural areas for stability. They also commodified both collective and state-owned land in principle. Based on historical memoirs and quantitative data collected from newspapers, my explanation
challenges the existing argument built upon sectoral capture and predatory state.
In Chapter 5, I examine the reverse trend of land commercialization in the 1990s and the subsequent rise of land use fiscalization. I argue that a coalition of conservative reformers, who became
autonomous leaders after the 1989 political crisis, shifted the central policy paradigm from rural
industrialization to state-led urbanization under the constant threat of macroeconomic instability.
More specifically, they excluded collective land from the urban land market to control inflation, as
land speculation went out of control in an overheating economy. Without resistance from radical
reformers, bureaucrats, and villagers, exclusive land commercialization was institutionalized in a
top-down fashion. Based on interviews and archives, I use this case to demonstrate the necessity of
social grievance. The case also explains why and how China became a champion of state capitalism. My explanation challenge that the conventional view that China’s land regime is designed for
rent-seeking per se. Rather, the fiscalization of land use is an unintended consequence of exclusive
land commercialization in an interaction with other sectoral reforms.
In Chapter 6, I use case studies to explain the variation of land market liberalization since
exclusive land commercialization in the 90s. At the national level, I show why central reforms have
been blocked by policymakers with conservative ideas under a weak leadership. At the subnational
level, I selected Guangdong, Guizhou, and Shandong as three diverse cases to study reform strategy.
By comparing the diverging historical and reform paths of the three cases, I explain how land-
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Table 1.1: Summary of Case Studies
Case
Land ownership reform
Land use commercialization
Shandong’s land market reform
Guizhou’s land experimentation
Guangdong’s land liberalization

Rural grievance
High
Low
High
Low
High

Ruler autonomy
High
High
Low
Low
High

Market reform
Inclusive
Exclusive
Exclusive
Exclusive
Inclusive

related conflicts and political leaders’ autonomy and independence affect land market reform. Both
Guangdong and Shandong are coastal, developed provinces, which allow me to control economic
development in comparison. Guangdong provides a typical case of inclusive market reform, in
which leaders are less tied up with corporate landed interests and more likely to liberalize land
market in reconciling intense conflicts. In contrast, Shandong is a case of exclusive land market
liberalization, where leaders rely on land development for economic growth and manipulate marketoriented policies to strengthen the exclusive land regime. Guizhou is a backward province that has
a low level of land use fiscalization same as Guangdong. Although the barrier to reform is low,
land-related conflicts in Guizhou are not intense enough to make leaders overhaul the existing land
policy, making it a typical example of the exclusive status quo.1
In Chapter 7, I then present a quantitative analysis to examine land market liberalization using
the city-level panel data. I employ event history models to test the theory across over 200 cities.
I find that the intensity of land conflict is positively associated with the probability of land market
liberalization in cities with local leaders who have central or provincial work experience. The
finding is robust under various settings. I also examine the causal mechanism by using a unique
survey of 348 county-level party secretaries, and provide a rare large-scale empirical analysis on
Chinese local leaders.
Finally, in Chapter 8, I conclude with the theory’s generalizability and implications.

1

There are individual cases of subsidizing losers to avoid conflicts, but not pattern. Covered in quantitative
analysis.
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Chapter 2
Political Learning and Economic Reform
Our attempts to impose order simply draws attention to the pervasive disorder. With each passing day, our illusion of order is shattered.
- Kofi Annan, Disorder
The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society,
rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good.
- Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies
The literature of economic transformation has offered many insightful explanations for why and
how market reforms begin and persist. In this chapter, I critically review the relevant literature on
the politics of economic transformation. I then offer a theory of inclusive market reform based on
China’s land market reform: inclusive market reform is implemented by an autonomous leadership
that learns from the unsettled masses.
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2.1
2.1.1

Literature on Politics of Economic Reform
Rational choice institutionalism

Economic transformation is a complex process constrained by interests and institutions.1 In socialist
systems, common constraints are Soviet-style political institutions and bureaucratic interests. State
ownership and bureaucratic coordination is an equilibrium that resists the impact of growing private
economy and market coordination (Kornai, 1990). Since bureaucratic interests are in a position to
control resources, seek rents, and redistribute toward themselves, economic transformation is also
a process involving winners and losers. As Kornai (1986) points out, the inner contradiction of
market reform is “gaining the participation of the very people who will lose a part of their power.”
Most early works of economic reforms, therefore, emphasizes the intentions and actions of
political leadership and bureaucratic apparatus. Public choice theorists in economics and pluralist
theorists in political science advocate the role of technocrats or “technopols,” who are motivated
to make policies in accordance with economic rationality and public morality (Buchanan, Tollison,
and Tullock, 1980; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; A. Krueger, 1974; Truman et al., 1971; Williamson,
1994). They view economic policy making as a political struggle among groups of self-interested individuals to lobby the government for maximizing their share of resources. Public officials introduce
preferential policies to serve interest groups in exchange for electoral support or economic rents. In
this rent-seeking environment, reforms happen only when “broad” economic rationality represented
by technocrats trumps “narrow” political rationality represented by vested interests. However, these
schools have limited explanatory power for the emergence of public-minded technocrats, as the very
foundation of their theories is built upon self-interest.
Starting with the same behavioral assumption of self-interest, rational choice institutionalists,
on the other hand, reject the pluralist theory that treats politicians as the agents of private interests
and the idea that reformers as the agents of public interests are encompassing and benevolent to
all. Instead, they see institutions as the rules of the game (North, 1990) and politicians as rational
1

Mainstream analyses identify six interrelated areas: (1) macroeconomic stabilization, (2) price liberalization, (3) trade liberalization and current account convertibility, (4) enterprise privatization, (5) social safety
net creation, and (6) the development of the institutional and legal framework for market economy (Fischer
and Gelb, 1991).
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actors whose primary concern is to retain public offices or, in other words, to survive in the game of
politics. It must be noted, however, that the strategy of survival is specific to institutional contexts,
which could generate incentives for, and credible commitment to, market-oriented reforms under
certain circumstances. North and Weingast (1989) explain the development of markets in Britain
with political institutions that constrain rulers’ arbitrary behavior, namely representative government, property rights, and rule of law. These self-enforcing institutions resulted from the bargaining
between the Crown which was under the credible threat of removal and the wealth holders who
wanted a greater say in government. In the context of African politics, by contrast, Bates (1981)
explains how politicians under electoral pressure get away with inefficient policies by constantly
engaging in clientelism to reward urban supporters and punish rural opponents. More recently,
Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) argue in Why Nations Fail that inclusive economic and political
institutions contribute the long-term growth, but they have provided little insight on the emergence
of inclusive or exclusive institutions. Taken together, rational choice institutionalists have developed an instrumentalist view toward market reform, i.e., they see it as a tool which can be used
strategically by political leaders to survive in changing societies.
Recent critics of rational choice institutionalists question the endogeneity of institutions. The
general causes of market-oriented institutional reforms given by North (1990) are exogenous changes
in the relative price of factors, such as labor, capital, information and technology, but it is not clear
how these contextual changes are associated with institutional changes by shaping political leaders’
survival strategy. Greif and Laitin (2004) contributes the literature by proposing a theory of endogenous reform based on the concepts of quasi-parameters and self reinforcement. Since institutions
may be endogenous to structural phenomena before the choice of institutions, many scholars trace
deeper causality back in history (Kitschelt, 2003). For example, Kitschelt and Malesky (2000) find
that the choice of presidential democracy in postcommunist countries promotes economic reform
only in clientelist autocracies under transformation. Frye (2010) argues that the partisan preference
of executives interacts with political polarization and democracy to shape economic transformation.
Many rational choice institutionalists have attributed regime change to the ruling elites’ fear of popular mobilization (Boix, 2003; Svolik, 2012; Wood, 2000). There has been extensive research on the

21

political consequences of social movements in democracies (Amenta et al., 2010; Cress and Snow,
2000; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Meyer, 2004; Edwin Schickler and Amenta, 2006; Tilly, 1978).
Scholars of authoritarianism have also generated a large literature of social protests and public policy (Bernstein and Lü, 2003; Y. Cai, 2010; Lorentzen, 2013; O’brien and Li, 2006; Perry, 2002). In
particular, redistributive land reforms have been used by autocrats to resolve social unrest (Albertus
and Kaplan, 2013; Huntington, 1968; Mason, 1998). But up to the present, there are few empirical researches on how social grievances divert political actors’ attention to neglected problems and
change their policy preferences through the learning mechanism.

2.1.2

Historical institutionalism

The creation of political institutions governing market is an issue of political development, which
can be defined as the “durable changes in governing authority” (Orren and Skowronek, 2004). Political development has been methodologically related to historical institutionalism in political science.
Compared to rational choice institutionalists, historical institutionalists “analyze organizational and
institutional configurations where others look at particular settings in isolation; and they pay attention to critical junctures and long-term processes where others look only at slices of time or
short-term maneuvers” (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). By taking time and macro-historical context
seriously, scholars of political development offer explanations for important and substantive questions, such as why certain governing institutions change over time and how they become the way
they are.
An important concept in the literature of historical institutionalism is critical junctures, which
are commonly defined as “relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially
heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest because structural
constraints recede” (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). Following this definition, a major crisis or external shock that generates long-lasting institutional changes can be seen as a critical juncture in
political development. Crises and shocks usually strike suddenly, dismantle ruling coalitions, delegitimize governing institutions, and create new patterns of interaction. These interactions spark
new ideas and reproduce new coalitions, which can then seize the authority to translate new ideas
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into institutional arrangements and political legacies. In addition, scholars argue that the process of
economic transformation is full of uncertainties in both procedures and outcomes of political, economic, and social development (Bunce and Csanadi, 1993). Uncertainty creates not only difficulty
for agencies to articulate their preferences and take strategic actions, but also space for powerful individuals to shape outcomes idiosyncratically. By eliminating counterfactuals in critical junctures,
we can build a causal argument for punctuated institutional changes.
Path dependence, on the other hand, means that institutions are inherently subject to a process of increasing returns in conventional wisdom. This definition suggests that path dependence is
useful in explaining institutional durability and continuity. In recent years, however, scholars have
made a step further by arguing that path dependence is also associated with incremental institutional
change.2 According to this view, path dependence is not a self-reinforcing nature of institutions, but
a contested outcome based on underlying coalitional dynamics. Seeing ambiguity as a permanent
feature of all the rules and institutions, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) argue that incremental institutional change occurs when “problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up space for
actors to implement existing rules in new ways.” More specifically, they conceive that institutions
change endogenously when the “gaps” between the institutional rules and the interpretation or enforcement of the rules are explored by actors in power contestation. Since actors are bounded by the
existing rules, such change is path dependent. Some common types of path-dependent institutional
change are bricolage (Campbell, 2004), conversion (Thelen, 2003), drift (Hacker, 2005), and layering (Eric Schickler, 2001). Path dependence suggests that, in the case of economic transformation,
remnants from the state socialism such as ideologies and institutions still play important roles in
post-revolutionary reforms.
2

The view has its root in Marxist theory, which treats organizational structures as power systems created
to maximize control. It is similar to the dynamic perspective of organization studies by Pfeffer (1981), which
rejects the existence of a preexisting organization goal and sees it as a by-product of power struggle or a
preferred outcome of the winning coalition.
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2.1.3

Eclectic institutionalism

My theory takes the approach of analytic eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010) and draws research traditions from sociological, historical and rational choice institutionalism (Hall and Taylor,
1996). Combining elements from the three schools of new institutionalism allows me to incorporate
rational agencies, structural constraints, and ideas into a theoretical framework to study endogenous
reform. Traditionally historical institutionalists focus on the overarching context and the interacting processes that shape politics, but some scholars of American political development have argued
that interpretive studies of ideas must be part of historical institutionalism (Lieberman, 2002; Orren
and Skowronek, 2004; Smith, 2006). This intellectual move is an attempt to combine sociological
and historical institutionalism into something new, while recognizing the role of rational agency.
In contrast to rational choice theorists, sociological institutionalists view institutional changes as
cultural practices that enhance the legitimacy of the organization. Accordingly, individuals in an
organization do not seek for maximizing their material interests, but for expressing their identity
in socially appropriate manners. Until recently, the concept of ideas has been largely absent from
political economic theories. Rodrik (2014) argues that ideas that the ruling elites have about the
range of strategies available to them, including policies, actions, coalitions, and so on, determine
the set of maximal economic outcomes achievable by the elites. Innovative ideas, he argues, can
relax political constraints and advance reforms that benefit the elites who previously block them.
In this study, I choose to be agnostic to the ontological and epistemological differences between
the schools of new institutionalism. Particularly, I do not choose side between the interest-based or
culture-based explanation of political actors’ preferences over governing ideology.
To make a case for ideas as a key element in political development, Smith (2014) develops a
general framework named “the spiral of politics,” a heuristic model that helps us understand how
politics work. In the first stage, political developments take place in pre-structured environments
that include intersecting contexts shaping human behaviors (i.e., physical conditions, institutions,
practices, and ideas). In the second stage, these contexts shape political actors’ ideas, including their
identities, ideologies, philosophies of the world, and conceptions of interests. Political actors may
inherit pre-existing ideas or reinvent inherited conceptions in response to conflicts, thereby creating
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both opportunities and constraints for building coalitions and mobilizing public support. These
coalitions, then enter the third stage of the spiral of politics, organize in political parties, social
movements, or special interest groups, etc., and compete against each other to capture governing
institutions (i.e., legislatures, executives, courts). Next, winning coalitions may strengthen, modify,
or terminate institutions and policies in the fourth stage. All these changes will then transform
contexts in the fifth stage, which, in turn, generate a new set of ideas in the sixth stage, restarting
a new sequence of political development in a repeated fashion, but with new ideas, new coalitions,
and new policies, leading to new contexts. The “spiral of politics” framework incorporates both
exogenous and endogenous institutional changes, which we can analyze using critical juncture and
path dependence, respectively.
In the process of acquiring new consensual ideas, learning takes place either in critical junctures or in the form of path dependence. Conventional wisdom considers learning a mechanism of
institutional stability. Pierson (2004) argues that “actors in high complexity filter information from
environment into existing mental maps. In other words, they incorporated confirming information,
which generates positive feedback.” This feedback loop may keep rulers from correcting obvious
policy mistakes or failures, as many historical institutionalists focus on the negative impact of path
dependence on institutional change. However, I argue that confirmation tendency may also bind
rulers to precedent mandates, motivating them to notice neglected problems and change deviated
policies in unexpected ways that still generate increasing returns to the mandates. A notable example is Abraham Lincoln, who was among the first to reinterpret American constitutionalism to
advance the anti-slavery agenda by associating it with the Declaration of Independence and natural
rights philosophy (Armitage, 2002).
Learning in critical junctures usually happens when a major crisis, such as hyperinflation, military defeat, regime change or some catastrophe, destroys incumbent coalition and generates a new
one.3 Conventional wisdom associates learning from crises with inclusive reforms. According to
Olson (1982), the formation of special interest groups in a liberal-democratic society will generate
exclusive institutions that accumulate their power and rent-seeking opportunities, leading to a de3

It is possible that exogenous shocks may be endogenous in nature, for crises may also be deliberately
provoked by political entrepreneurs to remove the political logjam to reform.
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cline in social flexibility and growth prospect, and crises can undermine the existing institutional
sclerosis. Moreover, Luong and Weinthal (2004) argue that the Asian financial crisis provided impetus for economic reform in Russia because it generated a widely shared perception among the
government officials and the oligarchs concerning the mutual benefits of cooperation.4 However, as
Hirschman (1973) argues, new leaders who attempt to dissociate themselves from the predecessors
after a major crisis may also disregard the positive accomplishments of the previous regime. That
is, crises are likely to introduce irrational elements into the process learning.
It should be noted that learning also requires certain characteristics from agency. Campbell
(2004) argues that agents of change are those actors located near the boundary of social networks,
organizational fields, or institutions with external ties. Therefore, access to additional resources
beyond immediate environment makes actors more likely to develop a repertoire of new ideas and
skills. Furthermore, not only do agents of learning need to have access to new resources, they must
also have discretion to utilize these resources and power to overcome vested interests (Mahoney and
Thelen, 2010). That is, relative autonomy may facilitate learning. While high autonomy may lead to
undesirable outcomes (Fukuyama, 2013), certain autonomy is necessary for significant institutional
reforms.

2.2

Theory in Action

2.2.1

Agency and rationality

2.2.1.1

Contentious citizens

Due to the institutionalized rural-urban divide, I categorize Chinese citizens in two groups: urban
residents and rural (or suburban) villagers. Scholars have argued that urbanites pose a serious threat
to the regime because their proximity to each other and the public office, or high population density,
increases the probability of collective action. Urban unrest may be caused by a number of things
4

While scholars usually consider crises as a catalyst for reforms (A. O. Krueger, 1993; Nelson, 1993;
Rodrik, 2014; Rosser, 2013), Brooks and Kurtz (2007) provide a contrary view and argue that economic
crisis may also impede the enactment of reforms if political actors do not anticipate immediate improvements
in economic conditions as a result of liberalization.
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like corruption, hyperinflation, shortages, unemployment, or poor public service. Therefore, rulers
may choose urban-biased policies to reduce the possibility of urban threat at the expense of rural
villagers (Wallace, 2014).
However, urban bias may stimulate rural unrest, which could also pose threat to the regime.
Throughout Chinese history, peasantry has been a constant destabilizing force. Even in the age of
industrialization, villagers in extreme poverty or against collectivization were considered as a major
threat by Mao and other central leaders. In the reform era, villagers in suburban areas gradually
developed an expectation for monetary gain from land, especially after receiving price signals from
emerging land markets around cities. But to lower the cost of urbanization and industrialization,
local state actors usually take villagers’ collective land by force, without sharing land revenues
properly with villagers.
An early example of land conflicts happened as early as the fall of 1984. The death of an
ordinary villager in Hebei province resulted in a decade-long petition that brought down a provincial
leader. The incident took place when the Xidingfu township in Sanhe County decided to expand
its brick factory by occupying 121 mu land of Baizhuang East Village. Most of the requisitioned
land was owned by the first team of the village. Reckoning that the township government did not
get legal permission for land requisition, a villager named Rong Dianhong organized petitions to
protect collective interests. They sent letters to higher level governments and made visits to Beijing
multiple times. The county officials initially agreed to compensate farmers 200 yuan per mu every
year under the pressure from above. Unfortunately, the county officials did not keep their promise.
Receiving no payment, angry villagers shut down the brick factory. Some villagers confronted
the local police and got arrested for violating the law. Among these villagers who resisted was
Rong, who was found dead under police custody. The official announcement given by the county
and provincial government was that Rong killed himself with pesticide. Rong’s wife and sons
were not convinced, however, because the officials did not allow them to see the corpse nor could
they explain the existence of pesticide in the police office. During the next decade, Rong’s family
repeatedly went to petitions in front of Zhongnanhai (i.e., the central leaders’ compound) and at the
Tiananmen Square. The county government eventually charged them for disrupting social order,
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and the county court sentenced them to two years in prison. Despite voluntary help from famous
lawyers, they lost appeals in both the city court and the provincial court. Their case was picked by
the Supreme People’s Court in 1989, after sympathetic reporters in Beijing sent internal reports to
the national leaders in charge of political and legal affairs (i.e. Qiao Shi and Ren Jianxin) and urged
for intervention. The conviction was overruled by the Supreme Court and the General Office of the
CCP commanded the then party secretary of Hebei, Xing Chongzhi, to implement the decision, but
Hebei officials refused to implement the order. It was not until the spring of 1994, after the removal
of Xing as the provincial secretary, that Rong’s family received final vindication, including a formal
apology from the city court and nominal compensation (less than forty thousand RMB) for their
loss during the past decade.
The tragedy of Rong’s family reflects the repressive side of Chinese developmental state. Land
is the most important asset for villagers and source of living. Once losing their lands, villagers
usually lack the ability to find decent jobs in urban areas. Since their interest is in conflict with
the government’s, villagers’ best strategy is to maximize compensation in a one-shot deal from
land requisition or expropriation. But according to statistics, over 95% of land rents was taken by
the state and real estate firms (Gan, 2014). Land issue became highly contentious when villagers
feel relatively deprived (Gurr, 1970). Land conflicts also emerge when corrupt village leaders, in
collusion with local state officials, misappropriated land compensation for private gains. Villagers
have limited resources to air their grievances aside from protests or petitions, as the judiciary has no
authority to review the administrative decision of land expropriation (Pils, 2009). In cases involving
compensation and eviction, villagers have little chance to win because courts and judges are not
independent from local governments.

2.2.1.2

Bureaucratic and real estate elites

State bureaucrats have been the strongest vested interests of China’s land regime. Under the command economy, Marxist ideologues in power did not regard land as a commodity, so the state
bureaucracies directly controlled land allocation and opposed land commodification. During the
reform era, the CCP leaders relaxed ideological constraints, replacing bureaucratic allocation with
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market coordination in many sectors. But bureaucrats still controlled land through state ownership
and regulations, thereby enjoying plenty of opportunities of extracting land rents. Land rents have
been an important source to fund infrastructure and urbanization and to pay the wages and bonuses
of civil servants. In an informal interview in Guizhou, a provincial land bureaucrat challenged me to
think that China would not develop so fast without the massive amount of land revenues captured by
the state (Interview GZ20161209). In another private occasion during my second visit to Guizhou,
a county-level land bureaucrat told me that every time the city government find it difficult to pay
year-end bonus, the land bureau will receive an order to put two plots of land on sale (Interview
GZ20171112).
According to these interviews, it is not unreasonable to assume that bureaucratic elites in the
reform era are net revenue maximizers (Levi, 1989; North, 1981; Olson, 1993). To achieve their
revenue-maximizing goal, many local officials monopolize urban land supply, restrict land conversion, and pay land compensation fees at the minimum level. Local officials in tax, finance,
construction, and urban planning all benefit from the development of state-owned land. Although
some departments in the state bureaucracy (e.g., land administration) gained more power from the
reform, leading to some internal conflicts, bureaucratic elites in general opposed a complete land
market reform, including privatization and commercialization.1 Under the current land regime, a
conventional urban development cycle runs as follows. Officials first attract manufacturers with
cheap industrial land. Then, with the industrial sector taking off, officials can lease commercial and
residential land to real estate developers at a high profit margin, all the while collecting tax revenues
from business and services to make up the cost of developing industrial parks.
Property developers are another group of vested interests. Before the market reform, real estate
firms were the units of local state construction agencies, getting land for free from local governments. During the reform era, these firms were separated from the government, given more autonomy, and even privatized. Driven by the goal of maximizing profits, real estate firms generally prefer
1
The local land bureaucrats’ preference is more complicated, however, since land bureaus in cities or
counties are under the dual leadership of the local government and the provincial land bureau. They have two
goals to achieve simultaneously, namely, having sufficient urban land supply for new investment and protecting land resources (especially prime farmland) from natural or human damages. Given the state monopoly in
urban areas, these goals are not inconsistent with the ultimate goal of revenue-maximization.
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dealing with the local government over dealing with villagers. Developers believe that the government has more credibility than villagers who sometimes do not honor contracts. For instance, a new
village leadership may refuse to recognize the contract signed by the previous leadership, putting
developers in a disadvantaged position. In addition, developers are pleased that the government
could use legitimate violence to expropriate land, so that they would not need to deal with individual villagers themselves. Without state intervention and surcharges, real estate firms could acquire
land parcels at cheaper prices, albeit not necessarily with greater profits for they would pay more to
villagers. As an executive of a state-owned real estate corporation told me, he felt sorry for the state
land monopoly and high housing prices, but he could only live with it. Another manager told me
that he would take the land parcel no matter who owns it as long as its location is good. In short,
property developers are part of the vested interests, although not as stubborn as state bureaucrats.

2.2.1.3

Political leaders

Existing explanations for China’s economic reform have long focused on institutions that shape
central-local relations. Some of the pertinent examples are fiscal federalism (Montinola, Qian, and
Weingast, 1995), market-preserving federalism (Qian and Weingast, 1997), and regional decentralization (Chenggang Xu, 2011). However, I contend that these institutional arrangements are
endogenous to political leaders’ survival strategy, which is linked to the pre-existing context. As
Shirk (1993) argues, fiscal decentralization is the consequence of central reformers’ strategy to
build political support, namely “playing to the provinces.” Without understanding political leaders’
preference and strategy, our analysis of economic reform is incomplete.
I assume that Chinese political leaders are politicians who attempt to maximize career success
(Geddes, 1994; Schumpeter, 1942). That is, they need to deliver economic development while
maintaining social order. This assumption applies to central, provincial, and local leaders. Each
national leadership in the post-Mao era emphasizes both goals, which are institutionalized in China’s
cadre evaluation system to constrain the behavior of subnational leaders.
Growth and stability are two interactive variables, that is, they can be either mutually reinforcing or undermining. While growth may strengthen stability and political support by creating jobs
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and revenues, distorted, predatory growth may intensify social conflicts, which in turn weaken the
regime’s legitimacy or individual leaders’ promotion prospect. Scholars have argued that failures
of keeping social stability could cost local leaders jobs or promotion opportunities (Y. Wang and
Minzner, 2015; S. Whiting, 2004). During a focus group discussion in the course of my field
research, some county leaders made a joke that there had been so much pressure from above on
economic growth and social stability that they would rather be punished for doing nothing.
Political leaders are dependent on bureaucrats and real estate developers to generate growth
and revenue. To win their support, leaders grant them rent-seeking opportunities for manipulating the land market, which essentially creates a broad state-business alliance. This coalition is not
self-reinforcing, however, especially if villagers as collective landowners are protesting. In such
cases, leaders could opt for persuasion, repression, or cooptation (inclusive or exclusive reform).
Career-maximizing politicians must achieve economic development and social stability simultaneously. Since much of the social stability risks caused by economic growth comes from urban land
development, they must find a balance between villagers and elites. We may expect that political
leaders who are more autonomous and less dependent on local bureaucratic or business elites to be
more likely to adopt inclusive reform measures through learning mechanism.

2.2.2

Structure and constraint

An important constraint over contentious villagers in China is collective institutions. Although collectivism has been weakened substantially during the reform era, collective land ownership in the
rural and suburban areas offers villagers a legal basis to claim land rights and frame their resistance.
In places where clan influence is historically strong, village collectives inherited traditional identities, internal structures, and physical assets. These collectives are not just empty shells but, rather,
functional organizations that can mobilize villagers. L. L. Tsai (2007) finds that kinships and clans
are encompassing and embedding solidary groups that help local public goods provision.2 Although
Mattingly (2016) warns that clan leaders may be captured by local state actors to repress ordinary
villagers in the short term, shared collective identities still have significant impact on villagers.
2

For clans and resistance, see a detailed case study by Bandurski (2016).
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When litigation, petition, media, and protest prove futile, unsettled villagers may choose extreme
measures. Violence like riot and self-immolation then becomes the last resort for hopeless villagers.
An interviewee in Guangzhou explained to me once how his villagers fought against corrupt officials and collective leaders who stole their landed assets. After a long and sincere conversation over
dinner, he said one sentence in his private car that still gives me the creeps, “sometimes I just want
to kill someone, so that I can get a trial and tell the world what I have been through” (Interview,
GD20160324).
As for bureaucratic and business elites, they face political constraints, most directly from local
political leaders. However, political leaders may be subordinated to powerful groups with concentrated interests in the status quo (Huntington, 1968). Special interest groups that have benefited from
economic liberalization (e.g., private sectors, mobile capital, international neoliberal organizations,
and etc.) may capture authoritarian politicians to adopt policies that keep expanding markets (Frye,
2007; Rosser, 2013). But, as many scholars note, there is little evidence that economic reforms
are initiated in response to pressure groups (Bates and A. Krueger, 1993). An important factor that
shields rulers from special interest groups is autonomy (Evans, 1995). Autonomy may come from
capacity of generating independent revenue from lands and natural resources (Kiser, Drass, and
Brustein, 1995), state capacity of resolving external threat or domestic conflict (O’Donnell, 1978;
Fukuyama, 2013), organizational capacity of increasing efficiency and reputation of professionalism (Carpenter, 2001), and political mandates such as national security (Dower, 1990; Waswo,
1996; Cummings, 1998), public support (Frye and Mansfield, 2004; Nelson, 1993, p.436), regime
legitimacy (Weber, 1958), and party’s platform (Aldrich, 1995).
For authoritarian rulers who are not constrained by competitive elections and veto players (Tsebelis, 2002), they are still constrained by political mandate and ideology. They need legitimation
to effectively eliminate threats from the masses and elites.3 The lack of procedural legitimacy may
compel authoritarian rulers to seek other sources of legitimacy. Based on performance legitimacy
3
In autocracies, mandates are more implicit and subject to less popular pressure. Without a direct mandate
from the public, governing elites may be less committed to reform. This is best illustrated by the case of
gradual market reforms in Hungary and Poland, the failure of which was due to the lack of commitment to
comprehensive price liberalization and the unwillingness of the political leadership to yield to the market the
determining influence in resource allocation (Wolf, 1991).
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achieved through economic reforms and effective governance, they can silence opposition and establish a credible commitment to markets by “setting a precedent of ‘responsible behavior’” (North
and Weingast, 1989). Such commitment may evolve into a general perception of belief about the
regime, which serves as the basis of mandate for performance commanded by the selectorate. A critical instrument to create this consensual knowledge is a centralized political party, which is capable
of providing partisan officials with resources (e.g., money, staff, and rhetoric support) to mobilize
their supporters. Many political economists who study federalism argue that a centralized political party can incentivize local officials to internalize interjurisdictional externalities and parochial
interests in policymaking process, subject them to party discipline, or reward them with chances
to higher positions (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Gennaioli
and Rainer, 2007; Y. Huang and Sheng, 2009; Kochar, K. Singh, and S. Singh, 2009; Riker, 1964;
Véron et al., 2006). Studies of authoritarian parties suggest that certain organizational features of
political parties, such as patron-client relations, generate career incentives for ambitious politicians
to demonstrate loyalty to central leaders at the expense of local interests (D. L. Yang, H. Xu, and
Tao, 2014).
So, who are autonomous leaders in China? I first argue that central leaders are expected to be
more autonomous to special interest groups than local leaders in general. Scholars have argued that
national politicians are less subject to capture since they have greater power to solicit the compliance of local political and economic agents than local politicians (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000).
However, a complication arises to the effect that national politicians can be captured by national
bureaucrats and business. Reform-oriented politicians find their “creative response” opposed by
powerful nation-wide interest groups. They find it difficult to discredit or delegitimize the previous
regime, which has yielded positive results in the past and vested interests. Ideological escalation
and the politicization of policy issues may further delay reform. Because of the foregoing issues, it
is necessary for reformers to build new coalitions, consolidate power, and secure key governing positions before realizing their reform goals. This is particularly the case since significant institutional
change at the national level only takes place when national leaders control governing institutions.
Autonomous leadership also exists at local levels as economic structure may affect local lead-
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ers’ policy preference. If the local government has a large tax base and low fiscal dependence on
land, then the leaders would have less difficulty to shift land policy towards the market because the
reform would not seriously damage the economy and their career prospect. In addition, the political
structure of CCP’s authoritarian rule is characterized as hierarchical, with a high concentration of
power at each level. Political leaders have the authority to make local policies, to decide personnel
arrangement at the lower level, and to distribute particularistic benefits, such as political protection,
policy favors, fiscal transfer, and bank loans. Therefore, those politicians who have a cozy relationship with higher level officials close to the central power are more likely to be autonomous and
independent from local bureaucrats and business as they have access to resources from above as an
alternative to support from below.4

2.2.3

Learning to reform

Using the “spiral of politics” framework, I assume that in each spiral of political development political actors share the same first-order preference, which is survival in politics. But, they may develop
different second-order preference (i.e., governing ideology) and third-order preference (e.g., land
policies). These preferences over ideology and specific land policies are shaped by different interpretations of the existing context. When facing sustained social grievance, leaders formulate
or reproduce governing ideologies from pre-existing ambiguous mandates to redefine the goals of
governance (e.g., market-oriented or state-led, centralization or decentralization, efficiency or equity, etc.).5 More specifically, performance legitimacy as a mandate provides the implicit script for
political actors to interpret and respond to social grievance.
Once governing ideologies and policy alternatives are expressed in discourse, different ideas
compete against each other in persuading the masses and coordinating the elites into coalitions. I
4

Remmer and Wibbels (2000) find that subnational governments in Argentina controlled by the party in
power at the national level are more likely to cooperate with national government than others. In nondemocratic countries like China, informal patronage network within the CCP plays a similar role as party politics
in democracies. For further readings about Chinese elite networks, see (J. Jiang, 2017; Shih, Adolph, and
Liu, 2012; D. L. Yang, H. Xu, and Tao, 2014)
5
Leaders refer to political elites with relative more power (resource or autonomy) than the common political elites. They are not necessarily the creator of the governing ideology, but they play an important role in
formulating and expressing the idea.
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hold that political actors’ preferences are fixed in making strategic calculation and interaction with
others. In this way, we can analyze power struggle using rational choice theory and economical
methods. A ruling coalition will emerge when a group of political elites acquire sufficient governing
authorities, then we are more likely to observe significant institutional reform. The new institution
interacts with other institutions in ways that historical-institutionalism identifies (e.g., critical juncture and path dependence), generating intended and unintended consequences. These consequences
include significant changes of political actors’ preferences and behaviors. As some preferences and
behaviors become conventional, the sequence of political developments enter a new spiral, where
political actors modify the existing governing ideology into new ones through learning.
In any given spiral, when citizens’ goal of maximizing returns on land is in conflict with the
elites’ goal of maximizing land control or revenue (e.g., rising cost of land for construction or
delayed land development), political leaders’ first reaction is usually repression. But an undesirable
outcome of repression is the intensification of conflicts with well-organized citizens, which could
eventually hurt their political careers and regime legitimacy. Political leaders may also adapt to
rising conflicts through cooptation, such as regularizing the local practice of land requisition and
expropriation, setting higher standards for land compensation, and offering better conditions to
protesters in general. These adaptive solutions may be effective as long as political leaders can
satisfy citizens’ material demands. However, adaptation does not involve changes to policy goals,
thus cannot solve the fundamental problems of land conflicts. For example, under socialist planned
economy, the state may retreat from radical collectivization or nationalization program, but would
not give it up as the end goal. In the reform era, there is a general lack of consensus with regard
to the market being the most desirable coordination mechanism.6 The instrumentalist view of the
market leads to exclusive reforms that allow politicians to manipulate land markets and privilege
rent-seeking elites over ordinary villagers. Rulers captured by bureaucratic and business elites are
more likely to adapt to social grievances with these exclusive measures rather than learn to push for
inclusive reforms.
6
On the one hand, land is conceived as the last safe haven for villagers migrating to urban areas and
should not be commercialized. One the other, market in general is perceived by political leaders as merely an
instrument to facilitate the more efficient realization of the state’s priorities (Wolf, 1991).
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When recurring land conflicts pose threat to political leaders by changing the general perception
of existing political order, we may observe inclusive land market reforms. These reforms are the
result of active learning from autonomous leaders. To legitimize their rule and garner popular
support, political leaders would absorb experiences from local experimentation, arguments from
scholars, and opinions from technocratic bureaucrats, policy entrepreneurs, and policy communities.
With more accessible information and resources, national leaders would learn new ideas and policy
instruments, leading the paradigm change of land regime. Local leaders have less time to engage
in learning, but some are empowered by the ruling party as agents with more discretion. These
autonomous local leaders are less likely to misunderstand central leaders under uncertainty, less
likely to be captured by local special interests, and more likely to follow central reform agenda.
Meanwhile, local leaders who have encountered more land conflicts at work are more likely to have
negative view towards the exclusive land regime and support inclusive land market reforms. The
combination of political autonomy and social grievance makes inclusive market reform possible.
Without experiencing land conflicts, on the contrary, autonomous leaders may learn from previous
or potential crises and other challenges to pursue exclusive market reforms.
Applying the theory to China’s land market reform, I explain three significant institutional reforms in the post-Mao era. These reforms are connected in spirals as shown in Figure 2.1. First,
the inner spiral stands for land ownership reform and initial land commercialization reform. It
highlights the broad ideological change from class struggle to economic development in the critical
juncture after Mao’s impending death. This change was made possible by radical reformers who
learned from people’s grievances and resistance to collectivization in extremely poor rural areas.
They adopted inclusive measures to facilitate administrative decentralization and rural industrialization after taking governing authority from ultra-left Maoists. But they were still constrained by
the idea of rural-urban divide, so land ownership was only partially modified to serve the purpose
of urban construction, agricultural production, and rural stability. In the second spiral, nascent land
market interacted with partially reformed state sectors and path-dependent collective institutions,
creating problems of macroeconomic instability in a fast-growing economy. Conservative reformers, who rose to power after pushing out radical reformers, learned from the 1989 regime crisis
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(i.e., another critical juncture) and shifted the policy paradigm to state-led development focusing on
economic efficiency, regulation, and urbanization. This new governing ideology cleared the way for
exclusive land market reform. But an unintended consequence of exclusive land commercialization
was rampant rent-seeking behavior in the form of land use fiscalization, which caused widespread
land disputes. Finally, the third and outer spiral represents land market liberalization, a significant
change to China’s land regime in recent years. The liberalization reform was an important part
of populist leaders’ redistributive agenda of reducing rural-urban divide. But the reform has been
blocked at the central level due to weak leadership and resisted fiercely by local officials, who gained
most from the existing land regime. However, I find some local leaders with relative autonomy pursued land market liberalization in response to people’s grievances about unfairness in state-led land
development. As a pro-poor coalition continues to formulate, the changing strategy to inclusive land
market reform is a result of political learning by autonomous leaders from recurring land conflicts.
In sum, I posit that China’s land market reform is a process of learning by autonomous leaders.

2.3

Summary

In this chapter, I critically review the intellectual lineage of my theory in the literature of economic
transformation. I focus on rational choice and historical institutionalism, and combine them under
the concept of learning. I then examine the preference of actors in the context of China’s land market
reform as well as the structural constraints they are facing. Building on these analyses, I present
an integrated explanation for inclusive and exclusive land market reform in China. In the following
chapters, I will provide evidence for this theory from three aspects of China’s land market reform:
land ownership, land commercialization, and land market liberalization. Before getting into case
studies, I will briefly introduce China’s land regime in the next chapter.
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Figure 2.1: Spiral of Politics in China’s Land Market Reform
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Chapter 3
China’s Land Regime
For most part of the Maoist era, China’s land regime was highly fragmented. In the early days of
PRC, there was a national land bureau responsible for land-related affairs such as surveying, registries, titling, requisition, taxation, and dispute adjudication. But amid political chaos afterwards,
the agency was dissolved into pieces. Since the late 1950s, the agricultural ministry administered
agricultural land; sectoral authorities managed urban land for their own use; construction commissions handled land requisition for urban projects (Ho and G. C. Lin, 2003). As for the specific use of
land, local governments and rural collectives make decisions for urban and rural land, respectively,
allocating land with no term limit and free of charge.
In the post-Mao reform era, central leaders have made significant changes to the land regime in
adaptation to a market economy. They commercialized land use, created land markets, and established a centralized, hierarchical system to control land use and regulate land markets. However,
this market-conforming superstructure was built on top of an essential institution that has not been
changed since the Maoist era: the rural-urban divide. As local governments become the de facto
owner of urban land, rural land remains under the ownership of villagers’ collectives. The dual land
ownership serves as an institutional foundation of the land regime that structurally discriminates
against collective land in urban development, limits villagers’ collective land rights, and denies collectives’ access to urban land market. In this chapter, I will introduce the institutional context of
land in the reform era to lay out a common ground for later discussion. After a brief overview of the
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evolution of land institutions, I will highlight three aspects of the land regime that are most relevant
to the theme: land use control system, urban land market,1 and land income distribution.

3.1

Land Regime under Reform: Centralization and Commercialization

Since the mid-80s, central reformers have begun to recognize the defects of fragmented land regime
in the Maoist era. Because the users of urban land were the administers of the land, they usually
demanded more land than needed, leading to wasteful and inefficient use of land for construction.
From 1961 to 1981, arable land declined from 0.155 hectares per person to 0.097.1 Although agricultural land area expanded after the privatization of land use, it shrank again with the rise of rural
industry. In 1984, the central government allowed townships and villages to develop rural enterprises (township and village enterprises or TVEs) to absorb surplus labor freed from agricultural
production. Since then, thousands of rural enterprises were established across the country, converting even more agricultural land for factories and non-agricultural uses. Rural industrialization
further reduced farmers’ willingness to produce grains, leading to a drastic slowdown of agricultural
output from 13% annual growth rate in 1984 to 2% in 1985.
To stop the decline of agricultural growth and farmland area, central leaders came up with the
solution of centralizing control over land use. The Land Administration Law (LAL) enacted in June
1986 provides the first legal framework for land use management. It stipulates rules about land
rights, land utilization plan, state-owned land for construction, and collective land for construction
(Cheng and Tsang). Two months after its promulgation, a national agency – State Land Administration (SLA) – was established, as well as subnational land bureaus and offices down to the township
level. The establishment of SLA signifies that the power of land requisition, which had been shared
by sectoral line departments, was concentrated in the new agency. SLA’s core mission was to preserve cultivated land and to ensure the rational use of land. To achieve the goals, SLA began to
1

Farmland market is not under consideration in this study because there has been few excessive state
restrictions on the market transactions of collective land for agriculture.
1
See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.ARBL.HA?locations=CN. Last visited: 2019/2/3.
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develop a comprehensive land cadastral system in both rural and urban areas. Meanwhile, it created
legal disciplines to protect farmland and economic incentives to improve land use efficiency. In the
late 1980s, SLA successfully pressured the State Council to establish prime farmland protection
areas, impose tax on land conversion, and create a land lease market.
Introducing market mechanism to restrain wasteful use of land was a controversial decision
under communist ideology. In the early post-Mao period, all kinds of land transaction were prohibited by the constitution and 1986 LAL. But in practice, the government has been charging foreign
investors for land use since 1979. As ideological constraints gradually relaxed, Shenzhen special
economic zones and other coastal cities began to collect land use fees to accumulate capital much
needed for urban construction. Central leaders then realized that a functioning land market could
not only improve land use efficiency, but also accelerate urbanization and industrialization.
In 1987, central leaders decided to borrow Hong Kong’s model of land lease sale and permitted
the transfer of urban state-owned land use rights (LURs) in Shenzhen (China land 2006). This
experiment of commercializing LURs quickly spread to other cities and became institutionalized in
the 1988 constitutional amendment. The LAL was also amended in 1988, saying that “[T]he right to
the use of state-owned land and collectively own land may be transferred in accordance with law.”
This change is so significant that scholars have called it “the second land reform” in China (M.
Rithmire, 2015). It separates LURs from land ownership rights, and thus fostered the development
of land use markets. Since then, land was not merely a scarce resource or means of production, but
also an asset that can be capitalized by state and collective landowners.
However, the trend of land commercialization was partially reversed by central leaders to strengthen
centralized control over land use. In May 1990, the State Council issued the regulation on the conveyance and transfer of state-owned LURs, but did not address rural collective LURs. The lack of
regulation later turned into restriction. In 1993, the central leaders decided to inhibit market transactions of collective land for urban construction.2 This policy was institutionalized in the 1998 LAL,
a landmark legislation in the reform era that redefined China’s land regime and even trajectory of
economic reform. In the following section, I will discuss an essential institution of the 1998 LAL:
2

Market transactions of collective agricultural land are allowed and even encouraged in some areas for
the economies of scale.
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Land use control system.

3.2

Land Use Control System

The 1988 LAL stipulates land use regulations, but it lacked an effective policy instrument to enforce
these regulations. In the spirit of protecting scarce cultivated land and improving land use efficiency,
the 1998 LAL introduced the overall land utilization plan (OLUP), which is a long-term plan that
arranges how land shall be used. According to the OLUP, land is categorized into three kinds:
agricultural land, land for construction, and unutilized land. With land-use in juxtaposition with
land ownership, we have six types of land in China. For the purpose of this study, I will only discuss
collective agricultural land, collective land for construction, and state-owned land for construction.
Collectively owned agricultural land, as an input of agricultural production, is owned by rural
collectives and contracted to rural households under the rules stipulated in the Rural Land Contract
Law issued in 2002.1 The land contract rights allow rural households to use collective contracted
land for agricultural production, to dispose agricultural products, and to claim the income generated
on the land. They can also transfer the right to use their contracted lands to other individuals and
organizations. However, they as collective landowners do not have the same property rights over
collective land as the state land owners. Particularly, they do not have the right to convert or develop
agricultural land they collectively own for urban construction purposes.
The conversion of agricultural land to land for construction is rigidly restricted by the state. Unlike land use plans in many other countries, the OLUP assigns a mandatory cap on the total amount
of agricultural land that can be converted to land for construction during a fixed term. In practice,
land conversion requires the administrative approval of the prefectural government or above in accordance with the OLUP as well as the annual land utilization plan (ALUP). ALUP is a hierarchical,
centralized land-use control system, which allocates land-use quotas annually to subnational governments to implement the cap of land conversion in the OLUP. Each year, lower-level governments
1

Agricultural land is also administered by other state agencies depending on its use. For instance, farmland
is administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, and forest land is administered by the National Bureau of
Forestry.
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apply for the quotas of additional land for construction for the next year to the higher-level governments all the way up to the MLR. After the national data is compiled, MLR coordinates the quotas
across regions and distributes annual caps in the ALUP downwards to provinces, which then divide
and distribute the quotas to prefectures, counties, and finally townships. Any land conversion must
be in compliance with the OLUP and under the limit of the authorized cap in the ALUP.2
The next important thing about land use control system is that, depending on its use, collective
agricultural land can be converted to collective or state-owned land for construction. According to
the Article 43 of the 1998 LAL, “all units and individuals that need land for construction must, in
accordance with law, apply for the use of state-owned land, except for building township or village
enterprises, villagers’ residential buildings, or public utilities of townships (towns) and villages.” If
a construction project is planned to be built on collective land for the purposes such as rural enterprises, villagers’ houses, and village schools, then collective land ownership may not be changed.
However, if a construction project on collective land involves industrial, commercial, or residential
development, then the land shall be expropriated by the local government under the authorization
of the State Council or the provincial government.
The Article 43 essentially deprives villagers’ right to develop collective land, so that the local
government can become the sole supplier of urban land for construction. City or county officials
have certain administrative power to approve specific requests for using state-owned or collective
land for construction. But they are constrained by the central or provincial government, which has
the authority of approving OLUP, land conversion, and land expropriation. For many local officials
in developed areas, insufficient quota of land for construction and long waiting time for administrative approval are big problems, which slowdown economic growth. My fieldwork suggests it is
very common for city or county governments to get a construction project going without getting
the approval of land conversion and expropriation. Such behavior often causes land conflicts with
villagers, who were denied land developmental right and access to urban land market.
2
Besides, 1998 LAL requires users of converted land to take the responsibility for the reclamation of an
equal amount of land with equal quality. Subnational governments are required to ensure the total amount of
cultivated land is not reduced within their own jurisdictions.
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3.3

Land Markets

In addition to restrictions on the use of collective land for construction, the 1998 LAL also has
restrictive regulations on the circulation of collective land use rights. According to the Article 63,
collective LURs are not allowed to be conveyed, transferred, or leased for non-agricultural purposes,
unless enterprises that have lawfully obtained land for construction in conformity with the OLUP
have to transfer the collective LURs because of bankruptcy, merging, or other reasons. Since most
township and village enterprises have been bankrupted or privatized since the 90s, the rule basically
illegalizes any kind of market transactions regarding collective land for construction. However,
the elusive wording of the Article 63 does allow space for policy and institutional innovations.
In particular, “other reasons” stimulated some local experiments to test the boundaries of legal
restrictions on collective land for construction.
In comparison, state-owned LURs can be conveyed, transferred, or leased under the regulations
specified in Urban Real Estate Administration Law (UREAL). Local governments (municipalities,
prefecture-level cities, and counties) have two tracks to dispose state-owned LURs. In the administrative track, they allocate LURs to state or collective units with no term limit. In the market track,
they exchange LURs on the primary land market. By conveyance, local governments sell LURs
of a certain period to land users, who pay a fee up front through negotiation or through auction,
bidding, or quotation. The maximum period of conveyed LURs is 70 years for residential purposes,
50 years for industrial purposes, and 40 years for commercial purposes. Land users who obtained
state-owned LURs through conveyance may circulate LURs in the secondary market by transferring or leasing LURs to other users or by mortgaging LURs as collateral. Land users who obtained
state-owned LURs from the administrative track may also circulate LURs after compensating the
state for the price difference between allocation and conveyance. But the dual-track system of stateowned land has breed rampant corruption. To solve the problem, starting from 2006, the central
government required all the land used for profit (i.e., commerce, tourism, recreation, and commercial residence) and all the industrial land with more than two intended users must be conveyed in
the market track through auction, bidding, or quotation.
The establishment of a legal framework for state-owned LURs has contributed to the develop-
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ment of state-owned land market. But a prosperous state-owned land market has also crowded out
collective land from urban development. In addition to restrictions on its transferability, a deeper
ideational context also makes collective land inferior to state-owned land. Since the Maoist era,
collective land has been regarded by the state as “the final guarantee of subsistence” instead of the
most valuable asset to the rural population. In the reform era, although privatization of land use
(i.e., household contracting system, or household responsibility system, or HRS for short) grants
villagers the right to use agricultural land, they also bear the responsibility of cultivating land by
contract. If a villager wants to become an urban resident, they must renounce their membership of
rural collectives and their possession of collective land. However, with an underdeveloped social
safety net, few villagers have the resources to risk what they have in villages for urban citizenship.
Collective land institution thus restrains the free flow of rural surplus labor to urban areas. In other
words, it ties villagers to rural land (Pils, 2009).
However, before the creation of legal constraints, villagers have already been developing and
capitalizing from their collective land. Since the period of rural industrialization in the 1980s, TVEs
been converting collective agricultural land for industrial use. Later, with the privatization of TVEs,
villagers rented collective land to private entrepreneurs, so that they could earn fixed income every
year without assuming any risk in business operation. For many small and medium enterprises,
renting collective land for a period (usually 5 to 10 years) is much more economical and flexible
than paying state-owned LURs for 40 and 70 years for industrial and commercial projects, respectively. Since many collective land users are (former) members of the collective, contract is signed
between collective leaders and land users without an approval from the local government. Unless a
collective land transaction involves land conversion, local governments usually tolerate it because
this kind of behavior not only saves them time and money from expropriating the land, but also
maintains economic growth and social stability. Therefore, despite the restrictions in 1998 LAL, a
grey, extralegal market of collective land for construction continues existing under the government’s
radar. Local land bureaus have very few data about collective land transactions.
The problem is that the grey market is hindered by these restrictions from reaching its full
potential. Large corporations and real estate developers prefer using state-owned land to collective
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land, for they cannot use collective land to get loans. Banks do not accept collective land as collateral
because they have no rights to dispose it, of which market transaction is forbidden by law. In
addition, private investors who are not familiar with the village’s affairs are likely to stay away from
collective land transactions, which are not registered at the government and not protected by law.
They would lose all the investment if the collective negates the contract or the state expropriates the
land. To attract buyers, village collectives engage in a race to the bottom by lowering collective land
prices. As a result, villagers cannot extract the maximal utility out of collective land, investors do
not have a long-term expectation on the use of collective land, and the state has to deal with a large
amount of land disputes over illegal contract.
An even bigger problem is the black market of collective residential land and the so-called
“small properties.” Building real estate projects on collective land for sale is strictly forbidden by
the central government. But pricey “big properties” on state-owned land in large cities have forced
many urban dwellers to buy villagers’ houses on collective land. Although these houses shall be
demolished by law if they are not in compliance with urban land planning, but local officials usually
dare not to do that because they fear tearing down people’s houses would intensify social conflicts
(Interview, HN).

3.4

Land Income Distribution

Divided rural-urban land system and restrictions on collective land transactions have significant impact on land income distribution between the state and collective. Since land use commercialization
in 1988, state-owned land has become an important asset for local governments’ fiscal revenue and
maximizing land revenue a goal of land bureaucrats. Ten years later, with the establishment of centralized land control system, local governments were empowered to extract a huge amount of land
rents from land conversion and expropriation by repressing villagers’ collective land rights.
A major source of land revenue is state conveyance, which is transacted at a “conveyance price”
consisting of three main components: the cost of land expropriation, a variety of stipulated land
fees, and the conveyance fee.1 The cost of expropriation is compensation to village collectives for
1

Land revenue also includes land taxes, land lease income, and income from administratively allocated
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cultivated land, resettlement subsidies, and attachments to the land. The 1998 LAL stipulates that
compensation for cultivated land shall be six to ten times the average annual output value of three
years preceding the expropriation, but in practice, some local governments give more than what is
legally required to deal with villagers’ resistance.
Villagers resist land expropriation when they expect a higher compensation from the land. They
get price signals from the state-owned land market and real estate market, knowing that the local
government acts as the dealer and benefits from expropriating their land and conveying LURs to the
developers for a lumpsum of money. The conveyance fee is determined through negotiation or by
the land market through auction, bidding, or quotation. After urban development, the government
can further collect taxes from real estate transactions in the secondary land market. Compared
to compensation based on agricultural output, large increments in land value make villagers feel
relative deprived.
However, some scholars argue, citing Philadelphia-born American economist Henry George’s
famous idea, that land rent should be collected by the state on the behalf of the society, for it is the
state’s investment in urban infrastructure that increase land value. Some also point out that villagers
usually do not realize the local government needs extraction, not just for corruption, but also to pay
initial investment in developing the land and other expenditures. Although the fiscalization of land
use has been recognized as an important factor of China’s rapid urbanization with moderate tax
burden, many criticizes it for unfairly depriving villagers’ rights. They argue that the value derived
from the position and location of the cultivated land can only be realized if the villagers give up their
rights to use it. But the 1998 LAL forces villagers to surrender their rights to dispose collective land
or to decide its use. Considering villagers will lose their biggest asset and source of income from
land expropriation, it seems reasonable that they resort to contentious ways to maximize their gains
for the rest of their lives from a one-shot deal.
In addition to submarket compensation for land and resettlement, unfair distribution within collectives is another important reason why land conflicts rise. Village collectives are led by a few
village committee members, who are elected by villagers and usually coopted by the state. They
land. The state may allocate land to a state or military agency at an allocation price, usually substantially
lower than the conveyance fee set by the market.
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represent villagers to communicate with state officials and manage collective assets. In the absence
of transparent and democratic governance, they may become predators under the support of corrupt officials. In many cases, village leaders divide up land compensation to the collective and
leave fractions to individual households. Some lease collective land cheaply to entrepreneurs and
pocket rents without sharing with members of the village collective or notifying the local government. These land-related problems are caused by not only the land regime but also the lack of
accountability institutions in collectives.
Since land income distribution has generated negative impact on social stability, political leaders
are exploring ways near the legal boundary to appease villagers. As a land bureaucrat told me, the
core of land market reform is to figure out an optimal arrangement of land income distribution
between the state and collective and within the collective, otherwise it is meaningless.

3.5

Summary

From the Maoist era to the reform era, rural-urban divide has been the defining feature of China’s
land regime. In this institutional context, centralization has formed a land system that repressed
collective landowners’ rights and discriminates against collective land. Partial commercialization
contributes to a functioning state-owned land market, but it denies the access of collective land. As
a result, the reform has created a distorted and underdeveloped land market as well as distributional
conflict between the state and villagers. China’s land regime is still in the shadow of command
economy. In the next chapter, I will explore the origin of this discriminatory land regime, starting
from the divided collective and state ownership of land. I will explain how and why collective land
ownership was created under the system of planned economy, with a built-in function of sustaining
rural-urban divide.
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Chapter 4
The Political Origin of Land Ownership
In this chapter I will discuss the formation of land ownership in the early period of China’s economic transformation. Whereas land has been either privatized or nationalized in former Soviet
republics, Eastern and Central European countries, and Vietnam, China has adopted a dual land
ownership, in which state ownership of land coexists with collective ownership. Compared to private and state ownership, collective ownership allows village collectives to have exclusive rights to
use and transfer land. Given the fundamental importance of land ownership and property rights to
the development of land market, students of Chinese politics have been puzzled by the institutional
arrangement. Existing explanations for China’s land ownership are based on either a predatory
state or balance-of-power within the ruling coalition. I challenge these arguments by employing the
framework of “spiral of politics” and situating land ownership reform in the larger historical context of rural-urban divide. In addition, based on closer examination of data from newspapers and
memoirs, I use Bayesian process tracing method to show how central leaders’ concerns over rural
instability shaped land ownership. I argue that reform leaders in post-Mao China adopted collective
ownership in rural and suburban area as an inclusive reform to placate villagers because they learned
from rural unrest in the Maoist era. They could have adopted a more exclusive approach by enacting
state ownership of land, but they only nationalized land in urban areas to facilitate land requisition
for state-led construction and development amid sporadic resistance from urban citizens.
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4.1

China’s Land Ownership Revisited

Existing literature provides two competing explanations for the dual land ownership in Chinese
constitution. First, German legal scholar Frank Münzel (M\IeC {\"u}nzel2008) argues that the
dual land ownership was designed to balance jurisdictional authority between state agencies. His
argument starts with the fact that private law was indistinguishable from public law in the socialist
China in the early 80s, suggesting land ownership right was an administrative law concept instead
of a civil law concept. This means that land ownership right was essentially the jurisdictional right
of a state organization. More specifically, the ownership right of state-owned land in the cities was
the jurisdictional right of the state construction agencies, and the ownership right of collective land
in rural and suburban areas was the jurisdictional right of the state agencies in charge of collective
economies (i.e., agriculture, light-industry, etc.). Münzel then argues that the constitutional makers
in 1982 wanted to stop unlawful land transaction between state units and rural collectives by decommodifying land with public ownership of land, but they did not apply state ownership to all
lands because they wanted to balance the power between these national state agencies.
Münzel’s explanation is dubious for several reasons. First, the Committee for the Revision of
the Constitution was comprised of senior politicians in the CCP and leaders of other democratic
parties. Although some members of the Committee were in charge of agriculture and construction,
they were senior officials of the CCP or the State Council, not the heads of state agencies under
the State Council. It is hard to believe that national leaders like Deng Xiaoping had any incentive
to accommodate departmental interests when writing the basic principles for the new era. Second,
departmental interests were not institutionalized to the degree that was able to affect central leaders’
decision. The State Council’s organizational structure was under constant changes in the early
80s. For example, administrative authority over land was centralized in 1986 and given to the
newly established National Bureau of Land Management, suggesting that the central leadership was
autonomous and independent to departmental interests.
The second explanation for the dual land ownership is made by Chinese economist Zhou Qiren
from the perspective of rational choice institutionalism.1 He argues that adopting state ownership
1

See Zhou’s column in Chinese: http://www.eeo.com.cn/2012/1106/235711.shtml.
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only in the cities was a calculated move by central leaders to reconcile the conflict of interests
between the state and villagers. They knew in advance that rural collectives could obstruct stateled construction by engaging in illegal land transaction and speculation, so they had to claim land
state-owned to facilitate urban construction. But they were also worried that abandoning collective
ownership might infuriate villagers, destabilize rural society, and reduce agricultural production.
Central leaders solved this dilemma subtly by setting up a loophole in the constitution. It allows the
central government to claim the collective land of a county as state-owned by simply changing the
county into a county-level city or a district of the prefecture-level city. Through the manipulation
of the administrative status of local state units, according to Zhou, the state can then take land from
collectives on the legal ground that land in cities is state-owned.
An underlying assumption of Zhou’s argument is that central leaders were concerned with the
intensification of land conflict between the state and villagers. However, a closer examination reveals that in the early 1980s, state-led, rent-seeking land development was not yet a common practice of developing local economy in China. Even in newly established special economic zones like
Shenzhen, where land taking was more often than other places, land conflict was not a prominent
issue in rural areas, since land for construction was not a scarce resource that constrained development as much as was capital. Nationwide, land expropriation was not a conflict-ridden process until
the late 1990s after a series of institutional change that I will discuss in the next chapter. According
to the World Bank’s internal report in 1988, “issues of involuntary resettlement and land compensation seem to be addressed systematically and well in China.” The common problem with Münzel’s
and Zhou’s argument is implicit ahistorical assumptions, which characterize political development
after the constitutional making period. However, we need to give more attention to the historical
and institutional context in which central leaders made their decision with regard to land regime.
We must first examine the institutional background at the end of the Maoist era and the constraints
central leaders were facing to better understand the origin of land ownership in post-Mao China.
2019/2/3.
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4.2
4.2.1

The Spiral Politics of Land Ownership
Context: Land Ownership under Mao

At the dawn of communist China, most lands were privately owned and heavily concentrated. Landlord and rich peasant households, which were 10 percent of the population, owned 56 percent of
the land by estimate (Esherick, 1981). This situation was reversed by the mid-1950s, after a fierce
and violent redistributive land reform eliminated the landed classes and equalized land ownership
within villages. The redistributive land reform consolidated the CCP’s power at the grassroots level,
shifting power in the countryside from landlords and rich peasants to party cadres (Kerkvliet and
Selden, 1998).
Soon after the Party’s mobilization apparatus penetrated the countryside, Chairman Mao began
to push for socialist transformation and industrialization. Private holdings in rural and urban areas
were nationalized through the state requisition system to make way for public construction projects.
Meanwhile, to accumulate capital needed for urbanization and industrialization, the leadership decided to extract surplus from agriculture through the compulsory procurement of grain at artificially
low fixed prices. Since the extraction would inevitably cause tension between the state and peasants,
a coercive system of rural-urban divide was created to limit the mobility of rural residents.
A pillar institution of the rural-urban divide was the farmers’ collective. Starting from the
experimentation of small mutual-aid groups, party cadres coerced peasants to join cooperatives
in 1955 and then larger collectives in 1956.1 Collectivization aggregated agricultural land under
the control of collectives and facilitated the state monopoly over agricultural products. With the
creation of collective land ownership, farmers were deprived of private property rights of land after
having it for just a few years. Sporadic resistance and protests emerged. But socialist transformation
proceeded quickly as politics was in command. At the end of 1956, 96.3 percent of rural households
joined cooperatives, most of which were collectives (Chongde Xu, 2003, p.300). In 1958, the Party
Central Committee decided to strike the iron while it was hot by upgrading collectives to People’s
1

The term “collective” refers to a high-level cooperative (Gaoji Hezuoshe) in which land and other means
of production are collectively owned and organized by local party cadres. A low-level cooperative, in contrast, is a less comprehensive organization which allows private ownership of land and pays dividends on
investment of the means of production and labor.
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Communes.
People’s Commune is an organization that integrates the functions of government administration
and economic management. Its establishment signaled that public ownership (or state ownership)
would continue growing and substitute for collective ownership soon. Such signal emboldened local
party cadres to confiscate peasants’ assets, ranging from land to livestock, farm tools, pots and pans,
by adopting semi-militarized management in people’s communes. As a result, agricultural production was destroyed, social order was destructed, the greatest famine in human history followed, and
millions lost their lives.
To stabilize the turbulent countryside, Mao reinstituted a more decentralized form of collective
ownership. In 1961, the Party Central Committee promulgated the Work Regulations for Rural People’s Commune, later known as “the Sixty Articles.” It confirmed that people’s communes should
adopt a three-level ownership: ownership of the commune, ownership of the production brigade,
and ownership of the production group. In its original version, all the production materials such
as land were owned and allocated by brigade, not commune. This new institutional arrangement
stopped radical communist movement from going further, but it did not resolve the ambiguity of
property rights in people’s communes. Conflict existed between brigades and subordinate groups
and between group cadres and group members. After hearing complaints from provincial governments (e.g., Shandong and Hebei), Mao accepted the idea of group-based collective ownership.
The amended Sixty Articles in 1962 changed the basic unit to production group, specifying that
“land, livestock, and farm tools are owned by groups.” The Articles also stipulated that group-based
collective ownership, once established, should remain unchanged for at least thirty years.
Mao upheld the commitment to group-based collective ownership in the ensuing decade of Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Although multiple attempts were made to roll back to brigade-based
collective ownership, they all failed under farmers’ resistance. The 1975 Constitution confirmed
the three-level, group-based collective ownership of people’s communes. Thus, collective ownership, invented and perceived as a temporary alternative to state ownership, continued to define the
relationship between the state and farmers, as a result of Mao and the leadership’s compromise to
popular resistance.
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4.2.2

Coalition and Ideology: Reformers Seeking Truth from Facts

Mao’s death in September 9, 1976 marked the beginning of a new era in contemporary Chinese
history. With the arrest of Gang of Four in October, radical left ideology came to an end after ten
years of chaotic Cultural Revolution. Even before Mao’s death, open demonstrations and protests
have shown people’s strong dissatisfaction with Gang of Four and their radical agenda. Although
radical leftists were untouchable under Mao’s indulgence, Mao’s death opened the possibility of
reversing the political direction to the right.
The period from Mao’s death in 1976 to the promulgation of new constitution in 1982 can be
retrospectively considered as a critical juncture in the history of contemporary China. In the literature of historical institutionalism, a relatively short period of time is called a critical juncture, if it
qualifies three conditions (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). First, the range of feasible options facing
human agents was expanded. Second, the agents’ choice from available options has a lasting impact
on subsequent outcomes. Third, the probability that actors’ choices will affect outcomes decreases
after the period. All these three elements can be found in China after Mao passed away. In March
1977, ideological constraint was somewhat loosened, as the new party leadership chaired by Hua
Guofeng, the man handpicked by Mao, decided to divert the party’s focus from cultural revolution
to modernization in the Central Work Conference. Then, reformers led by Deng Xiaoping, after
seizing the power from Hua, set the basic rules in the 1982 constitution that are still effective today.
Finally, institutional arrangements such as dual land ownership laid out in the 1982 constitution have
become a fundamental principle for the operation of Chinese economy, therefore they are unlikely
to change in the near future.
In this critical juncture, power struggle between Maoist and reform cadres within the party
was prominent. The focal point of the struggle was how Mao’s heritage should be treated and
how modernization should be proceeded in China. On the one hand, Maoists wanted to continue
class struggle. They believed that “politics must be put in command of expertise”, thus preventing
those cadres labeled as Rightists under Mao from working in the government. They criticized
Hua for not adhering to the deceased leader’s will. To compromise with these radical Maoists,
Hua endorsed the statement famously known as the “two whatevers”: “We will resolutely uphold
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whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions
Chairman Mao gave.”
On the other hand, senior party cadres like Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and those who were persecuted in the Cultural Revolution held the idea of “seeking truth from facts,” which they borrowed
from a Mao’s speech in the revolutionary era. Deng said that only “correct and complete” Mao’s
thought should be used to guide the party, army, and people, thus clearly opposing the idea of “two
whatevers.” In May 1978, an article titled “Practice Is the Sole Criterion of Truth” was published
in an internal journal of the Central Party School by reformist cadres, suggesting a critical view to
Marx-Leninism and Mao’s thought. Using Mao’s own words to criticize Mao, this creative interpretation triggered controversy among Hua’s Maoist supporters, but it received Deng’s praise. The
article emboldened Deng’s supporters, serving as a centerpiece of a “coordinative discourse” that
uses Mao’s thought to organize a coalition of reform-minded cadres to de-legitimize and challenge
Maoists.
The rise of reform coalition led by Deng and other senior party cadres was almost inevitable
since then. Their revolutionary experience in the Long March in the 1930s rendered them influence
and personal reputation within the party unmatched by Maoists. Besides, Hua must rely on their
governing experience to lead modernization and liberalization. He not only admitted Deng and
other senior leaders into the Politburo, though reluctantly, but also entrusted Deng’s supporters such
as Hu Yaobang with important tasks of managing the Central Party School. This position allowed
Hu to play an important role in coalition-building. He organized teachers at the School to formulate
a “communicative discourse” to mobilize prosecuted cadres against the Maoists.
Maoist cadres, unlike senior cadres with revolutionary experiences, were upstarts who gained
power in the Cultural Revolution. They controlled the party’s propaganda machine and personnel
system when Mao died, but their agenda had already lost public support toward the end of Cultural
Revolution. After Deng and senior leaders returned to leading positions, Maoist leaders were under
siege from more senior cadres who demanded justice. With the number of petitions mounting,
Politburo Standing Committee (especially Deng Xiaoping, Marshall Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian)
decided to remove the head of Central Department of Organization, a Maoist cadre, to appease the
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angry crowd of senior party cadres. Hu Yaobang was recommended by Deng to be the replacement
and approved by most Politburo members in December 1977.
As Maoists lost control over the party’s personnel management, victory inclined in Deng’s favor.
Under Hu Yaobang’s management, more senior cadres returned for work, generating a momentum
for Deng’s ascendance. During his visit to the northeast region in 1978, Deng openly criticized the
advocates of the “two whatevers”, and emphasized “seeking truth from facts,” which then became
the mainstream thought among party cadres. The facts that China was behind Western capitalist
countries in economy, science, and technology convinced most party leaders and cadres to, not only
adopt the “open door” policy, but also abandon rigid Maoist ideology and comprehensive planned
economy, which Hua had been reluctant to recognize. In the Central Work Conference in November
1978, under the pressure of senior leaders, Hua accepted Deng’s idea and admitted his mistakes to
avoid internal conflict. This action ended the power struggle over the party line. Eventually, the
Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress in December 1978 marked the moment when Hua
and most his Maoists allies transferred power to Deng and his fellow reformers.
Once reform coalition were in control of the party governing institutions, reformers began to
pursue economic liberalization and institutional reform under the principle of “seeking truth from
facts.” The most urgent concern for them at that time was the supply of food grains. During the
early period of economic reform, agriculture was regarded as the foundation of economy and given
the top priority for improving people’s living standards. The biggest constraint, however, was agricultural land, with only 0.1 hectares arable land per capita in 1980. By promoting the household
responsibility system (HRS), reformers redistributed the right to use collective land from collective
cadres to individual households. Village collectives were thus only responsible for allocating land
to households and providing services such as seed, fertilizer, irrigation, and machines in exchange
for fees and agricultural products. Villagers could contract land from collectives and make operating decisions independently. Meanwhile, they took the responsibility of cultivating land. Such
de-collectivization of land use was legitimized by the No. 1 Central Document in 1982, and imposed by the central government in 1983, after a series of debate between central reformers and
local officials, waves of persuasion, and necessary personnel reshuffle. Although land use issue was
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settled, how land ownership should be arranged remained as a question for reform leadership.

4.2.3

Institutional Change: Dual Land Ownership

In making the new constitution, some prominent red capitalists and military leaders contended that
collective land ownership hindered economic and military construction such as mining and building
airports in rural and suburban areas. They believed that land speculation by villagers was an impediment to state-led development and source of conflict, and therefore collective land ownership
should be replaced by state ownership (Chongde Xu, 2003, p.637, 645).
An alternative to collective ownership is private ownership. Land privatization has been a key
component of economic transformation in most postcommunist countries (Wegren, 2003). The
adoption of HRS seemed to open the possibility of privatizing land. Du Runsheng, an influential
rural policy maker, once said with regret that farmers’ situation would be much improved if land
ownership were given back to them when the central government promoted the household responsibility system in the early 1980s.2 Some ordinary citizens suggested that rural residential land was
inherited from ancestors and should be protected by the constitution as private property (Chongde
Xu, 2003, p.721).
Reform leaders, however, decided to maintain the status quo. The early draft of the constitution,
which was approved by the Politburo before being distributed to the 1982 Constitution Revision
Committee for discussion, states that land in the cities is owned by the State; land in the suburban
and rural areas is owned by collectives. This arrangement was the final version of the 1982 constitution even after rounds of debate and discussion. As a result, somewhat controversially, the state
ownership of land was written into the constitutional text for the first time in the PRC’s history.
Why did not central leaders replace collective ownership with state or private ownership? Why
did they adopt state ownership only in the cities? I argue that dual land ownership was enacted by
reform leaders because they sought to resolve two different types of land-related conflict that undermine their rule. The basic assumption of my argument is rural-urban divide, or more specifically,
2

See Wen Guanzhong’s memoir of Du Runsheng, former director of the Central Rural Policy Research Office of the Central Committee of the CCP. http://m.ftchinese.com/story/001064484 (last visited on
12/13/2017).
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the divided function of land in rural and urban areas constructed in the Maoist era. Rural and suburban land was planned for agricultural production, whereas urban land was planned for industrial
production, residential buildings, and infrastructures such as roads, toilets, hospitals, and train stations. This rigid division can be found in multiple articles in People’s Daily around that period. For
example, an article titled “the suburban must guarantee cities have vegetables to eat” was published
on the front page on March 6, 1982. Another article, titled “suburban vegetable plots decrease year
by year; how can the provision of vegetables be guaranteed,” was published on the second page
on April 24, 1981. Such evidence suggests reform leaders needed rural and suburban villagers to
cultivate agricultural land, producing grains and vegetables for urban residents. Villagers should not
convert land to non-agricultural use unless it was intended to assist agricultural production.
The divided function of land implies different patterns of land-related conflict in urban and
rural areas. In urban areas, the urgent need to expand and upgrade city infrastructures created statesociety conflict over land. Urban households refused to make way for redevelopment without decent
compensation. Their resistance added financial burdens on the government, slowing down economic
development (Chongde Xu, 2003, p.681). But in rural and suburban areas, where the rural sector
was essentially the agricultural sector, major land-related conflict was between the central government and local administrative units and households over land conversion and illegal transaction. As
the HRS increased the income level, villagers had a greater demand for housing improvement. They
began to occupy agricultural land to build more houses, along with enterprises and local state units.
With more farmland converted to nonagricultural use, central leaders became deeply concerned with
agricultural output. In addition, housing shortage, urban expansion, and industrialization stimulated
illegal land transactions between local state units and rural collectives and corruption.
Since central leaders faced different kinds and levels of social conflict in urban and rural areas,
they opted to different solutions. In urban areas, they adopted state ownership to legitimize land
requisition and facilitate new urban construction projects. In rural and suburban areas, they upheld collective land ownership to stabilize agricultural production and the rural society. Otherwise,
adopting private land ownership would encourage illegal land transactions, while state ownership
could instigate villagers’ protests and reduce their motivation for farming.
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4.3

Empirical Evidence

To test the aforementioned arguments, I first examine two books detailing the process of the 1982
constitutional revision: The History of Constitution of the People’s Republic of China written by Xu
Chongde (2003) and The Birth of China’s Constitution by Xiao Weiyun (1986). These are credible sources for this study because both authors are participants of the revision and kept conference
minutes and diaries. If Münzel’s argument were correct (i.e., dual land ownership resulting from
jurisdictional allocation), we would expect to find a negotiation process involving land administrators in the Maoist era, including the Urban Construction Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry
of Forestry, Ministry of Water Resources, and Ministry of State Farms, Ministry of Railroad, and
Ministry of Transportation. None of these central state organizations were mentioned in the discussion of land ownership in either Xu’s or Xiao’s account. Therefore, no evidence suggests that
balance of power between state agencies is a major concern for central leaders when drafting the
1982 constitution.
If Zhou’s assumption were correct (i.e., dual land ownership resulting from a predatory state
that intends to take rural land by manipulating administrative procedure to legitimize land ownership change), we expect to find that state-society conflict over land was more serious in rural and
suburban areas than in urban areas. According to Zhou, central leaders could not adopt state ownership of land in rural and suburban areas to claim land rents, as they did in urban areas, because they
were worried about the past and potential land conflict between the state and villagers.
Alternatively, my argument suggests that central leaders did not adopt state ownership of land
in rural and suburban areas because they did not consider converting agricultural land as a priority
for economic development. In contrast to Zhou’s argument, I argue that central leaders did not want
to extend state ownership to rural and suburban areas in the first place, as in the early reform era
their focus there was on agriculture and farmland protection. To preserve farmland, they actually
restricted land conversion and illegal transactions.1 If my argument were correct, we can expect less
1

See the No.1 Central Document in 1982. On February 13, 1982, the State Council promulgated the
Regulation of Residential Land in Villages and Towns, prohibiting excessive use of cultivated land for housing
and all the transactions of residential land. The Article 10 of the 1982 Constitution also explicitly says that
“no work units or individuals is allowed to buy, sell, or rent land.”
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state-society conflict over land in rural and suburban areas than in urban areas.
To test these two competing arguments, I collect data from the People’s Daily during period of
1979 and 1982. The data includes all the 189 news articles related to land conflict. Each article
contains keywords from two sets: 1) land requisition and eviction resulting from state construction
and 2) land negotiation or speculation of individual landowners.2 I manually coded the sample
articles into two dummy variables: 1) rural and suburban area and 2) state-society conflict over
land. I coded the state-society land conflict variable as 1 if an article’s content suggests that people’s
demand or discontent causes problems for land expropriation or eviction or the other way around.
The sample is shown in Table 4.1. As we can see, 124 articles are involved with land conflict
in rural and suburban areas, whereas 65 articles in urban areas. There are 50 articles involving
state-society conflict over land, among which 27 are in rural and suburban areas and 23 in urban
areas. Although the absolute number of state-society conflict in rural and suburban areas (27) is
greater than in urban areas (23), the percentage of state-society conflict in the total reports of rural and suburban land conflict (21.7% = 27/124) is much lower than that in urban areas (35.4% =
23/65). This evidence suggests that state-society conflict over land is a greater problem in urban
areas. More systematically, the variable “rural and suburban area” is negatively correlated with the
variable “state-society conflict over land” with statistical significance at the 5% level (correlation
coefficient=-0.21, p-value=0.0056). This result suggests tension between the state and rural collectives around land requisition was not an urgent issue that required immediate government response.
It is consistent with my argument and casts further doubt on Zhou’s explanation for China’s dual
land ownership.
The result supports my critique to the existing explanations for land ownership that land requisition and eviction was a bigger problem in urban areas than in rural and suburban areas in the
early days of economic reform. The variable “urban area,” which is the opposite of the “rural and
2

The key words for land requisition and eviction are Zheng Di (征地), Chai Qian (拆迁), Zheng Shou
(征收), Zheng Yong (征用), Dong Qian (动迁), and Ban Qian (搬迁). The key words for land negotiation
and speculation are Yao Jia (要价), Gao Jia (高价), and Qiao Zhugang (敲竹杠). Different Chinese words
with similar meaning are used in the research to increase the sample size. To filter the result, I searched the
keywords (except for Zheng Di and Chai Qian) together with the word “land” (Tu Di, 土地) in the database
of People’s Daily (http://data.people.com.cn). Official documents were excluded from the sample. I also
manually excluded articles on eviction or resettlement caused by activities other than state construction such
as environmental pollution, natural disaster, and occupation of ancient relics and historical sites.
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Table 4.1: Reports on Land Conflict from the People’s Daily (1978-1982)
State-society conflict
Urban
23
Rural and suburban
27
Total
50

Central-local conflict
42
97
144

Total
65
124
189

suburban area” variable, is positively correlated with the state-society conflict variable (correlation
coefficient=0.1772, p-value=0.0176). In addition, a few months before the promulgation of 1982
constitution, the State Council issued the Regulation on Land Requisition for State Construction
on May 14. According to the regulation, the cadres and the masses whose land was requisitioned
shall comply with the state and shall not obstruct land requisition. To mitigate land speculation and
save construction cost, the state also prohibited any work unit or collective unit to engage in land
transactions. This move during the process of constitutional revision suggests that reform leaders
were worried about the difficulty of urbanization in the cities and agricultural production in the
countryside.
To show that illegal land conversion and transaction in rural and suburban areas was indeed a
serious problem for central leaders, I further coded the 189 articles into a dummy variable measuring whether an article has to do with illegal or excessive occupation of farmland or illegal land
transaction. 60 related articles are coded as 1. Among the 60 cases of illegal land activities, 56
happened in rural and suburban areas. That’s to say, in the total of 124 rural and suburban reports,
almost half (45% = 56/124) of them are related to the issue of farmland occupation and transaction.
This percentage is more than twice higher than the percentage of land conflict related to requisition
and eviction in rural and suburban areas (21.7%). The correlation coefficient between the variable
“rural and suburban area” and the variable “land occupation and transaction” is 0.3740, statistically
significant at the 0.01 confidence level. The evidence suggests that protecting farmland and inhibiting land transaction, instead of land conflict related to requisition and eviction, was the biggest
challenge in rural and suburban areas for central leaders.3
To curb land occupation in rural areas and facilitate land requisition in urban areas, central lead3
It should be noted that these two variables, “state-society land conflict” and “land occupation and transaction,” are not mutually exclusive. A news report can be simultaneously addressing both issues.
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ers decided to adopt public land ownership.4 But still they could choose between state and collective
ownership. Why did they choose collective ownership in rural and suburban areas instead of state
ownership? My answer is that changing collective land ownership to state ownership would only
cause instability in rural and suburban areas without fundamentally solving the problem of excessive occupation of farmland and illegal land transactions. For example, some constitutional makers
opposed this institutional change because they worried that it might generate backlash among peasants, who struggled for a long time to take land away from landlords (Chongde Xu, 2003, p.665).
Since almost all the urban work units were nationalized, state ownership of land would not generate
strong resistance from urban residents. But rural and suburban villagers have inherited collective
land ownership from the Maoist era, and they have been consistently resisting any progress towards
state ownership of land. In addition, even if collective ownership were changed to state ownership,
the state would still have to expropriate or requisite land from collectives and make compensation for it. Besides, collective landownership was flexible enough to perform the function of both
encouraging private farming and constraining illegal land occupation.
The last piece of empirical evidence from Peng Zhen, who oversaw the party’s political and legal
affairs and was handpicked by Deng to be the deputy chair of the Constitution Revision Committee.
Peng endorsed state ownership for all land in principle, but also urged that this goal should be approached cautiously by maintaining collective ownership in the suburban and rural areas (Chongde
Xu, 2003, pp.680-82). In his report to the National People’s Congress on the drafted constitution,
he indicated that state ownership in the cities (excluding suburban areas) was adopted to “secure
the state’s construction of socialist economy,” while collective ownership was used in the rural and
suburban areas to “secure the socialist direction of the development of agricultural economy.”
In sum, my analysis shows that China’s dual land ownership was not originally designed to
accommodate special interests or create rent-seeking opportunities. Instead, it was designed to resolve land-related conflict in urban and rural areas, respectively. In urban areas, where individual,
disorganized homeowners delayed urban construction projects, reformers imposed state ownership
4

Socialist ideology could play an important role in rejecting private land ownership, as many local governments were still reluctant to grant private use of farmland in 1982. Without a legal framework for regulation,
private land ownership could pave the way for uncontrolled land commodification and increase the cost of
land requisition for state construction.
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of land to facilitate land requisition and eviction. In rural and suburban areas, where organized villagers posed threat to social stability since the late Maoist era, central reformers adopted collective
land ownership to protect farmland and maintain social order.

4.4

Summary

I conclude that China’s land ownership was designed to achieve different goals of governance in
rural and urban areas. It has its root in revolutionary history. The idea of rural-urban divide was
deeply entrenched since the Maoist era. But reform leaders, constrained by the old framework of
rural-urban divide, still made significant changes to the land regime. As the central policy paradigm
shifted from class struggle to economic development, the primary goals of land reform were to
increase grain supply and rebuild urban infrastructures. To facilitate urban construction, reformers
adopted state ownership of land in urban areas. To stabilize grain production, they could have
adopted state landownership to prevent people from occupying farmland. But reformers allowed
collectives to own the land for the fear that villagers would revolt if collective land was nationalized.
My argument contrasts to the existing explanations that China’s land regime in the post-Mao era
was created to accommodate the interest of central departments or the local need for rent-seeking.
I argue that it is a result of path-dependent political development since the Maoist era and a deliberate choice by autonomous and independent reformers in the critical juncture between 1978-82.
The state-collective dual land ownership reflects not only reform leaders’ vision for development,
but also lasting threat to social and regime stability from rural areas. Group-based collective ownership was previously adopted in response to villagers’ resistance against collectivization in the
late Maoist era, but after written in the constitution, it entails more meanings than a transitional
institution. It creates interest groups who have legitimate claims over rural and suburban land. Although the days of people’s commune have gone, village collectives survived and even flourished
in some parts of China in adaptation to agricultural de-collectivization and rural industrialization.
When agricultural growth slowed down and farmland area shrank in the late-80s, central leaders
decided to strengthen rural collective organizations by allowing village leaders to reallocate agricul-
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tural land to gain economies of scale. To stabilize grains production, the No.1 central document in
1986 re-emphasized the importance of cooperative economy and the role of collective organizations
in providing services for agricultural production such as credit and marketing, which individual
households could not supply. As we will see in the next chapter, collective institutions have significant impact on the trajectory of China’s economic transformation, as land market institutions were
layered above and generating unintended consequences.
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Chapter 5
The Political Development of Land
Commercialization
It is quite true that land monopoly is not the only monopoly which
exists, but it is by far the greatest of monopolies - it is a perpetual monopoly,
and it is the mother of all other forms of monopoly. It is quite true that unearned increments in land are not the only form of unearned or undeserved
profit which individuals are able to secure; but it is the principal form of
unearned increment which is derived from processes which are not merely
not beneficial, but which are positively detrimental to the general public.
- Winston S. Churchill, The Mother of all Monopolies, 17 July 1909
In this chapter, I examine a durable change of China’s land regime: land commercialization and its
partial reversal, which has led to state monopoly over urban land and the fiscalization of land use.
While the initial reform was inclusive, the reversal reform excluded collective land and villagers
from urban development. This important illiberal turn of China’s economic transformation has been
studied as the result of encroachment by the central state to accumulate the value of state-owned
assets or a bargain between the center and local government over recentralization.
However, I contend that the main reason behind this paradigm change is central leaders’ learning
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from the regime crisis in 1989 instead of state predation or central-local negotiation. By examining the institutional context, governing idea, and coalitional politics in the critical juncture between
1989-1993, I show that exclusive land commercialization was used as an expedient measure by
conservative reform leaders to avoid another regime crisis. The post-crisis conservative leadership
came into power with a focus on rolling back radical reformers’ achievements. They held that the
land regime created in the 1980s posed threat to macroeconomic instability in a partially reformed
economic system. Conservative leaders’ biased learning can be attributed to two political factors.
First, they were autonomous and independent in the central leadership, as radical reformers were
ousted after the 1989 Democratic Movement and bureaucratic opponents were overwhelmed by the
central-local alliance. Second, as political repression remained at a high level after the crisis, urban
citizens posed little threat to social order, while villagers engaging in collective land commercialization under weak government oversight. As my theory suggests, conservative reformers, facing
little political and social resistance, adopted the land market reform that was exclusive in nature.

5.1

China’s Land Commercialization Revisited

Land was commercialized in post-Mao China along with urban development and rural industrialization in the 1980s. During the legislation of the 1986 LAL, some local governments and ministries argued that the rule on collective land use was too restrictive in the draft, which was based on the 1982
regulations that require collective land to be used for the sole purpose of agriculture.1 They wanted
to circumvent the tedious land requisition process and rural-urban divide to transfer technologies,
funds, and human resources from urban to rural enterprises. Relaxing this restriction could also
lower the cost of investment to TVEs, save land users from making land compensation payments
and resettlement payments, and thus stimulated rural industrialization. This opinion was supported
by the leadership of radical reformers led by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who were committed to
economic growth as the central mandate of the 1980s.2 The final version of the 1986 LAL stipulates
1

The 1982 regulations refer to the Regulation on Land Requisition for State Construction and the Regulation on Residential Land in Villages and Towns. For legislative details, see Gan (2001, p.355) and People’s
Daily on March 16, 1986.
2
The category of conservative and radical reformers is borrowed from Dittmer (1992).
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that individual entrepreneurs and TVEs have the rights to convert and use collective land for urban
construction, subject to the payment of taxes and fees and the approval of the county government or
above.3 SOEs and urban collective enterprises could use collective land for construction by setting
up joint ventures with rural collectives, upon the approval of the county government or above.4 In
addition, reformers made a significant breakthrough for land market in the 1988 LAL by allowing
land users to reallocate land through transfer or mortgage. This institutional change was initially
an accommodation to the commercialization of state-owned land for foreign investment and urban
housing, but it also made collective land tradable in the rural and suburban areas just as state-owned
land in urban areas. In places like Guangdong and southern Jiangsu, land users acquired collective
land use rights from villages to build factories or develop commercial projects (e.g., tourism, catering, and entertainments) with an amount of leasing fee paid to the county government, about 70%
of which was shared with collective villagers.5
However, the trend of land commercialization was partially reversed in the 1990s. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the Article 43 and 63 of the 1998 LAL set restricted measures on (or basically
bans) the use and circulation of collective land, respectively. The official explanation for the restricted use is improving land use efficiency, preventing pollution from TVEs, and taking advantage
of agglomeration effects in the rural industrial sector. As for restrictions on circulation, the official statement offers two reasons, built on the assumption that the commercialization of collective
land will cause a large amount of collective land for agriculture to be converted to collective land
for construction. First, collective land, once allowed into the market, will complicate the commercialization of state-owned land. Second, since township and village cadres are highly motivated
to develop real estate on collective land for agriculture, commercializing collective land will make
the goal of farmland preservation unattainable.6 Although land use efficiency, environmental protection, economic growth, and farmland preservation are all desirable goals, it is not necessary to
impose restrictions based on land ownership. A conventional way used in many countries to solve
3

See Article 39 and 41 in the 1986 LAL.
See Article 36 in the 1986 LAL.
5
See Wuxi Tudi Zhi (Wuxi Chorography on Land).
6
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa Shiyi (Explanation for the Land Administrative Law of the People’s Republic of China), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/flsyywd/xingzheng/200011/25/content_8294.htm. Last visited on 2019/2/8.
4
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land use problems is zoning, which allows the government to dictate how land can or cannot be used
on specific sites by dividing land into sections. Effective implementation of zoning, companied with
centralized land administration and unified land market, should be sufficient to prevent massive land
conversion, but central leaders still imposed additional restrictions on collective land.
A common explanation for institutional design under authoritarian regimes is that politicians
are predatory in nature. Chinese scholars have built theories around the predatory state to explain
the development and underdevelopment of nonstate sectors (Che and Qian, 1998; Y. Huang, 2008;
Liu, Shih, and D. Zhang, 2018). When it comes to the land regime and fiscalization of land use,
some blame central predatory policy for the collective land. Others argue that center leaders were
captured by local agents seeking rents from land development (Zhou, 2006). M. Rithmire (2015,
p.64) offers a somewhat different interpretation based on central-local bargaining. She argues that
central leaders recentralized the financial system, so in exchange they allowed local governments to
extract revenues from state-owned land by denying the access of collective land to urban markets.
However, existing studies cannot explain the specific choice of excluding collective land. Again,
it is not the only way to maximize local revenue streams. Effective zoning regulations could also
stimulate fiscalization of land use, as shown in the studies of land use in the United States (Chapman,
2008; Lewis, 2001).
If the fiscalization of land use is the central government’s goal, we will expect to find institutional changes that streamline administrative approval for investment projects and maximize land
revenues from real estate development. If the fiscalization of land use is a result of local land
predation, we expect to find the proliferation of local practices of land lease sales before central
promotion. If the fiscalization of land use is a bargaining result between the center and local over
the tax reform, we will expect to see central promotion and local proliferation immediately after
1994.
My research into historical contexts and details finds evidence against these hypotheses from
intentional predation to central-local collusion. Alternatively, the hypothesis derived from my theory is that autonomous central leaders, in the absence of challenging factions, bureaucrats, and
organized villagers, changed to an exclusive policy paradigm because they learned from the regime
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crisis in 1989 that the reversion of land commercialization is a practical way to counter macroeconomic instability. To test the hypotheses, I will next employ the framework of “spiral of politics” to
closely examine the sequence of land commercialization, using extensive historical data to support
these qualitative inferences and to avoid cherry-picking evidence.

5.2
5.2.1

The Spiral Politics of Land Commercialization
Context: Macroeconomic Cycle

Scholars argue that the secret of China’s economic success is the gradualist strategy of market liberalization, which mobilized a broad coalition of supporters (Naughton, 1996). By allowing the
market to grow out of the plan, reformers created a dual-track system, which protects the interests
of state actors in procuring fixed quantities of goods at fixed planned prices and provides incentives
for economic actors to produce and sell more goods at free market prices (Qian, 2003). Equally
important, particularistic contracting allowed SOE managers and local officials to retain a lion share
of profits and taxes, respectively, through negotiation on a case-by-case basis (Shirk, 1993). In rural
areas, the fiscal contract system in the 1980s incentivized local officials to promote rural industrial sectors (S. H. Whiting, 2006, pp.79-93). County governments, though having no rights over
the residual of collective enterprises, relied on taxation and extrabudgetary funds from these enterprises to fill their coffers. Township governments, as the de facto owners of township-run collective
enterprises, received profit remittances and payments from these enterprises as a major source of
discretionary income. Villagers and land users also wanted to evade taxes and fees by engaging in
unsanctioned land transactions. This local coalition, which is discussed extensively by Oi (1999) as
“local state corporatism,” contributed to rural industrialization and economic growth.
Although these new institutional changes in rural and urban areas stimulated economic growth
and reinforced market reforms, they also created recurrent inflationary disorder, shaking the CCP’s
rule. On the one hand, reformers lowered entry barriers to increase employment in labor-intensive
industries. As a result, competition from TVEs, private firms, and foreign companies reduced profit
remittances from SOEs in industry and commerce, shrinking the size of state budgetary revenue
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and the tax share of the central government. Administratively, central leaders also had difficulty to
discipline profit-seeking, tax-evading rural cadres and villagers, who were reluctant to comply with
the mandates of farmland protection and tax collection that would hinder the growth of collective
economy.1 On the other hand, the central and local governments were increasingly active in making
investment in infrastructures and industrial sectors. The decentralized state-run banking system
were pressured to subsidize public investment projects and enterprises that were still under soft
budget constraints. The mismanagement of financial system provoked deposits drop and credit
squeeze in 1988. To avoid the collapse of financial system, the central bank (People’s Bank of
China or PBOC) injected additional liquidity, which in turn fed higher inflation (Naughton, 1995).
Meanwhile, facing urban discontent over rampant corruption and rent-seeking behaviors among
officials, central leaders decided to unify dual track systems by significantly increasing the procurement prices of consumer goods. This proved to be a premature action, considering China in 1988
still had low material supply, volatile consumer expectation, and a nascent financial system. The
public announcement of price adjustments stimulated bank runs and panic buying among urban
citizens. Fluctuating prices, low wages, hyperinflation, and growing discontent over corruption altogether culminated into the 1989 Democracy Movement, which led to a highly oppressive political
environment until Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992.
In 1993, concerns for macroeconomic instability restarted with the emergence of “real estate
bubble.” This time, land commercialization stimulated a large amount of investment into the real
estate sector. Table 5.1 shows the growth rate of total and real estate investment in percentage from
1986 to 1995. In 1992, 73.1 billion yuan, or nine percent of total fixed asset investment, went to the
real estate sector, an increase of 117.6 percent from the past year. In 1993, investment in real estate
increased by 164.9 percent to 193.8 billion yuan, capturing nearly 15 percent of total investment.
The real estate investment increased more than 5 times in just two years. During this span, the number of developmental zones or industrial parks increased nearly twentyfold. Foreign investors, local
governments, and work units all began to invest heavily on speculative real estate projects (M. E.
1

News reports show that township officials did not comply with the 1986 LAL. Some even intentionally
violated it to seek private gains from land with a variety of means. See more details from People’s Daily,
February 18, 1989; April 18, 1989.
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Table 5.1: Growth Rate (%) of Total and Real Estate Investment (1988-1995)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total Investment
25.4 -7.2
2.4 23.9 44.4 61.8 30.4 17.5
Real Estate Investment 71.6 6.0
-7.1 32.7 117.6 164.9 31.8 23.3
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Investment in Fixed Assets (1950-1995), p.349.
Rithmire, 2017). During the course, real estate prices rose sharply by 100 percent in Hainan and
50 percent in Fujian province (World Bank, 1992). Deposits and funds were diverted away to fuel
speculative activities. As a result, net credit to government soared by almost 70 percent just in the
last quarter of 1992 (Harrold and Lall, 1993). In urban areas, local officials administratively allocated land to state-owned real estate development companies, which could make huge profits from
the dual-track system by simply transferring the LURs on the market to the next holder.2 In rural
and suburban areas, collective leaders negotiated private deals with commercial land users without
notifying the county government and villagers, so that both parties gain from the development.
Land and real estate speculation inflated not only property prices, but also producer prices (such
as cement, glass, steel, and wood) and consumer prices. The rise in agriculture prices contributed to
60% of the inflation rate, due in large part to uncontrolled urbanization (Yu, C. Jiang, and Lu, 1996).
At an annual growth rate of 4.4%, rapid urban expansion reduced farmland area and investment
in agriculture, driving up prices of agricultural products (Gan, 2001, p.83). Figure 5.1 illustrates
China’s inflation rate since 1986. The noticeable surge in the period of 1993-95 peaked at an even
higher level than that of the 1989 crisis. In 1994, the average index of agricultural products’ prices
increased by 33% from the last year. By comparison, real wage of urban citizens per capita increased
by just 25%. More importantly, since the wage increase lagged behind the increase in prices, citizens
had a worse quality of life. A popular saying arose at the moment: “we do not lack anything, except
for Chen Sheng and Wu Guang.”3 However, under the high political pressure in the post-1989
period, few violent outbursts were recorded in urban areas.
2

See People’s Daily on June 25, 1991; September 4, 1994; December 4, 1995.
Chen Sheng and Wu Guang are the leaders of the first large-scale popular uprising ever recorded in
Chinese history.
3
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5.2.2

Idea: Inclusive and Exclusive Land Commercialization

The “real estate fever” sent a cautionary note to the CCP leaders, as urban turmoil resulting from
rising inflation in the late 80s still haunted them. Fighting against inflation became one of the most
important tasks of governance. Since the late 80s, some central leaders like Chen Yun have a second thought about the radical, decentralized economic reforms. To prevent future macroeconomic
volatility, they argued for a greater degree of concentration of power in the central government. A
new agenda was put on the table to recentralize the central government’s authority in planning the
economy.
An important aspect of this rolling-back is the policy idea that land commercialization must be
managed more closely. Central leaders recognized that unbridled land commercialization in pursuit
of short-term economic interests can create adverse conditions for long-term development. The fact
that China has a high population-to-land ratio, a collective memory of the Great Leap Famine, and
an urgent need to stabilize food prices during economic transformation convinced central leaders
that the loss of farmland posed a serious threat to the nation and the regime.4 Without effective
oversight, land speculation would drain scarce capital from industry, inflate housing prices, waste
farmland, destabilize grain prices, and damage overall economy and social order (Ho and G. C. Lin,
2004). Meanwhile, reform leaders have fully recognized that a functioning land market is an integral
part of socialist market economy. They all believe that land should remained commercialized, thus
rejecting the orthodox socialist view that land is extra commercium.
However, no consensus existed among reformers about the strategy of land commercialization
to balance economic development and social stability. There are two competing ideas of governing
land commercialization, based on totally different social constructs of land. The first idea, what
I called “inclusive commercialization,” allows both state-owned and collectively owned land to be
commercialized. Collective ownership is treated as an independent form of ownership with an
equivalent status to state ownership. Collectives thus are entitled to land value appreciation from
commercialization. No need for the state to nationalize collective land before commercialization
because requisition for profit is an abuse of state power through inequivalent exchange. Radical re4

People’s Daily, July 17, 1995.
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formers respected the property rights of collective land in 1986, and layered inclusive commercialization on the top of dual land ownership to accelerate urbanization. But without detail regulations,
such institutional layering was radical reformers’ expedient decisions in response to spontaneous
land transactions among villagers.5
By contrast, “exclusive commercialization” was advocated by conservative reformers, who contend that collective land must be requisitioned by the state before commercialization. They view
land as fundamentally a “state property,” an idea originated from premodern China and the Maoist
era. They attribute land value appreciation primarily to the development of national economy, the
improvement of public infrastructure, and the expansion of urban areas, so the state representing the
general will of the society is entitled to the added value of land conversion and exchange. To prevent
the leakage of state-owned asset in the dual track system, city and county governments are local state
agents that have rights to develop land and transfer land on market as the sole supplier. Collectives,
however, shall have no rights to allocate land for commercial gains (but they can allocate land to
the collective members for “self-use”). Collective ownership, after all, was an intermediary form
of public ownership inferior to state ownership, an institution created to contain the “backward”
smallholder farmers and supposed to be replaced by state ownership eventually.
The differences between inclusive and exclusive land commercialization are summarized in Table 5.2, in reference to the socialist land regime under command economy. Inclusive land commercialization prepares local officials for regulating and providing public services for landowners. By
contrast, exclusive land commercialization gives the local state an opportunity to extract from villagers, using legitimate violence to grab land, paying minimum compensation, and then collecting
rents from the sale of state-owned LURs to commercial users.
Although radical reformers overturned restrictions on collective land use and transfer in principle, exclusive land commercialization started to regain momentum under conservative leadership.
The idea became more justified as a result of macroeconomic instability. World Bank’s (1992) report on China’s urban land management, produced with the Chinese national and local authorities,
gives two reasons why government monopoly over urban land was necessary for macroeconomic
5

People’s Daily, June 17, 1986; June 28, 1986.
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Table 5.2: Patterns of Land Commercialization in China

Right to develop

Allocation mechanism

Right to transfer

Socialist Land
Regime
State units

Exclusive Land
Commercialization
City or county
governments

Inclusive Land
Commercialization
State or collective
units

Bureaucracy

Monopoly market

Competitive
market

None

City or county
governments

State or collective
units

stability. On the demand side, many potential land users were state-owned enterprises under soft
budget constraints. The lack of progress in enterprise reform made executives offer prices much
higher than the market values of land leaseholds. On the supply side, village collectives knew land
would become more valuable after conversion, so they hoarded their lands to bargain for windfall
gains that far exceed the standard compensation for requisition. Since both state-owned land buyers
and collective land owners tend to push land prices higher, central intervention is needed to keep
the nascent land market from “generating politically dangerous charges of runaway ‘speculation’”
(World Bank, 1992, p.xi). The report further advocates local government expropriate rural and suburban land for all urban conversion purposes, including those that promote economic growth. But
it also stresses that compensation should be transparent and equitable. By making local SLA as the
single agency to requisition rural land and supply urban land, the state created an important tool
to manage land transactions. Over time, state monopoly could guarantee sufficient land supply for
urban construction. It could also increase urban land prices and housing rents to alleviate the inflationary pressure of consumer goods prices.6 However, the report urges that the medium-term goal
6

Housing reform was initiated in 1988 to commercialize housing by changing the low rent system of
public housing. Urban housing units had been financed, produced, and maintained as a welfare in kind by
work units, with subsidies from local governments. Urban households back then only spent about 1 percent
of their wages on housing, putting heaving financial burden on the state for maintenance (WB, 1988). The
rise of disposable incomes increased citizens’ demands for consumer goods and drove up inflation rates.
Housing commercialization (and privatization) could dampen the trend of inflation by setting a reasonably
higher, commercial rent, which consists of site values and land development cost reflected in the price signals
from a land market. So, housing reform requires a functioning land market that allocates land to economize
its use and reveal its values.
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of land market reform is “limiting and finally eliminating the need to use administrative requisition
mechanisms,” after creating a functional capital gains tax system and forcing all enterprises operate
under hard budget constraints.
Real estate fever also gave rise to another strong argument for exclusive land commercialization:
farmland preservation. As developmental zones proliferated across China in 1992, land conversion
was getting out of control. An estimate by Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences predicted
the dependency on food imports would be 7-8% by 2020, close to the red line of food security by
international standard (Gan, 2001, p.78). Once China had a food shortage, it would be difficult to
buy enough grains from the world market. Central leaders were deeply worried about the negative
impact of land conversion on agriculture and grain supply for 1.20 billion people, which was seen
as the first and foremost problem for development.7 They thought that a regime crisis would not
happen again as long as the prices of food grains and primary agricultural products remained stable.
A convenient way to achieve the goal at the time was to forbid the urban use of collective land. In
other words, macroeconomic instability provides a strong justification for conservative reformers to
implement exclusive land commercialization as an expedient countermeasure against inflation.

5.2.3

Coalition: Conservative Reformers

To revoke radical reformers’ inclusive land institutions, conservative leaders must build a ruling
coalition. Their opportunity came in the late 1980s, when radical reformers were under the pressure of senior party leaders, after implementing a series of liberalization policies in economic and
political sphere that destabilized the CCP’s regime. The supreme leader Deng Xiaoping supported
“reform and opening up,” but he was also committed to the principle of one-party rule. He was
particularly upset about Hu Yaobang’s tolerance of the “spiritual pollution” from capitalist societies
such as liberal democracy and separation of powers. He believed in using iron fists to repress the
intellectuals, something Hu was reluctant to do. During the students’ protests in 1986, Deng and
conservative leaders forced Hu to resign from the post of party secretary for his leniency towards
7

See Jiang Zemin’s speeches in Zhongguo Tudi Nianjian (China Land Yearbook, 1993, pp.1-6). Jiang
also said that “protecting farmland is protecting our lifeline” during his visit to Fujian in June 1994.
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liberal capitalism.
Hu’s replacement was Deng’s long-time protégée, Zhao Ziyang, who was also one of Hu’s
allies. Zhao attempted to unify party elites around economic construction. He underplayed the
rectification campaign against “capitalist liberalization” in 1987, withheld the pressure from ideological conservatives, and tried to convince conservative reformers to support further economic
liberalization. In the 13th party congress, he emphasized Deng’s idea that China would be in the
“primary phase of socialism for a long period of time,” which is essentially capitalism, according to
his own understanding of Marxist work. Somewhat unexpectedly, the sudden death of Hu Yaobang
in April 1989 ignited people’s anger over corruption, inflation, and the party’s monopolization of
power. Zhao, who were sympathetic to the students and the Democratic Movement, was purged
after the crackdown led by the conservative hardliners. So were many liberal-minded radical reformers ousted during the subsequent personnel reshuffle and party reorganization. Three central
organizations of the party concentrated with Zhao’s supporters were revoked: The Central Leading
Group for Financial and Economic Affairs (reinstituted later), the Central Research Office for Political Reform, and the Central Research Office for Rural Policy. From then on, conservative reformers
took charge.
The new Party leader appointed by Deng was the former secretary of Shanghai, Jiang Zemin,
a Beijing “outsider” who had few experiences in the capital city. Surrounded by political rivals
and affected by democratization in the Soviet bloc, Jiang’s initial agenda was “stability overcomes
all.” However, as economic reforms halted, the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, whose historical
legacy rest upon “reform and opening up,” had a second thought about Jiang. During his tour to the
booming, quasi-capitalist south China in the early spring of 1992, Deng sent a clear “reform or quit”
message to Jiang’s conservative leadership.8 Afraid of being replaced by other conservative leaders
in the upcoming 14th Party Congress, Jiang quickly sided with Deng in pushing for economic
reform.
The conservative leadership learned from the 1988/89 crisis and began to silently push price
reforms to minimize the announcement effect among urban citizens.9 They also encouraged fixed
8
9

The Pittsburgh Press, page 4, February 21, 1992.
By the time when Jiang took power, most consumer goods had been deregulated, as a result of Zhao
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asset investment and export-oriented sectors in eastern cities. With the enactment of the Provisional
Regulation on the Conveyance and Transfer of State-owned Land Use Rights in 1990, more local
governments outside experimental zones benefited from land commercialization. The vice prime
minister responsible for real estate affairs, Zou Jiahua, said in a speech in August 1992 that the real
estate sector was heating but not overheating.10 As a conservative leader, Zou supported exclusive
land commercialization for the purpose of revenue generation for the state.11 In November 1992,
the State Council called for accelerating the development of the real estate sector and the commercialization of urban state-owned land, requiring all collective land be requisitioned before leasing to
real estate developers.12
Shifting developmental strategy from rural industrialization to urbanization facilitated the realignment of central and local interests. The central policy paradigm change redirected resources
into the real estate sector. As a result, shirking credit supply to rural private sector since 1992 has
made TVEs a financial burden to local governments (Y. Huang, 2008). Fiscal pressure undermined
the foundation of local state corporatism. Local officials, who used to support rural enterprises in
the 80s, began to look for investors from outside. They tried to attract foreign investors with the
authority of representing the state to plan, requisition, develop, manage, and convey urban land. A
new, urban-oriented coalition emerged between central conservative reformers and local political
entrepreneurs.
Although exclusive land commercialization was in conflict with the principle of 1986 LAL and
State Council’s Regulations on Implementing the LAL (issued on January 4th, 1991), which allow for the commercialization of collective land for urban uses (i.e., housing or TVEs), support for
exclusive land commercialization strengthened in the 90s as sectoral interests realigned with conservative leaders. The biggest loser and major opposition of exclusive land commercialization was
Ziyang’s reform to the dual track price system. Laborers’ mobility across provinces had also been permitted
(World Bank, 1992).
10
People’s Daily, August 13, 1992.
11
Zou was a conservative reformer with a prestigious family and education background. Zou’s father-inlaw is Ye Jianying, marshal of the People’s Liberation Army and former head of the state. Zou also shared
the experience of studying in the Soviet Union with then Premier Li Peng.
12
See Guowu Yuan Guanyu Fazhan Fangdi Chanye Ruogan Wenti De Tongzhi (The Notice of
the State Council on Several Issues of the Development of Real Estate Industry), 11/04/1992.
http://www.gov.cn/xxgk/pub/govpublic/mrlm/201012/t20101219_63321.html.
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early winners in the bureaucratic system who gained from the dual track system, i.e., the Ministry of
Construction (MoC), local Construction Commissions, and their affiliated real estate development
companies. MoC was the agency that administered land before SLA was established.13 It used to
have the authority of urban land allocation, which was conceded to SLA after 1986. Its affiliated
real estate development companies had to pay conveyance fees to SLA for land use, which was free
of charge with no term limits in the Maoist era. When SLA generating revenues from land commercialization, MoC also tried to take a share.14 Overlapping jurisdictions between MoC and SLA
caused confusion for property owners and local officials.15 More importantly, MoC and its affiliates
could collect land rents by leasing administratively assigned land on market. Such behavior reduced
revenues for central and local governments, causing the leakage of state-owned land assets, which
is something that conservative leaders aimed to stop with exclusive land commercialization. To
discipline bureaucrats in the construction system, conservative leadership removed then Minister of
Construction Lin Hanxiong on account of corruption.
In addition, as the state agency responsible for land management, SLA originally advocated
inclusive land commercialization as a means to preserve cultivated land and improve land use efficiency.16 But the newborn agency faced competition from MoC over land rent and lacked the
organizational and technological capacity to constrain local officials.17 To strengthen its power visà-vis MoC, SLA stood with city and county leaders in implementing land requisition procedures.
It changed its agenda to call for the strengthening of governmental monopoly on urban land and
“opening up a new source of fiscal revenue for the state.”18 For instance, SLA promoted Zhuhai
as one of the earliest special economic zones that adopted the strategy of exclusive commercializa13

Bureaucrats in the construction line develop urban “master plans,” which lay out the general outline
for infrastructure, land uses, and the expansion of built-up areas. They also oversee the implementation of
“master plans” in the making of detail plans that control density and floor area ratio.
14
According to the Item 5 of the document of Ministry of Finance issued on 9/21/1992
(http://www.mohurd.gov.cn/fgjs/xgbwgz/200611/t20061101_159662.html), local land administrations were
responsible for collecting land conveyance fees and construction commissions for land transfer fees.
15
People’s Daily, November 5, 1992.
16
SLA introduced urban land use fees in 1988 and reportedly experimented it in 35 percent of the counties.
17
Although SLA shared the power with the State Planning Commission of assigning the annual quotas
(i.e., the quota for state-owned land, the quota for collective land for construction, and the quota for rural
residential land) to local governments, the implementation of these quotas depended on local land bureaucrats,
who reported to local political leaders instead of SLA.
18
The Notice on Further Promoting the Reform of Land Use Institution. June 25, 1992.
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tion.19 In a related work, Hsing (2006) discusses how city leaders consolidated their power over
land through urban planning, redevelopment projects, and their moral capacity as social protector
and market regulator. SLA also played an important role in facilitating this change.
Another major stakeholder of land commercialization was the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Its
organizational objective was to ensure that revenues generated from land commercialization were
captured by the state and to maximize the share of the central government. At the time, MoF had
a hard time to collect land revenues from local governments. In 1988, it introduced urban land
use tax to incentivize urban land users (i.e., work units and enterprises) to return underutilized
land to the local governments and reduce the leakage of state-owned assets. But the tax failed
because the central authority did not have local information about the implicit value of land and
local governments did not want to share half of the tax with the central collector.20 MoF also
planned sharing the income from land lease sales on a on a 60-40 percent basis between the local
collector and the center. But such scheme was complained by local officials, for they had no profit or
even negative profit from urban development in face of peer competition for foreign investment.21
Some local leaders found ways to circumvent MoF’s regulations because of low profitability.22 As
a result, in September 1992, MoF grudgingly decided to reduce the central share to just 5%, making
a stance to promote the development of real estate sector through exclusive land commercialization.
The timing of bureaucratic realignment is important, as it indicates a ruling coalition in favor of
exclusive land commercialization has already formed in the early 90s. The initial focus of this coalition was to build a state-owned land market and prevent illegal transactions in the dual track system,
so that the state could generate more revenues from land and real estate development. Conservative
reformers have not paid much attention to the reform of collective land and collective institutions
(Interview GD20160314). In rural areas, villagers generally root for inclusive land commercializa19

People’s Daily, November 15, 1992.
Local governments had been charging land use fees under their own discretion. For more details, see
World Bank (1992, pp.63-64).
21
Decentralized competition for capital could drive down the price of industrial land to the level lower than
the cost of development. Although the price of residential land in urban areas may be higher than that of
industrial land, the cost of resettlement and development is usually much higher.
22
For example, some local governments asked land users to, not pay the full amount of land conveyance
fee, but pay the cost of building public facilities such as roads and bridges for them. Some othersdeliberatively
underreported the actual income of land lease sales, so that the center could only extract a tiny fraction of it.
20
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tion because they can reap long-term benefits from land value appreciation by retaining collective
land ownership. They can negotiate the amount of land requisition fees with urban land users who
encroach agricultural land. According to the Guangzhou real estate bureau, almost 80 percent of
land requisitions before 1992 was done without the involvement of city authorities (World Bank,
1992, pp.57-58). Villagers continued to develop, transfer, rent, and mortgage their collective land
without government approval or supervision, as the local state tried to monopolize urban land market. Quietly, without government oversight, they transferred existing construction sites on collective
land to commercial users or used land as a share to cooperate with investors. Suburban villagers built
mudbrick houses on agricultural land and collected housing rents from tenants. It is very costly for
local land bureaucrats to enforce the law of illegal occupation of agricultural land because, as soon
as they demolish these houses, villagers can rebuild their houses overnight. In addition, since many
lower income families and migrant workers live in these buildings, land agencies were reluctant to
demolish them in fear of social unrest (Interview HN20160414).
Due to the development of informal land and real estate markets, as well as low state intervention, open land conflicts were fewer in the rural area in the early 90s. As shown in Figure 5.2, only
a few reports in People’s Daily were related to state-society conflicts over land before 1992, but the
number began to rise in the late 90s and jumped ten folds in the 2000s. The same pattern can also
be found in Enlightenment Daily, the mouthpiece of the Central Propaganda Department. Besides,
Figure 5.3 shows that the amount of land-related administrative litigation cases received by courts
increased rapidly after 2002. These evidences suggest that land requisition was not a big problem
or not a serious concern for central policymakers in the 90s. Low level of land-related conflicts
allowed conservative reformers to impose restrictive rules on collective land without considering
much about potential backlash from villagers.
There are several explanations for the low level of land-related conflicts in the early 90s. First,
urban expansion rate accelerated into the 2000s. Land requisition by urban authorities was around
1500 square kilometers per year on average after the millennium, compared to only 500 before. According to Bernstein and Lü (2003, p.165), the most common source of social conflict in rural areas
back then was excessive burdens of taxes and fees or unpaid peasant salaries. Land requisition for
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commercial development was not perceived as one of the most important abuses by local authorities. Second, since the late 90s, central land ministers have perceived spontaneous land transactions
between villagers and real estate developers as a serious disturbance to the state monopoly of urban
land and local land revenues.23 In 2004, the State Council authorized provincial land bureaus to
administer local land bureaus vertically, moving them away from the direct leadership of the local government to the provincial government. With the assistance of satellite and more advanced
technologies, local land bureaucrats could detect and stop illegal land use more effectively and efficiently than before. As a result, villagers’ spontaneous land conversion and transaction was no
longer easy as it used to be. Third, the local state has reduced its role in providing social services to
villagers who lost their lands. Before the collapse of the work unit system, local governments were
responsible for providing jobs, public housing, and other kinds of subsidies to displaced farmers after land requisition. But after the reform, these welfare benefits were no longer available to farmers,
who had more complaints about the accommodation to urban life. Finally, the state’s control over
the leadership of village collectives were weakened after the elimination of agricultural taxes in the
early 2000s. Village leaders used to be rewarded economically and politically to work with township
governments to extract taxes and fees from rural residents and to prevent or preempt popular resistance. But since the tax reform, township governments began to manage villages budgets directly,
which made village cadres less loyal to local state officials and more allied with villagers. With the
village leaders’ support, villagers were more able to organize, mobilize, and make themselves heard
(J. Wang, 2012).
By the 1993 “real estate fever” and the 1998 land administrative law, an urban-oriented ruling
coalition in support of exclusive land commercialization has already existed across China. As conservative leaders became autonomous and independent from local, bureaucratic, and rural landed
interests, they were ready to institutionalize exclusive land commercialization to develop and stabilize urban areas.
23

See “Zhengfu Yao Zuanjin Tudi Gongying Quan” (The Government Shall Grasp the Right of Land Supply: Interview with the Vice Director of the Ministry of Land and Resources Li Yuan), Chengshi Kaifa (Urban
Development), 2002(10).
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5.2.4

Institutionalization of Exclusive Land Commercialization

Changes in the institutional context, governing ideas, and ruling coalitions paved the road for a
comprehensive revision of the 1986 LAL and the institutionalization of exclusive land commercialization in the 1998 LAL. In 1993, Jiang’s leadership became highly alarmed of inflation pressure
and macroeconomic instability. As the decentralized banking system continued pumping hot money
into speculative real estate projects in Guangdong, Hainan, Shanghai and other coastal areas, the
central leadership decided to take urgent measures to avoid another political crisis. Premier Li Peng
announced to freeze all the approvals of new development zones, while Vice Premier Zhu Rongji
orchestrating the austerity program. On June 23, the State Council intervened the land market by
stopping credit supply from PBOC to the real estate sector and terminated all the initial public offerings of real estate firms. Under the tight credit control, the craze for real estate development ground
to a halt, with a large amount of buildings unfinished. The bubble burst quickly, but it left a lasting
impact on the development of land regime.
Conservative leaders, who had been promoting the idea of exclusive commercialization, became more determined to tighten up urban land supply through centralized control and government
monopoly. Without substantial opposition from central or local elites and being free from worrying
about rural instability, they accelerated in revoking radical reformers’ agenda of inclusive land commercialization. In November 1993, the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress decided to
speed up the marketization of production factors such as finance, labor and land. Along with fiscal
recentralization, developing a regularized real estate market with state monopoly over urban land
was regarded as a key part of the grand strategy of forging a socialist market economy. As TVEs
were privatized or restructured into joint-stock companies, rural entrepreneurs one after another
changed collective ownership of land to state ownership so that they could cash in through transfer
or mortgage.24 To rally local support in developed areas packed with spontaneous collective land
transactions, Jiang Zemin visited Zhuhai in Guangdong in June 1994, where he praised the city
leader for investing in urban infrastructure and using revenues from transferring state-owned LURs
24

Township governments also collected conveyance fees during the privatization of TVEs. According to
Zhongguo Tudi Nianjian (China Land Yearbook, 1993, p.279), 81% of collective land for construction was
conveyed by the time.
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to finance urban construction. He acclaimed that this model did not create a “bubble” economy or
land speculation. “Land is the most reliable asset of the state,” he said, “it is absolutely right to
manage land in a highly centralized way. The practice that the state does not monopolize land is not
viable at all. I’m here to support for your monopoly (on land).”
Under this guiding principle, MoC began to draft the 1994 Urban Real Estate Administration
Law (UREAL). Vice premier Zou Jiahua, who was then promoted to the Politburo, was in charge of
this legislation. A consensus, involving 31 central departments, 30 province-level governments, and
21 city governments, was reached that collective land should not be used for real estate development
to “implement the basic state policy of farmland protection.”25 The final legislation balanced the
interests between MoC and SLA. Simply put, the former manages buildings, and the latter manages
land. Land conveyance is managed by SLA, but real estate transactions (along with the transfer of
LURs) are co-managed by MoC and SLA, with the former being the primary decision-maker.26
Since the promulgation of UREAL, more local leaders and bureaucrats started to foster local
state monopoly on urban land. An unusual practice was recorded in Weihai, Shandong, where
the city and county governments requisitioned collective land and then conveyed it as state-owned
land back to the original collective owners (i.e., township or village collectives).27 SLA promoted
the model in eight provinces, as it achieved multiple goals at the same time: preserving farmland,
strengthening state monopoly on land, increasing fiscal revenue, and accelerating urbanization and
economic growth.28 On April 15, 1997, the CCP’s Central Committee and the State Council jointly
issued a policy, which explicitly says that “collective land cannot be conveyed, or used for profitdriven real estate development, or transferred or leased for non-agricultural construction.”29 The
document set the tone for the institutionalization of exclusive land commercialization in the 1998
25

See the explanation for UREAL given by the vice head of MoC in the National People’s Congress.
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2001-01/02/content_5003190.htm.
26
See Article 12 and Article 60 in UREAL for more details.
27
The local governments did share with the collective owners 60% of the profit from land conveyance or
10% of the area of requisitioned land in kind as compensation.
28
See Guanyu Feinong Jianshe De Jiti Tudi Jiaoyi Ying Zhengwei Guoyou De Shidian Fangan De Tongzhi
(The Notice on the Proposal of Experimenting the Nationalization of Transactions of Collective Land for
Non-agricultural Construction), State Land Administration, 1995-7-21.
29
See Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Tudi Guanli Qieshi Baohu Gengdi De
Tongzhi (the Notice on Further Strengthening Land Management and Protecting Cultivated Land), so-called
No. 11 document of 1997.

87

LAL.30 Although SLA officials tried to argue for inclusive land commercialization during the legislation, for they knew it was unrealistic and ineffective to stop villagers transferring collective LURs,
the Article 63 still prohibits the transaction. The attempt failed because of the “powerful momentum” of exclusive commercialization and “lack of experience from local experiments” at the time
(Gan, 2001, p.233, 237).

5.3

Alternative Explanations

The historical analysis above suggests that the institutionalization of exclusive land commercialization was driven by conservative reformers’ concerns over urban instability, which is under the constant threat of uncontrolled inflation. To avoid another regime crisis like the one in 1989, conservative leaders must take urgent measures to stop speculative land and real estate activities in the partial
reform environment. Since enterprises were still under soft budget constraints when land markets
emerged, commercialization of collective land would increase inflationary pressures, endangering
macroeconomy and survival of the regime. From an economic or social justice point of view, the
best solution for the long term is enterprise reform through privatization, putting state-owned or
collective enterprises under hard budget constraints. But enterprise reform is a complicated process that could lead to higher unemployment rate and further destabilize social order, conservative
leaders thus made a “second-best” choice to institutionalize exclusive land commercialization in
adaptation to the problems resulting from China’s distinct sequence of reform. It is the only feasible
way to control inflation in the short term without making structural changes.
In addition, urban order is under pressure when prices of agricultural products rise sharply partly
due to farmland conversion. Exclusive land commercialization is one way to control the speed of
urban sprawl and stop illegal occupation of collective land for agriculture. However, this is not the
primary reason because farmland preservation does not require imposing restrictions on collective
land use, as long as land use planning and management are effective. Besides, there is no convincing
evidence from the first land survey that shows farmland reduction was mainly driven by urbanization
30

The policy ordered to freeze the administrative permission of land conversion for a comprehensive revision to the 1986 LAL.
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(Interview BJ20161015). Most farmland reduction is due to the change of land use to other (more
profitable) agricultural purposes such as garden, water, pasture, and forest or to unutilized land.
Land statistics show that only around 20% of farmland lost is caused by urban construction and
transportation.1
Moreover, conservative leaders’ concern over urban instability also comes from petitioners who
lost their investment in unfinished real estate projects after the central bank tightened the credit in
1993. For example, Guangdong government had dealt with more than a hundred “zombie” properties left by indebted developers since 1995. It issued 36 regulations and held 23 coordination
meetings to appease over ten thousand homeowners.2 More broadly, government officials tried to
solve these conflicts by gradually raising housing prices to revitalize abandoned projects. And this
urgent affair required them to prioritize the development of state-owned land market over collective
land market. Exclusive land commercialization serves the exact purpose, as the official explanation
for the 1998 LAL indicates.3
One may argue that conservative leaders already had an extractive agenda for exclusive land
commercialization before coming to power, and they imposed the idea once their power was consolidated. However, their initial idea was ambiguous and unpersuasive to local and ministerial officials, with its narrow focus on preventing the leakage of state-owned assets. Real estate overheating
and land speculation in 1993 changed the reform dynamics, as more political elites perceived that
exclusive land commercialization was the only way to fight inflation and maintain urban order in
a partially reformed economic system. Without the threat of overheating real estate, conservative
leaders could not easily build a consensus among political elites within a short period of time in
making UREAL and 1998 LAL. Restrictions over collective land use and transfer would not be
necessary if enterprises were under harder budget constraints.4
Therefore, it would be overstretched to argue that the institutionalization of exclusive land commercialization was mainly driven by a predatory state. Political leaders who pushed the reform had
1

China Land Resource Yearbook, 2000.
People’s Daily, 1998.11.22
3
See 6.
4
The budget constraints faced by SOEs were not hardened until 1997 when reformers led by Zhu Rongji
launched a sweeping wave of enterprise reform.
2
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more pressing concerns over recurring inflationary pressure, potential urban riots, and regime survival than economic extraction. If conservative leaders designed the exclusive institutions to extract
rents from collective land and promote real estate development, they could have done it more efficiently. They could have created the Ministry of Land and Housing Administration to streamline the
administrative procedure of real estate development. This proposal was actually called by SLA to
build a comprehensive management system of urban and rural land, removing cross-cutting bureaucratic lines between itself, MoC, and Ministry of Agriculture (World Bank, 1992, p.131). However,
when the State Council being restructured in 1998, central leaders instead created the Ministry of
Land and Resources (MLR) by merging SLA with the Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources,
State Oceanic Administration, and State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. The aim was reportedly to strengthen land control and preserve cultivated land. This institutional change suggests a
more possible explanation for exclusive land commercialization than the predatory state is political
learning from the previous crisis in 1989 and the quasi-crisis in 1993.
As for the argument of central-local collusion, which implies that the center empowered the local states to seek rents from land by institutionalizing exclusive land commercialization in exchange
for greater share of tax revenues, I show that central leaders have already promoted the idea as early
as 1992 for the purposes of economic development and fiscal revenue. By 1993, land conveyance
income has taken up to 25-50% of fiscal revenues in some major cities. Nationally, annual land conveyance income fluctuated around 50 billion RMB during the period of 1993 to 2000, as most urban
land lots was still allocated administratively (Gan, 2014, p.256). However, if local governments had
a bargain with the central leaders in 1994, we would like to see a surge of total land conveyance
income immediately afterwards. But the number did not increase significantly until 2002, when the
center ordered all lands used for commerce, tourism, entertainment, and real estate purposes should
be allocated through auction, bidding, or quotation. So, the 1994 tax reform did not give rise to
exclusive institutions of land commercialization. Instead, both institutional changes were driven by
the decentralized administration inherited from the late Maoist era.
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5.4

Summary

To summarize this chapter, I argue that exclusive land commercialization in China, that is, excluding
collective land from urban market or creating state monopoly over urban land, was institutionalized
by a coalition led by conservative reformers as an urgent solution to stabilize macroeconomic condition in a partially reformed economic system. By tracing the evolution of institutional context,
policy ideas, and coalitional politics from the late 80s to early 90s, I show that reversion from inclusive to exclusive land commercialization was hastily pushed by conservative leaders to prevent
potential collapse of the single-party regime after learning from the previous crisis. The policy idea,
which was initially formed to generate revenues for the state, was institutionalized mainly because
it provides the only viable way to solve the problems of speculative land and real estate projects in
fighting inflation. Conservative leaders were able to shift the policy paradigm because radical reformers were ousted from the central leadership, bureaucratic interests were along the same line, and
land-related conflicts in rural areas were not intense (as a result of relatively weak state capacity).
My finding contrasts with the conventional wisdom that China’s land regime was deliberately
designed to facilitate land grabbing by local governments or to compensate local governments’
fiscal loss from the tax reform. Although exclusive land commercialization is by nature predatory
for villagers, its institutionalization in the 90s was not driven by state predation. It was first and
foremost a practical, convenient, or even expedient measure, which was learned by autonomous
conservative leaders to solve urgent macroeconomic challenges that could threaten their survival
during economic transformation. The finding supports my theory of economic reform based on
autonomous leaders’ learning from recurring social grievance. In this case, learning from the regime
crisis is biased towards the rectification of radical reforms in the 80s. Such biased learning overlooks
the potential negative consequences on social stability.
In addition, while I explain the specific institutional arrangement of exclusive land commercialization with rational choice theory, the institutional context that shaped political leaders’ decisionmaking was path dependent. Without the interaction of partial enterprise reform and collective
land ownership contributing to an overheating real estate sector in 1993, it would be difficult for
conservative leaders to institutionalize exclusive land commercialization in 1998. To some extent,
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exclusive institutions of land commercialization are an unintended consequence of collective land
ownership and gradual enterprise reform.
Since the 1998 LAL came into force, the mainstream description of collective land has become
villagers’ “last resort” that provides them the final guarantee of subsistence. It has been treated as
a welfare given by the state to villagers exclusively. However, seeing their land being exploited by
local developmental states for profits, villagers began to resist. As we will see in the next chapter,
villagers’ resistance has generated a new dynamic to land market reform.
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Chapter 6
The Politics of Land Market
Liberalization
This chapter examines the liberalization of land market since the establishment of exclusive institutions of land commercialization. It has been a puzzle why political leaders in China pursue
the reform that goes against the interests of local bureaucrats and real estate interests. Existing
explanations to the puzzle are mainly economic rationales such as economic development and fiscal dependence on land. That is, the more economically developed places are more constrained
by scarce land quota for construction, so the local governments have a stronger incentive to promote the reform to circumvent the tedious procedure of land expropriation and stimulate economic
growth. In addition, local governments that are less dependent on land revenues are more likely to
reform because they have less to lose. However, in 1.3, I show that reformed cities are diversely
distributed on the dimension of economic development and land dependence, meaning that the two
factors cannot fully explain the local variation.
My theory suggests the reform may also have something to do with the intensity of land conflicts
and political leaders’ autonomy and independence. To test the theory, I select local governments
from three provinces – Guangdong, Shandong, and Guizhou – as my fieldwork sites during 201617. These three cases encompass a set of diverse cases to represent the variation in rural collective
strength and local fiscal structure (6.1 shown below). Guizhou is selected as it has the weakest rural
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Figure 6.1: Case Selection for Land Market Liberalization
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sector and low land conflict intensity. Both Guangdong and Shandong have strong rural collectives,
but Guangdong is fiscally less dependent on landed interests and politically more important than
Shandong. In the following pages, I will first explain the unsuccessful reform at the national level
in the absence of an autonomous central leadership. Next, I will show in detail the subnational
variations of land market liberalization. While Guangdong’s reform is subversive to the extractive
land regime, Shandong’s land market reform is still extractive in nature, as officials embraced market
in a way that took advantage of institutional ambiguity only to reinforce the existing regime. Then, I
explain the difference between Guangdong and Shandong with political leadership’s autonomy and
independence of landed interests, which originate from local economic structure and the privilege in
political hierarchy. I also bring in Guizhou into comparison as a typical example of underdeveloped
provinces that have low intensity of land conflicts and have not reformed actively. Finally, I trace
back in history to show that the government’s land policy in response to villager’s resistance has a
deeper root in the state-society relations.
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6.1

National Reform of Land Market Liberalization

As discussed in the previous chapter, conservative reformers resorted to a series of institutional
and regulatory changes to maintain macroeconomic stability: urgent austerity measures, unification
of dual-track markets, and the recentralization of fiscal and financial system. Under the old fiscal
contract system, both tax revenues and central share have been declining. The trend was overturned
by the 1994 tax reform. Local governments, which used to collect all the taxes and negotiated with
the higher-level government on their shares, only had direct control over income taxes on individuals
and enterprises, business tax on services sector (especially construction), agricultural tax, and other
modest taxes under the new tax regime. The central government took away 75% of the value added
tax from provincial governments. Since 2002, the center increased its share of income taxes to 60
percent to fund fiscal transfer to the western provinces. These tax reforms not only squeezed local
tax base, but also reined in local extrabudgetary revenues to strengthen the central government’s
ability of macroeconomic management (S. H. Whiting, 2006, p.285).
The new centralized tax system also gives local governments a stronger incentive to develop
manufacturing and services sectors, where they can collect business tax under their discretion, and
to promote land lease sales, which generate land premium outside the budgetary system (Tao et al.,
2010). They devote their energies to allure investors with low-cost industrial land, tax incentives,
and other subsidiaries. They set up local government financing platforms (LGFPs) to get lowinterest loans from state-owned banks, build infrastructures, and create new urban areas through
massive land requisition. Once industrialization kickstarts the services sector, local governments
can pay back their debts by selling the commercial and residential LURs on the primary stateowned land market and collecting business taxes from the real estate transactions on the secondary
market.
This model of land use fiscalization became widespread due to other reasons as well. First, under Jiang Zemin’s second term, the central ideology shifted from “balancing efficiency and fairness”
to “efficiency first while balancing fairness.” While this subtle change in words is read as a part of
the broader reform agenda of coopting private entrepreneurs into CCP, its emphasis on efficiency
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over fairness encouraged local officials and capitalists to prioritize economic growth.1 Second, local officials’ pressure of generating economic growth is also given by a more institutionalized cadre
evaluation system (S. H. Whiting, 2006). Third, trade liberalization such as China joining the WTO,
together with a low foreign exchange rate, motivated local officials to develop export-oriented manufacturing industries for economic growth (Lardy, 2004). Fourth, the central government recentralized state-owned banking system to restrict credit to TVEs and repressed interest rate to subsidize
SOEs or LGFPs under soft budget constraints (Y. Huang, 2008; Shih, 2007). Fifth, comprehensive urban housing reform, which was launched partly in response to the 1997-98 Asian Financial
Crisis, abolished administrative housing allocation, privatized residential properties, and, with low
interest rates for mortgage, facilitated the rapid growth of urban housing markets. Sixth and finally,
exclusive land commercialization allows local officials to seek monopoly rent from land lease sales
within their own jurisdictions.
This combination of tax, banking, housing, land, and administrative institutions with ideology created a situation in which local governments have strong motivations to grab collective land
from villagers for urbanization. The 1998 LAL has not specified what constitutes public interest
in the expropriation of collective land and set low standards of compensation for collective land
and buildings on collective land. Exclusive institutions allow local officials to seek rents from land
development and a distorted urban land market at the expense of villagers. In addition, corruption
and collusion between village head and local officials also intensified land-related conflicts, causing
greater pressure on rural stability and state-collective relations.
As predatory state-led developmentalism generated massive social grievance in rural areas, central leaders needed a new set of ideas and policies to legitimize the CCP’s rule. Hu Jintao became
the Chinese leader in 2002 and the general secretary of CCP in 2003, but his rule was overshadowed
by his predecessor Jiang Zemin. After ruling China for over a decade, Jiang was still a powerful
political figure. He did not resign from the Chairman of the Central Military Commission until
September 2004. More importantly, among the nine members of Politburo Standing Committee,
six were promoted to the Politburo by Jiang after Deng Xiaoping’s death in 1997.2 Although Hu
1
2

See Jiang’s reports on the fourteenth and fifteenth congress of the CCP.
The only exceptions are Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, and Wen Jiabao.
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was appointed directly by Deng, he couldn’t exercise autonomous and independent power in the
collective leadership. Facing an increasingly contentious society and a group of political rivals surrounded him, Hu proposed to build a “harmonious society” while having a “scientific development
concept.” The new governing ideology was formed during Hu’s term as the president of the Central
Party School, where he visioned his own political legacy by learning from party cadres and scholars
to solve the problems of social grievance and unbalanced state-led development.
Hu’s governing ideology had different impact on elite politics and societal control. At the elite
level, to keep harmony within the collective leadership, Hu let each member of the Politburo govern
his own policy areas without much interference from the others. The division of labor became more
institutionalized, allowing central leaders to develop their own patronage networks and agendas.
These networks bred abusive use of state power and rampant corruption in line sectors, which stimulated Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign after Hu’s retirement. A prominent example is Zhou
Yongkang, the member in the 17th Politburo Standing Committee responsible for the legal-political
work and public safety. Known as the “security tsar” of China before his down fall, Zhou dictated
the state security machine to suppress petitioners with brutal means, which often exacerbated social
conflicts.3 At the local level, the notion of “harmonious society” was distorted, as local officials
used repressive measures to reduce petitions and mass incidents, preempting or preventing people
from protesting the state. Local governments also became increasingly defiant to central mandates
because of the divided collective leadership in Beijing.4 Few significant institutional reforms were
successfully implemented during Hu’s term, aside from the exemption of the agricultural tax in the
honeymoon period.
A key policy component of Hu’s “harmonious society” was a paradigm shift from the systemic
rural-urban divide to coordinative rural-urban development. The ambitious reform was designed to
reduce social inequity by improving the welfare of rural residents. Land use reform was a central
piece. In the Third Plenum of the 17th CCP Congress, the party leadership called for reining in
excessive land expropriation and taking care of villagers who lost their lands.5 The main idea was
3

See https://www.economist.com/china/2014/12/11/tiger-in-the-net.
The situation at the time was called Zhengling Buchu Zhongnanhai (or the central policy stops at Zhongnanhai).
5
Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Big Issues on Promoting
4
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to gradually narrow the scope of condition for land expropriation to public use, thereby excluding
land expropriation for commercial use. To reduce land conflicts, the center urged local governments to improve the compensation scheme, make compensation timely, and deal with villagers’
employment, housing, and social security issues more appropriately.
The second major policy change is towards more inclusive land commercialization. The reform,
known as the “marketization of collective land for construction” (Jiti Jianshe Yongdi Rushi or JJYR
for short), is the other side of the first policy. Since government-led land expropriation was no longer
applicable to commercial use, any commercial project (approved by the government) outside urban
areas must use collective land. Restricting land expropriation to non-profit construction projects
means that villagers could develop collective land for commercial constructions and benefit from
it. The Decision explicitly encourages the government to “gradually build a unified rural-urban
land use market for construction use, transfer the right to use collective land for construction in the
unified market through public and legal ways, and give collective land equal rights as state-owned
land, provided that its use conforms to the state land planning.”6
The idea of collective land commercialization is not truly pathbreaking. Villagers in suburban
and urban areas have been trading collective land on black market for a long time, creating inefficient use of land as well as numerous conflicts over contracts and expropriation. A similar policy
was adopted earlier in 2000, when the State Council issued an opinion that encouraged local governments to gather fragmented TVEs in small towns and to supply land by allowing collective land for
construction to be circulated on market. The policy was made in the context of rising debt burden of
rural collective enterprises and in the spirit of the Third Plenum of the Fifteenth Party’s Congress,
which emphasized that “developing small towns is a grand strategy of promoting the development
of rural economy and society.”
The reform in 2008, however, was made in a different context for a different purpose other than
economic development and urbanization. It was essentially a policy of land market liberalization
for redistribution. It formally legalized collective land transactions by regulating these activities.
the Reform and Development of Rural Areas. Oct. 15, 2008.
6
Ibid. The reform was pursued gradually. The initial policy proposal in 2008 applies to collective land
for industrial and commercial uses only to avoid generating shocks to real estate markets. But the central
government later allowed collective land to be used for residential buildings for rental.
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As long as a construction project complies with the land use planning and is approved by the majority (or super majority) of the villagers, village leaders can make direct transactions of collective
LURs with commercial or industrial land users. By allowing villagers to negotiate with real estate
developers in a market without going through the process of land expropriation, this reform opens
the opportunity for villagers to capture a greater share from land value appreciation. Hence, they
would have less grievances over land and less likely to challenge the government.7
Another immediate consequence of the reform is increased supply and lower price of land for
construction, which would facilitate urbanization and economic growth. However, lower urban land
price is not a good sign for existing real estate developers. A lower entry barrier means a higher
level of competition. It also negatively affects the valuation of real estate firms, which are heavily
leveraged, using land holdings as collateral to take bank loans for financing development projects.
To maintain a positive cash flow, local real estate developers are not enthusiastic land market liberalization. Besides, real estate developers generally prefer dealing with the local government in
land market to village collectives, which typically consist of hundreds of households with diverse
demands. Negotiation with these villagers can be extremely time-consuming and costly for developers, who do not have the state’s power of using legitimate violence to expropriate land. In addition,
an executive manager of a large real estate firm told me in an interview that he thinks governments
are more credible than village collectives because village leaders sometimes do not respect the contract signed by their predecessors (Interview, GD20160310). For these reasons above, real estate
developers, though do not mind using collective land for construction, are reluctant to support or
push for the liberalization reform.
Perhaps a more consequential impact of this reform has to do with local government’s land revenue and local officials. Land premium and taxes have been a significant part of local governments’
revenue, on which local bureaucrats’ wages and bonuses depend. A land bureaucrat talked to me in
a private setting that every time the government is in short of year-end bonuses, their leader just told
7
Some may argue that ordinary villagers couldn’t benefit directly from the reform because in practice
corrupt officials would take advantage of this opportunity to seek rents and fill their own pockets. However,
without effective oversight, the same thing happens in cases of land expropriation as well. It is not land market
liberalization that causes the problem. Instead, regulating collective land transaction may reduce illegal use
of collective land by villager cadres or township officials and infringement to villagers’ rights and interests.

99

them to put two state-owned land lots on the market (Interview, GZ20171107). Because of exclusive land commercialization and state monopoly, local governments hoard urban land and drive up
land price to maximize revenues. Land market liberalization would dismantle the state monopoly
from the root and eliminate local officials rent-seeking opportunities. Several local land officials
complained that the reform was “meant to eradicate the fiscalization of land use” and “going to
make land expropriation costlier and more difficult” (Interview, GZ20161209).
Although the idea of “harmonious society” prevailed and elites agreed to narrow the scope of
land expropriation, no consensus existed when it came to specific institutional design. In 2007,
the Property Law recognized collective LURs in principle, but it remained ambiguous about the
circulation of collective LURs. An attempt to revise LAL in 2009 failed due to ministerial conflict
and local resistance. An official who participated in the legislation process told me that the Central
Rural Work Leading Group and relevant state ministries held 13 meetings during 2011-12 to draft
a new LAL, mainly trying to improve the compensation scheme for villagers (for example, higher
social insurance and long-term benefits from land appreciation), but opinions were divided on almost every aspect (Interview, BJ20170419). The debate was centered on the scope of expropriation
and the definition of public use. Like the case of Kelo v. City of New London in the U.S., land
expropriation for the purpose of economic development, such as factories and realties, was disputed
in China as well. More specifically, some argue that the state should not be involved in any commercial land development, but others argue that restricting land expropriation for public use will
cause even more social conflicts.8 In addition, power struggle existed between ministries with overlapping jurisdictions. Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for the use of collective land, but the
planning and management of collective land use was the responsibility of MLR. Moreover, local
practice provides little empirical evidence for the feasibility of the new rules, as local officials were
reluctant to share land revenues with villagers.
Because of the decentralized collective leadership, no institutional agreement on land market
reform was achieved under Hu’s regime, although tentative solutions were proposed. It was until the
8

For example, villagers whose land is expropriated for roads and parks get less compensation from the
state than that of nearby villagers whose land is sold for commercial projects. Since a city is an organic unity,
villagers affected by the same development project should get equal compensation from the state regardless
of the future use of land.
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end of 2014 that the central government under Xi Jinping’s leadership began to restart the legislative
revision process by exempting 33 counties from the LAL to experiment market-based land reforms.

6.2

Subnational Reforms of Land Market Liberalization

Although it has been difficult to reconcile central disagreement, local governments have been experimenting a wide variety of market-based land reforms. China’s decentralized administrative environment since the late Maoist period has allowed subnational leaders to try different policies that
accommodate to local conditions. Shortly after the promulgation of 1998 LAL, which delegitimized
the commercialization of collective land and recentralized the authority of land expropriation, local
governments hungry for land and growth started finding ways to circumvent the more restricted land
use regulations.
A common goal of diverse local experiments is to improve the utilization of collective land, or as
many land officials and scholars call it, to “awaken the sleeping land.” By exploring the ambiguous
central mandates and laws, local officials tried to introduce market mechanism to allocate collective
land for construction. But when it comes to the specific design of land market liberalization policy,
local experiments vary on how market mechanism is used in accommodation to local needs. While
some experiments are inclusive by enabling villagers and small developers to invest on collective
land, others are simply regulatory changes that aim to strengthen local fiscal performance.
Inclusive land market liberalization refers to the re-commercialization of collective land that
generates a redistributive outcome. While villagers in prosperous areas have been developing and
renting collective land to local investors in violation to the national policy, some officials have
allowed collective land outside the urban planning area to be circulated without ownership change
since 1996. The city government of Suzhou called such practice as “preserving rights and leaving
benefits” (Baoquan Liuli) to villagers. Despite many detailed differences, these local experiments
allow village collectives to dispose their own collective land (in compliance with land use planning)
and distribute more land rents to villagers than land expropriation.
A prominent example is the city of Foshan in Guangdong. Shaxi is a village in the suburban area
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of Guangzhou under the administration of Nanhai county and Dali town. Since the 90s, the village
collective has been building factories and logistic parks, but short-term renting was not stable. The
renting price in the informal market has not been satisfactory either. In 2009, the village rented 18
mu collective land to a local real estate developer for 28 years, at the price about 6 RMB per square
meter. This low price caused discontent among villagers, which led to a new village leadership,
elected in 2011, and renegotiation with the developer. The new village leadership was comprised
of entrepreneurs who are familiar with business operation and government policies such as the
provincial land market liberalization policy in 2005. With the support of the provincial, city, and
district government, they turned the game around, extending the lease to 40 years and increasing the
unit price to 19 RMB. In 2014, the developer and the village made another deal for additional 50
mu collective land. By the time I visited the village in 2015, the real estate company had invested
2.5 billion for a 470,000 square meter urban complex, including a shopping mall, hotel, and office
building. More importantly, villagers swapped the 68 mu collective land for 75,000 square meter
building areas, which they rented back to the developer for 25 years and received incomes about 15
times more than the previous price.1 In addition, both parties agreed that the village as the collective
landowner has the right to recall the 68 mu collective land and all the buildings attached. With the
guarantee of long-term lease, villagers in Shaxi are getting fixed income every year. Even before
the opening of the shopping mall, each individual villager has 16,000 RMB dividends per year from
this single project, much better than what they had before.
By contrast, some local experiments of collective land re-commercialization are regulatory liberalization that aims to create a market of collective land but does not have redistributive consequences. A typical example is the state-led land market liberalization in provinces like Shandong.
In 2001, the provincial government followed the State Council’s opinion and issued a notice to
recommodify collective land for the integration of rural enterprises.2 However, careful reading reveals the reform is extractive in nature. In the paragraph related to collective land (shown below),
1
The contract says that the developer shall pay 23 RMB per square meter per month before the project
is completed. Then the price increases by 1 RMB annually since the sixth year. The starting price for the
twentieth year is 60 RMB. The price for the last five year increases 10 RMB annually. The total estimate of
the 40-year lease is close to 1 billion RMB.
2
The Notice on Strengthening and Improving the Management of Land for Construction in Small Towns.
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the policy granted town governments instead of villages the right to dispose collective land and to
claim the residual income generated from collective land.
“To experiment with the compensated use of collective land, town governments
shall handle the conversion of land for agricultural purposes and the registration of
land for construction use in accordance with the law, urban development plan, and
annual plan of land for construction. Town governments must sign agreements with
villages if using the collective land, reasonably deal with land rights, and compensate
for the village according to the law. Town governments may also allocate 10-15% of
the approved land for construction to the occupied village as land for producing and
living, in addition to one-time monetary compensation; or pay rents to the occupied
village year by year according to the agreement in the contract; or share the interests and risks of land development and utilization with the village by allowing land
to be appraised as shares. Where conditions permit, villages outside towns may swap
the collective land with land in the town’s planned area. Town governments shall uniformly plan, develop, supply, and manage land that has been approved for construction
purposes. When a specific construction project uses land, town governments may sign
the agreement of the compensated use of collective land with the land user and register
the use of collective land; or they may experiment with tender or auction to fully take
advantage of the economic utility of collective land asset and realize its value. All the
income from the compensated use of collective land for small towns shall be left to the
town government, but the town government shall reasonably distribute land revenue in
accordance with the agreement signed with the villages.”
It empowered town officials by taking advantage of the ambiguous three-level collective landownership, so that they could urbanize towns more quickly, without complying to the tedious procedure
of land expropriation. In some cases, town officials simply change collective land to state-owned
and illegally profit from the state-owned land market. In either way, villagers’ rights as collective
landowners were denied by the state.
Another example of regulatory liberalization is the creation of land quota markets. The idea
was originated in Zhejiang, where centrally assigned land quota for construction was in severe
shortage. To increase the quota, local governments reclaimed unutilized rural collective land left
by urban immigrants or bankrupted rural enterprises. Through land reclamation, consolidation, or
redevelopment, local governments can generate extra land quotas and allocate them to projects in
urban or suburban areas, where real estate or industrial projects are held up by the lack of land
quotas. These extra land quotas can be traded on open markets or sold directly to buyers, including
public land banks, state-owned financial platform companies, and private entrepreneurs.3 The idea
3

See Yuan Xiao’s (2014) dissertation for details. Although government units or local state-owned compa-
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was endorsed by the State Council in 2004 with a major modification. To maintain the total area
of cultivated land unreduced, the central government required local governments to “balance the
increase of urban land for construction with the decrease of rural land for construction,” which
is also known as Zengjian Guagou (ZJGG) for short in Chinese. In 2006, Shandong and other
provinces piloted the ZJGG policy under the guidance of the MLR.4 Only two years later, the MLR
issued the detailed rules of the ZJGG policy for local governments to follow, as a part of the central
stimulus package to counter the influence of global financial crises. By the end of 2010, the policy
has become widely spread in 27 provinces. The land quota generated via the ZJGG policy has also
become centrally assigned.
Local governments’ enthusiasm towards the ZJGG policy is in stark contrast to their indifference
to the JJYR policy (or the marketization of collective land for construction). The reason seems that
local governments are the main beneficiary of the former but the loser of the latter. With the ZJGG
policy, underdeveloped counties can generate revenues from rural collective land for construction,
which otherwise has little fiscal value, whereas developed counties can get extra land quotas in
exchange. As for villagers in deep rural areas, where there is little demand of land for urban development, the policy does to some extent improve their welfare by increasing the value of collective
land. It enables rural residents to move into new apartment buildings with better infrastructures
and new communities with hospitals, children’s homes, nursing homes, and so on. Although it has
been reported that rural villagers protested forced demolition of their houses, resisted new living
style, or demanded higher compensation, recent research has found that these reports may have
been exaggerated (Long et al., 2012). A land official of Shandong province told me that rural villagers in general welcome the ZJGG policy and envy those who moved to new houses (Interview
SD20170829).
My own field research suggests the policy did generate moderately positive impact in deep rural
areas, but the local government also benefited a lot from it. For example, in a hilly village in the city
of Weifang, many old houses have been left forgotten by migrant workers. The city government’s
nies are the main buyers of land quotas, some city governments (Chengdu for example) also enticed or forced
private enterprises to make bids on the market for their projects.
4
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2006-05/09/content_276294.htm
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financing platform invested 18 million RMB to subsidize villagers to voluntarily purchase new
houses in towns. As richer villagers move to urban areas, their houses were sold to poorer villagers
at a discounted price agreed by the both parties. Then, the government demolished the poorer
villagers’ houses and reclaimed the land to stepped fields. This created 130 mu land quotas for the
government and generated revenues much more than the original 18 million.
Another important reason why local officials welcome the ZJGG policy is that it allows them
to continue extracting land rents from urban development. When using extra land quotas from
ZJGG in urban and suburban areas, the government of developed counties still expropriate villagers’
collective land. In some extreme cases, local governments manipulated the ZJGG policy to demolish
suburban villages, relocate villagers into new communities, and then illegally occupy their arable
land for urban development without making proper compensation. In this way, the ZJGG policy
helps local officials justify their land grabbing activity without incurring strong complaints, but it
exacerbates villagers’ grievances even more. Although the ZJGG policy has some redistributive
benefits to villagers deep in rural areas, it is a policy conversion from the central liberalization
policy that aligns with local officials’ revenue-maximizing goals. Researchers have done many case
studies in places like Chongqing and Sichuan, but more systematic research needs to be done to
evaluate the policy outcomes. One thing can be said is that the ZJGG policy, and regulatory land
market liberalization in general, reinforces rather than undermines the existing distributive scheme
of exclusive land commercialization as well as the rural-urban divide.
In contrast to developed provinces like Guangdong and Shandong, Guizhou’s progress towards
land market liberalization has been slow and mostly directed by the central government. Local
officials focus on strengthening state-owned land market to maximize revenues. A county land bureaucrat said, “there has been few demands for state-owned land, not to mention collective land.”
Although some have been experimenting inclusive liberalization policies, these policies have been
limited to pilot sites such as Meitan County in Zunyi, a place that hosts several centrally sponsored
experiments as political tasks. In other underdeveloped places, village collectives do not even have
functioning organizations to carry out the reform. My fieldwork also finds some governments informally practiced inclusive land market liberalization as a special treatment to villagers who refused
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Figure 6.2: Subnational Reforms of Land Market Liberalization
Are there recurring conflicts?

No

Yes

Exclusive status quo in Guizhou

Are there autonomous leaders?

No, adaptation

Exclusive reform in Shandong

Yes, learning

Inclusive reform in Guangdong

to vacate, but they did not formally adopt the policy. However, under the central support, the ZJGG
policy was widely practiced across the province as a part of the national poverty alleviation program
to relocate poor population from mountains to urban areas.

6.3

Explaining Subnational Variation

The key difference between inclusive and exclusive land market liberalization is whether villagers
have right to develop collective land. In the case of inclusive land market liberalization, villagers in
Guangdong are granted land developmental rights, so that they can reap more benefits from urban
development. Whereas in exclusive land market liberalization, villagers in Shandong are rejected
from land development rights, so that the local government can manipulate the ambiguous collective
land ownership and the central liberalization policy. I explain this difference with autonomous
leaders’ political learning from social grievance. Figure 6.2 illustrates how cases fit into my theory.

6.3.1

Learning from Distributional Conflict of Land

I argue that an underlying factor driving inclusive land market liberalization is the social instability. The distributional conflict of land has been intense in developed provinces for decades. In
the prosperous Pearl River Delta in Guangdong, for example, rapid industrialization and urbaniza-
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tion significantly increased land value, thereby creating conflicts over the distribution of land rents
between the state, collectives, and rural households. In Foshan in 1994, individual villagers only
received less than 10% of a land user’s total payment, village collectives 20%, and the county-level
and township government received more than 70%.1 Relative deprivation led to more land-related
grievances and skyrocketing petitions, involving issues like compensation for expropriated land,
empty promise of resettlement, land speculation, farmland occupation, and land-related corruption.
Figure 6.3 shows the longitudinal data of land-related petitions in Guangdong and Shandong from
the 1992 to 2015, which I collected from the provincial land resource yearbooks. Despite periodical
fluctuations, the trends were generally rising all the way until Hu Jintao’s second term. In 2003,
the Guangdong Bureau of Land and Resources received 2512 letters and 1086 visits, 90% of which
were about illegal land occupation and insufficient compensation. In addition, the number of petitions to Beijing increased by 90.6% from the last year, putting a lot pressure on local political
leaders and bureaucrats.2
Considering local officials have incentive to hide or underreport the number of petitions to make
themselves look good, I also study user-generated petition data from the Local Leader Message
Board (liuyan.people.com.cn), a nationwide platform launched by the People’s Daily. The platform
allows citizens to file online complaints to local government officials (i.e., the heads of the Party
and government) in all subnational units at or above the county level. Since its launch in 2008,
the platform has received hundreds of thousands of complaints each year from all over the country
and become one of the most heavily used online platforms in China. Figure 6.4 shows the ratio
of land-related complaints in total complaints in three selected provinces. These statistics suggest
several more things. First, Guizhou has a low level of land conflict on average (or the third lowest
land-related online complaints among all the 27 provinces), which means officials there had little
incentive to redistribute land rent. Second, although Shandong had less land petitions and reported
conflicts than Guangdong, but it had more online complaints related to land. Third, both official
and online data shows that land petitions began to drop in Shandong and Guangdong after 2008, but
1

The numbers are calculated from the book Zhongguo Nongcun Gaige Shiyanqu Shinian Licheng (A
Decade Experience of Rural Reform Experimental Zone in China, 1997, pp. 383-4).
2
Guangdong Guotu Ziyuan Nianjian (Guangdong Land Resources Yearbook, 2004:54)
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Guangdong’s number declined more substantially.
Although the reasons for Guangdong’s decline are complicated, one of them has to do with
learning from land conflicts to reform. In Shunde District of Foshan, officials identified the “incompatibility between the existing institutions of collective land and a rapidly growing market economy”
as the root cause of land conflict back in 2001. As a result, they made policy concessions regarding collective land to address the issue. A key aspect of the reform was experimenting with in
situ circulation of collective land for construction (i.e., inclusive land market liberalization). With
MLR’s approval, collectives in Shunde should just pay the town and county government 10% of
the appraised land price for the first transaction and 20% of added value for the second. The experiment reduced the need for land expropriation, thereby reducing conflicts, and encouraged more
investment in the local industrial and service sectors. As Shunde District government reported, “by
establishing the institutions of circulating the right to use collective land for construction, respecting
villagers’ land property rights, and treating rural collective land as an asset, villagers are guaranteed
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with long-term, stable interests, which is beneficial for the long-term stability and development in
the rural area.”
After getting the initial benefits, the district government requested a revision of LAL to legalize the circulation of collective land for construction. Before the official experiment, this kind of
practice has been widely spread in the Pearl River Delta. According to the official estimate in 2004,
nearly half of collective land for construction in the Delta region had been circulated at least once.3
The local governments used to turn a blind eye to this grey market, for the size is small relatively to
the state-owned land market and stopping these transactions was costly and ineffective. However,
the 1998 LAL, made in the spirit of exclusive land commercialization, requires all land used for urban construction to be state-owned. This legal requirement put local land bureaucrats in a dilemma
between bottom-up pressure and top-down command. A land bureaucrat said in the interview, there
is no need to expropriate collective land that has already been developed for urban construction and
villagers do not want their remaining collective land to be expropriated (Interview, GD20160314).
Nevertheless, the central mandate has different lines, which sometimes are contradictory to each
other. Under the big political environment of building a harmonious society, Guangdong leaders
viewed the experiment as a fundamental solution to land-related conflicts. In June 2003, Guangdong government decided to scale up the experiment to a provincial initiative. In the official notice
of a new experimental policy, then party secretary of Guangdong and Politburo member, Zhang
Dejiang, demanded to leave the maximum interests to farmers in carrying out the reform and take
the opportunity to improve social security net in rural areas.4 Moreover, the vice party secretary of
Guangdong stressed the significance and necessity of this policy by highlighting the central instructions on protecting villagers’ rights. When addressing the land petition problems in 2004, the chief
director of provincial bureau of land and resources referred to the provincial experiment as an important reform to tackle the problem of rapidly increasing trend of mass petitions.5 The paragraph
below from his speech made explicit that the provincial experiment was driven by social stability
concerns.
3

Guangdong Guotu Ziyuan Nianjian (Guangdong Land Resources Yearbook, 2004, p.58)
Guangdong Guotu Ziyuan Nianjian (Guangdong Land Resources Yearbook, 2004, p.60)
5
Guangdong Guotu Ziyuan Nianjian (Guangdong Land Resources Yearbook, 2005, p.55)
4
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“If villagers come to petition day after day, repeatedly to higher level governments, and around the same kind of problems, how can this society be harmonious?
Now land-related petitions account for over one third of total petitions in our province.
If land petitions were solved properly, then Guangdong would slowly become harmonious. ... We are making efforts to fundamentally resolve the problems reflected in
petitions, to build an open, regulated, ordered, and unified urban-rural market for land
with all kinds of ownerships.”6
Building on the momentum generated by the experimental policy, Guangdong provincial government promulgated a formal policy regarding the circulation of collective land for construction in
June 2005, thus becoming the first province to formally recognize the same rights of collective
land as state-owned land. By establishing a level playing field for both collective and state-owned
land, making land in the same area the same value and the same rights, regardless of its ownership,
Guangdong started a transformative change to the institutionalized exclusive land commercialization. As an official in Foshan told me when discussing the project in Shaxi village, “we do not
just look at short-term benefits. What we do is to create space for development out of collective
land, so that we can achieve a balance between economic growth and social stability.” (Interview,
GD20160328) Meanwhile, the process was not as harmonious as it seems. A village leader told me
that their collective land for construction was not given free by the government. Instead, they “took
it from the government through multiple times of collective petitions.” (Interview, GD20160329) To
summarize Guangdong’s case, it is surging land conflicts that put provincial leaders on high alert
and made it a fundamental policy solution to land conflicts.

6.3.2

Autonomous and Independent Leadership

However, why did Shandong facing intense land conflict pursue an exclusive instead of inclusive
land market liberalization? Previous theoretical discussion suggests that the reform requires political
leaders to be autonomous and independent from landed interests, including bureaucrats and real
estate companies. If that’s the case, we would expect to find more autonomous and independent
politicians in Guangdong than in Shandong.
In fact, politically, Guangdong’s party secretary is a more powerful position than Shandong’s.
6

Guangdong Guotu Ziyuan Nianjian (Guangdong Land Resources Yearbook, 2005, pp.40-41)
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As the Politburo member, Guangdong secretary is within the small circle of top national leadership.
He has a unique channel to communicate policy ideas with the general secretary and other leaders.
With a better understanding of what the general secretary wants, he could prioritize the important
works to reserve a seat in the next Politburo Standing Committee. His power also allows him to
pressure the central ministries to give him preferential treatment such as local experiments. Since
giving obvious preferential policies to certain provinces could generate backlash from others, the
central leaders usually use experiments as a façade to reward their local followers. By contrast,
Shandong’s leaders usually lack these political resources to implement controversial policy ideas.
As a provincial land bureaucrat in Shandong said to me in reference to Guangdong’s inclusive
land market liberalization, “well, the center gave them a better policy.” (Interview, SD20121222)
Without getting a clear support from the center, political leaders would not risk their career to carry
out extralegal reforms that may fundamentally benefit villagers at the expense of local bureaucrats.
Fiscally, Shandong has developed a growth model and economic structure that is very different from Guangdong’s. While Guangdong’s economic model has been more driven by the private
and export sector, Shandong has recently relied more on state-led fixed asset investment and urban
land development. After the agricultural tax was removed, Shandong officials faced greater fiscal
pressure. The 1998 LAL gave them a strong incentive to build a state-owned land market and benefit from exclusive land commercialization. By building new industrial parks, urban communities,
roads, and bridges, Shandong’s FAI surged after 2000. As Figure 6.5 shows, the percentage of FAI
in GDP surpassed 70% in 2015. The difference in developmental strategy is also reflected in tax
revenue as a percentage of GDP. Before the tax reform in 2016, local governments mainly depend
on three kinds of tax revenues: value added tax from manufacturing, enterprise income tax, and
business tax from services. Fixed asset investment may generate value added tax and enterprise
income tax, but the central government shares with local governments 75% of the value added tax
since 1994 and 60% of enterprise income tax since 2002. Business tax is left to local governments.
This means that investment-driven economies share more tax revenues with the central government,
so the local governments may have less incentive to collect tax. Figure 6.6 shows that Shandong
consistently collects less tax in proportion to GDP than Guangdong, where privately owned services
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generate a large base for business tax.
Shandong has been fiscally relied more on urban land development to cover fiscal expenditure.
With the help of state-owned banks and securitization of land, local governments do not only care
about land premium and taxes, which have been rapidly declining since the 2008 global financial
crisis, but also bank loans using state-owned land as collateral. If collective land is allowed for
commercialization and securitization, local governments have less to gain from state-owned land.
A land bureaucrat in Shandong told me that, “local leaders do not care about a few more land
conveyance fees as much as people think. They want to anchor investment projects as quickly as
possible.” (Interview, SD20121222)
Both political and fiscal reason explain why local governments in Shandong only pursue regulatory land market liberalization with little redistributive impact. They were also concerned with
social stability, but they resorted to repression or incremental reforms, with focus on preventing
petitioners from visiting Beijing and practitioners from violating the law. As for local experiments,
the Shandong land bureaucrat said later in the interview, “these experiments wouldn’t have a profound impact on the land regime. Local governments would not change their way of expropriating
collective land in urban planning areas. Otherwise, the local state-owned land market would be
disturbed, and land expropriation would be very difficult. As for collective land outside (the urban
or suburban areas), governments do not make a profit from developing industrial land anyway. To
develop economy, they may do the ZJGG policy. Or they may even circulate collective land for
construction in some villages to appease the villagers. But that’s it.” (Interview, SD20121222)

6.3.3

Historical Origin of Collective Institutions

In the literature of contentious politics, successful collective action requires organizational and mobilizational capacity (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2003). So, village collective organization may be
a key intermediary factor between villagers’ grievances and policy reform. Chinese scholars argue
that strong kinship networks limit state interference with private property use in rural China and
protect villagers against unwanted land takings (T. Zhang and Zhao, 2014). Considering the subnational variation of rural China, scholars generally categorize Chinese villagers into three categories
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based on their structure (He, 2012; P. Huang, 1985): (1) “cohesive villages” in southeast China (e.g.
Guangdong); (2) “divided villages” in north China (e.g. Shandong); and (3) “fragmented villages”
along Yangtze River and in southwest China (e.g., Guizhou). Each category has distinct geographical endowments and historical origins. My case selection allows a diverse case study to delve into
these different categories. To fully understand how distributional land conflict shapes political leaders’ choice of land market reforms, I trace back in history and identify a deeper explanation for the
variation of state-society relations in land conflict. I show how village structure, interacting with the
contemporary rural policy, shaped collective institutions and state-society relations in land conflicts.

6.3.3.1

Cohesive Collectives in Guangdong

Since the Song Dynasty in the 10th century AD, massive migrants from inland China began to
settle in the Pearl River Delta. They turned lowland into agricultural land, cultivating mudflats,
building hydraulic infrastructure and irrigation systems. These activities required a high level of
social coordination, which gave rise to strong lineage and clan institutions. In turn, clans financed
reclamation of more mudflats to accumulate their assets and power. Under the influence of neoConfucianism, clans reserved some reclaimed land as clan land, which is land collectively owned
by clans, managed by the clan leaders, and used for supporting clan members for living and building
ancestral shrines, tombs, schools, and so forth. Through these communal uses, clan land functioned
as an essential institution that carried communal identity, which is the core of cohesive villages in
southeast China. In 1930s, around half of cultivated land in the Delta was clan land, suggesting that
communal land ownership was a common type of land tenure regime in the region.7
Communal land ownership not only strengthened clans and lineage institutions, but also facilitated inhabitants to make investment for and spread the risk of commercial agriculture. Starting
from the 16th century AD, as population-to-land ratio increased, people gradually gave up rice
growing for more profitable fish culture and sericulture, relying on imports for grains and clans for
financial support. They dug fish ponds, built dikes with pond muds, and learned to create a laborintensive agricultural ecosystem that integrates mulberry growing, sericulture, and fish farming, or
7

See more details in Freedman (1958) and Ye and S. Lin (1998).
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the so-called “mulberry-dike and fish-pond” (Sangji Yutang) system.8 Because of its high ecological balance, economic efficiency, and labor demand, the system was widely adopted in the region,
especially on the west bank of the Delta such as Nanhai and Shunde county.
However, when the household responsibility system was introduced and imposed in the early
1980s, inhabitants found it incompatible with the “mulberry-dike and fish-pond” system. First,
the HRS created a collective action problem. A fish pond can be as large as 16 mu, even the
smallest ones are 4-5 mu, and so must be shared by multiple households under the HRS. But the
problem is, while every household wanted to harvest fish, not everyone had incentive to collect
dirty muds from the bottom of ponds to refurbish dikes. Lack of maintenance left the pond-dike
system unable to raise fish and resist flood. Second, the typical HRS evenly allocated farmland
to households for private use with little charge. Such “unpaid contracting” (Wuchang Fenbao)
left collective organizations with few financial resources to maintain the infrastructure. In Nanhai
county, just a year after the imposition of the HRS from the above, 70% of fish ponds were out of
shape and required reconstruction.9
The price liberalization of fishery products and the cancellation of state procurement of grain
in Guangdong since 1984 incentivized villagers to convert farmland into fish ponds to earn higher
incomes. They spontaneously rolled back to the traditional way of renting fish ponds. Then, Guangdong officials decided to promote the scheme of “paid contracting” (Youchang Toubao). This new
method allowed villages to take back the contracted land (or fish pond) from villagers and then
contract it out to the highest bidder among them. Starting from September of 1989, 80% of the
dike-pond area in Nanhai was allocated in the new “paid contracting” way just in one year.10 With
the market mechanism in place, annual contract fee for fish pond raised to 700 to 800 yuan per mu,
more than 25% of which was reserved for maintenance and much higher than the annual agricultural
investment in the past decade (33 yuan per mu). After getting success in Nanhai, this new capitalist
scheme of HRS was gradually applied to all kinds of cultivated land in the entire Delta region.
8
The ecosystem works in the following way: mulberry leaves are fed to the silkworms, whose excreta are
used as fish food, and the fertile pond mud – consisting of fish excreta, organic matter, and chemical elements
– is brought up from the bottom and used as manure for the mulberry trees. See more details from Ye and
S. Lin (1998) and Zhong (1958; 1982).
9
See Nanhai Xianzhi (Nanhai County Chorography, 2000, p.566).
10
Author’s material from the Party’s Organization Department of Nanhai.
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The policy not only improved financial and environmental situation, but also reinforced collective institution. By re-centralizing the control of land, village collectives upheld the principle of
collective land ownership, acting as the supplier of land and managing auctions. By making payment to the collective in exchange for using land, individual farmers developed the perception that
land is collectively owned rather than privately owned or state owned. They also receive 5 to 7% of
their net income from the collective’s distribution as dividends or bonuses. To them, the “collective”
is not an empty word, it means a real organization of their own. In Nanhai county, villagers created
land-based joint-stock collectives, so that each household owns stocks rather than land plots, which
are used collectively for the economies of scale. Thus, under this quasi-capitalist scheme of HRS,
collective identity was not diminished but strengthened.
Collective institution was also preserved by the development of rural industry. Guangdong’s
strategy of rural industrialization was to prioritize export-oriented, collectively owned enterprises
in the relatively developed Delta region. Collective TVEs, inherited from commune and brigade
enterprises, were controlled by cadres in towns and villages, enjoying better access to capital and
technology than enterprises owned by private partnerships and individual households (Oi, 1999,
p.70). In 1987, collective TVEs produced almost two thirds of the total output of rural industry.11
Although capital influx from Hong Kong played an important role in the rapid expansion of TVEs
in Guangdong, collective enterprises were the dominant player until the mid-1990s. They were a
major financial source of township government, including the fees paid by “red hat” TVEs. Moreover, the expansion of TVEs also strengthened collective control over land, as collectives gradually
recentralized unused land and cultivated land to build factories. Since land occupation by TVEs
affected villagers disproportionally, collective organizations reinforced the rights to control land
through readjustment.

6.3.3.2

Dependent Collectives in Shandong

Compared to Guangdong, Shandong’s villages are less rooted in traditional lineage and clan institutions. Scholars have long noticed that the influence of lineage and clan institutions is historically
11

Author’s calculation from Zhongguo Xiangzhen Qiye Nianjian 1978-1987 (Chinese Yearbook of Township and Village Enterprises).
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weaker in north China than south. Northern villages are not dominated by a single powerful lineage as are southeastern villages. Instead, they usually consist of several smaller lineages that abide
by the same village norms while competing against each other. This is partly because land was
cultivated much earlier in the north, and there were few unused lands left for settlers, whereas in
the southeast plenty of unused lands provided space for new settlers. Inter-village competition motivated southeastern lineages to cultivate more lands for capital accumulation, but within-village
competition in the north did not. While clan land in the south functioned as a social welfare with its
provision of food for clan members, clan land in the north was mainly used for rituals and religious
places only. In Shandong, communal land and cooperative economy were not common before the
revolutionary era. In the 1930s, according to the national land survey conducted by the government
of the Republic of China, there were only about 250 thousand mu clan lands in Shandong, compared
to approximately 12.6 million mu in Guangdong.
Lack of communal land assets and within-village factions have led to weak collective identities
in the villages of Shandong. Villagers are in general dependent on the state, unable to resist the state
encroachment. During the Great Leap Famine, Shandong had one of the worst records of casualty.
The mortality rate increased by almost 100 percent, compared to 58 percent in Guangdong. J. Yang
(2012, p.24) attributes this disaster to the divided village structure, as a lineage group of villagers
took advantage of the central policy of compulsory procurement to weaken another group in the
same village. As a result, local state officials have opportunities to employ the “divide-and-rule”
strategy to strengthen their power over villagers.
Another example of the state dominance is the implementation of the HRS in the reform era.
When the central government reiterated the importance of cooperative economy and economies of
scale in 1986, Shandong provincial government promoted a quasi-capitalist scheme of HRS called
the “two-field system.” The system categorized agricultural land into two kinds: ration land, which
was allocated to households for producing self-sufficient grains, and responsibility land, which was
contracted out to households for fixed fees (Rozelle et al., 2005). Compared to the conventional
“one-field system,” in which land allocation is based on the number of household labor and the
quality of soil, the “two-field system” allowed collectives to recentralize and allocate land resources
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to paid users through a tendering and contracting procedure. But unlike the experiment of “paid
contracting” in Guangdong, which was demanded by villagers, Shandong’s experiment was initiated
by the state without a strong popular base.12 Once the policy was promoted by the province, many
collectives and local governments abused it to take back the control over land and to charge more
fees from villagers.13
The local state also had tight control over the rural industrial sector in Shandong. With more
than 120 thousand commune and brigade enterprises and 450 thousand workers in 1958, Shandong’s
industrial base has been already strong since the Maoist era. In the 80s, rural industrial output
increased from 46.5 billion yuan in 1987 to 472.5 billion yuan in 1993 (in real terms). Over 70% of
the output was generated by collective enterprises managed by township and village leaders. During
the period, both income per capita from rural collectives and fixed asset investment per capita by
rural collectives in Shandong were higher than those in Guangdong.
Although the distorted HRS and rural industrialization kept collectives strong in Shandong, their
divided structure and weak identity have not posed much threat to the state. This explains why there
were few news reports on land conflicts in Shandong on Chinese mass media under censorship, even
though Shandong has the highest ratio of land-related online complaints among all the provinces.

6.3.3.3

Fragmented Collectives in Guizhou

Compared to strong collective institution in Guangdong and Shandong, Guizhou’s collectives are
weak, both economically and organizationally. As a land-locked, mountainous province, Guizhou
has scarce land resource for agriculture and urban development (low arable land per capita: 0.64
mu; 14% suitable for urban development). In addition, Karst terrain that covers most of the region
is rich for mining but challenging to extensive farming and human habituation. As such, Guizhou
has been historically dominated by ethnic minorities. Even today, more than one third of the total
population is not Han Chinese. Han diaspora swarmed to Guizhou only since the late Qing Dynasty.
They settled in scattered villages separated by hills, with little interaction with other villages. Within
12

The original experiment was initiated in 1984 to take advantage of two idle machine harvesters.
See Yu Keping’s (1997) article Lun Nongye Shidu Guimo Jingying Wenti (On the Problem of Moderate
Large-scale Operation in Agriculture).
13
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the same village, people had little need to work cooperatively because the fragile ecological system
can afford no more than subsistence agriculture. The lack of competition and coordination created
weakly organized villages without the presence of centralized lineages and institutionalized norms.
Such atomized rural society in Guizhou could not resist the expansion of the state during the
Maoist era. Local governments restricted the provision of grain to rural residents during the GLF
to meet the inflated procurement quota for Beijing, even when the total agricultural output already
declined as a result of excessive steel production. In Meitan county, over 20% of the population
died from hunger during the winter of 1959, most of which were villagers. The local government
did not save people from dying at the very beginning, but instead punished people who tried to hide
or steal grain from the state, leading to over 1000 ordinary citizens beaten to death. The tragedy,
known as the “Meitan incident,” was ended by provincial and prefectural leaders in April 1960.
Some commune leaders were prosecuted or even executed. Private farming and private business
were resumed to some extent after 1961.
Partly because of such cruelty against humanity, Guizhou became the first province that fully
implemented the HRS in the reform era, which generated strong population growth. To safeguard
the livelihood needs of new collective members and ensure equal allocation of farmland among
households, local governments had to reallocate farmland frequently. But land reallocation had
negative impact on the security of contract rights, which hindered the farmers’ investment in land
and productivity growth. In 1987, Meitan county government decided to detach land contracting
from household size and demographic change. The experiment eliminated the allocation of collective land based on household size, thereby providing better security of farmers’ rights on contracting
land for agriculture. For the lack of arable land, Guizhou government soon scaled up the experiment
to the provincial level.14 The reform, however, created new problems for villagers who are excluded
from collective membership. Unlike coastal areas in Guangdong and Shandong, Guizhou had weak
industrial and services sectors that could absorb surplus labor in rural areas. Agriculture remained
as the largest economic sector in Guizhou during the entire first phase of economic reform. In Meitan, most surplus labor was absorbed through the reclamation of nonarable hillsides. The problem
14

See Zhongguo Nongcun Gaige Shiyanqu Shinian Licheng (A Decade Experience of Rural Reform Experimental Zone in China, 1997).
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was alleviated after the central government liberalized rural-urban migration in the 1990s.
The de facto privatization of agricultural land and the slow growth of rural industrial sector in
Guizhou weakened collective institutions. Village collectives have no power of reallocating land
and little resource to extract from rural enterprises. Therefore, villagers have no need to interact
with collectives, making collective institution an empty shell with little mobilizational power.
In sum, subnational variation in state-village relations can be traced back to the geographical
and historical endowments. The organic structure of village-wide lineage in Guangdong makes
village collectives cohesive to resist penetration by the state and pose the most serious threat (in
the long term). Shandong’s divided village structure enables the state to intervene and even control
village affairs, so even though collective organizations are strong, they are more aligned with the
state’s interest. By contrast, Guizhou’s fragmented village structure does not produce a collective
institution that is capable of mediating the relationship between the state and rural households.

6.4

Summary

Amid rising conflict over land, central leaders proposed land market liberalization to reverse the
trend of exclusive land commercialization since the mid-90s. However, the reform was met with
resilient resistance from governmental officials who benefit from the development of state-owned
land market. Lack of an autonomous and independent leadership crippled Hu Jintao’s agenda of
building a harmonious society. Against this background, Xi Jinping’s new leadership has been
directing central experiments since 2015 and heading towards a new round of legislation.
Although it has been difficult to revise the existing legislation, there were major breakthroughs
at the subnational level. Following the initial experiment in Foshan, city leaders in the Delta and
later elsewhere learned to reform the collective land institution in response to land conflicts that pose
serious threat to social stability and economic development by organized villagers with strong collective identities. Guangdong’s liberalization policy was the first formal commitment by provincial
government to grant rural collectives the rights to develop and transfer land for urban construction.
In the next chapter, I will examine the reform dynamics among cities more closely using quantitative
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methods.
Shandong’s case represents a number of provinces and localities, where distributional conflict
over land is also intense, but village collectives are dependent on the local state, which is then
dependent on land development as a result of investment-driven growth model. Political leaders
are less powerful, less autonomous, and less independent, so they did not promote the market as
the major mechanism for allocating collective land. Instead, they converted central land market
liberalization policy, manipulating land regime to mainly serve their own interests.
In underdeveloped places like Guizhou, where land development is not a contentious issue,
local leaders have little incentive to open the state-owned land market for collective land, unless
it becomes a political task. Even with increasing investment and land conflict in recent years,
local leaders quickly imitated exclusive land market reforms, while only giving preferential policy
benefits to individual households, as village collectives are inadequate to mediate the relationship
between the state and villagers.
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Chapter 7
Mechanism of Land Market
Liberalization
Case study in the previous chapter suggests a causal link between land-related grievances and redistributive land market liberalization. In this chapter, I examine the relationship systematically
using a large-N panel data, and then test the learning mechanism with a unique survey of Chinese
county leaders. I spent a great amount of time collecting, reading, and coding local land market
liberalization policies. Since local leaders may manipulate land market liberalization to strengthen
the state-owned land market, I only selected policies of redistributive land market liberalization in
the quantitative analysis. To understand whether land-related grievances influence local leaders’
perception of the land regime, I also got a chance to design the survey questionnaire for over 300
county party secretaries. I find that political leaders with grassroots work experience are more likely
to learn from social grievances and that those with central or provincial work experience are more
likely to reform in response to social grievances. The finding suggests that local leaders do learn
from social grievance under certain conditions. In the remaining part of the chapter, I will introduce
more details of the research design, present the results for both panel data and survey analysis, and
conclude with a brief discussion of the implication.
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7.1

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of my quantitative study is whether a city has issued a policy document
that allowed market transactions of collective land for construction. The unit of analysis is at the
prefectural city level because city leaders are policymakers in charge of local land-related issues.
I collected policy documents of land market liberalization by first applying for open information
from the mayor’s office or land bureau of all city governments on their websites.1 For those that did
not respond to my requests, I conducted keyword searches about this policy on their websites and
PKU law (www.pkulaw.cn), a major online database on laws and regulations in China. I coded the
dependent variable as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the land market liberalization reform was
introduced to a city in a given year and 0 otherwise. Once a reform policy was issued, I drop that
city’s observations from the dataset for subsequent years. Figure shows the spatial distribution of
reformed cities with highlight.
A caveat to this measure is that it only focuses on policy output instead of policy outcome
after implementation. Ideally, I would like to have measures such as the total number or area of
collective land transactions. However, nationwide city-level data of collective land is not publicly
accessible. Even the existing data is not accurate because villagers usually do not report collective
land use rights transactions to the local government. Therefore, formal policy document is the
best available measure I can find for land market liberalization. To the extent that it often takes
organizational efforts to produce these guidelines and regulations, it can be seen as a costly (and
thus largely credible) signal about the local government’s decision on land market reform. Scholars
have long noticed that the existence of formal provisions can give activists opportunities to justify
their demands and pressure the state (Distelhorst, 2017; O’Brien, 1996). Similarly, the land market
liberalization policy can motivate villagers and entrepreneurs to make collective land transactions,
even if there are several procedural difficulties to overcome during implementation.
1

The official documents can take several forms, such as “administrative measures” (管理办法), “detailed
rules for implementation” (实施细则), or “opinion for implementation” (实施意见).
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Figure 7.1: Geographic Distribution of Land Market Liberalization Policy (2015)
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7.2

Independent Variables

The first independent variable – land conflict intensity – is measured by the frequency of usergenerated, land-related online complaints. I used data from the Local Leader Message Board
(liuyan.people.com.cn) and applied topic modelling technique (i.e., Latent Dirichlet Allocation
model) to classify the complaints into 30 topics.1 One of the topics has to do with land disputes,
consisting of words like “village committee, village cadre, rural residential land, compensation, collective land, and farmers who lost land.” Between 2008 and 2013, each city government received
an average of two hundred complaints per year, about ten of which were land-related.2 Figure 7.2
shows the subnational variation of this measure of land conflict intensity. The measure correlates
with existing measures of land disputes drawn from the Collective Incidents Dataset by the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences and the Chinese Citizenship Awareness Survey by Peking University.
The other independent variable is city leaders’ autonomy and independence, measured by city
leaders’ prior work experience in the central or provincial government. From the perspective of
central and provincial leaders, they want to place their faithful allies to cities’ leading positions
to accumulate work experience and political capital for the future. That means, city leaders sent
down from the central and provincial government are expected to be more acquainted with and
more accountable to the top down mandate (e.g. land market liberalization). In addition, with
powerful friends above, they may not be easily captured by local bureaucratic and business interests,
compared to those who rise to city leadership from the bottom up and immerse in local politics for
a long time. Their goal is back to the higher-level government safely after getting some governing
experience in cities. To validate this measure of autonomous leaders, I use the data on the number of
bureaucrats prosecuted for crimes in office from the cities’ yearbooks. As shown in Table 7.1, there
is positive and statistically significant correlation between the number of prosecuted bureaucrats and
leaders’ prior work experience in the central or provincial governments.
Therefore, the main hypothesis is that, facing challenge from contentious villagers, local leaders
with central or provincial experience are more likely to promote land market liberalization as a
1

For the details, see also J. Jiang, Meng, and Q. Zhang (2016).
The number includes not only complaints filed directly to the city leaders, but also the city-related complaints filed to the provincial leaders and to all the county-level leaders within the city jurisdiction.
2
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Figure 7.2: Geographic Distribution of Average Land Petition Intensity, 2008-2015 (in
Percentile)

% of Land Petition (percentile)
No data/Not a prefecture unit
[0,3.09) (<20%)
[3.09,4.53) (20−40%)
[4.53,5.97) (40−60%)
[5.97,7.52) (60−80%)
[7.52,15.72] (>80%)
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Table 7.1: Evidence on Autonomous Leaders
DV: Number of prosecuted bureaucrats
(1)
Log fiscal expenditure

-3.6999
(7.5968)

Log own-source revenue

23.0106∗∗
(8.3595)

Log GDP

11.6655
(10.7326)

Log population

42.5915∗∗
(6.8017)

City leader w/ central or prov exp

3.3541∗
(1.6662)
X
253
2630

Year and city fixed effects
Number of cities
Observation

Note: Model reports coefficient from fixed-effect models. The following variables are included in the regressions but not shown in the interest of space:
secretaries’ and mayors’ individual characteristics and province-specific trends.
Standard errors clustered at city level are reported in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)

policy to maintain social stability.

7.3

Control Variables

I matched the dependent and independent variables in a city-year format with a number of political and economic statistics, which allows me to control various confounding factors to draw causal
inference. I include in the regression two variables measuring the impact of revenue-maximizing
bureaucrats. The first is dependence on own-sourced revenue, measured by the log ratio of government expenditure to its own-sourced revenue. Because revenue from land sales is a major source of
fiscal revenue for local governments, I expect that bureaucrats in localities that rely more heavily on
their own source revenues (as opposed to transfer from above) would make greater efforts to resist
redistributive land market liberalization, which will undermine the local government’s role as the
sole supplier of land for construction. The second variable is log number of government employees
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based on China’s 2008 economic census.1 Local bureau chiefs are likely to have greater bargaining
power vis-à-vis their political principals when their departments employ a larger share of the local
population. A measure of non-government employment is also included to control for the total size
of the local employment.
To measure the influence of real estate firms, I construct a variable of market power concentration among local real estate firms using primary market land transactions records from Land China
(www.landchina.com), an online land transaction monitoring system maintained by the Ministry
of Land and Resources. Local governments are required by law to report information on each land
transaction taking place within their jurisdictions, including the identity and sector of the buyer,
the size of land, the amount of payment, the transaction dates, and so on. Because a real estate
company’s market power is closely related to the amount of land it can acquire from the (primary)
state-owned land market, I calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the purchase of state-owned
land as a measure of power distribution within the real estate sector.2 The real estate sector as
a whole is expected to enjoy greater policy influence in localities where a few large companies
dominate the market. This implies a negative relationship between the Herfindahl index and the
likelihood of reform.
Finally, I include controls for the size of local economy (log GDP), local population (log population), the level of urbanization (% of urban area), and dependence on land revenue (log landrev,
2006-08 average). Economic development can affect political leaders’ preferences to land policy.
In more economically developed areas, local leaders may be more willing to allow the entry of villagers to the land market because there are higher demands for land for construction than the supply
of state-owned land. In addition, the amount of available space for construction and population
are important factors in local leaders’ calculation, as they may support the reform to increase land
supply if population density is high. Moreover, I include the average ratio of land conveyance to
1

This is done by summing up the number of employees for organizations whose industry code starts with
93 (party organization) or 94 (government agencies).
P
2
More specifically, the index is calculated by H= s2i , where si denotes the share of land area bought
by real estate firm i as a fraction of all real estate companies’ purchases in a given city-year spell. Because
different provinces may have distinct socioeconomic characteristics and policy environments that could affect
the development of the real estate sector, I subtract the provincial averages from the city-level concentration
index to account for heterogeneity across provinces.

129

revenue in the past three years, which measures the relative price of urban land. A greater amount
of land premium suggests that villagers have a higher stake in land market liberalization and may
put more pressure on the government. Last but not the least, individual characteristics of local leaders may matter as well. For example, those who are going to retire soon may not be willing not
pursue risky reforms like land market liberalization. In a more extensive specification, I control for
a full set of key demographic and career attributes for political leaders, including their age, gender,
education, tenure length, and time spent working in the city.

7.4

Estimation Framework

I analyze the data using a Cox proportional hazard model with the following specification:

(t)
=
h
(t)
exp
αLand Complaintit + γ Autonomous Leaderit
hreform
0
i

+ δLand Complaintit × Autonomous Leaderit + Xβi

where hi (t) is the hazard function of reform occurrence for city i at the time t. Land Complaint is
the variable indicating the share of land-related complaints in proportion to total complaints1 and
Autonomous Leader is a dummy variable indicating whether the city secretary or the mayor has
prior work experience in the provincial or central government. The key coefficient interest here is δ,
which measures the likelihood of reform under autonomous leaders facing land complaints. Based
on prior discussion, I expect this coefficient to be positive and statistically significant.
Reform likelihood is estimated during the period of 2009 to 2014, which best matches with the
availability of the key covariates discussed above (X). The period also satisfies the noninformative censoring assumption of the proportional hazard model. Both left censoring (2009) and right
censoring (2014) are random due to the unexpected central interventions: the party’s decision to
encourage local experimentation in 2008 and to direct experiments in 33 designated counties in
2015. During this period, local governments were allowed to try their own reform policies. Since
1

To facilitate the interpretation of the main variables when interaction is present, I use the de-meaned
complaint variable by subtracting the provincial average of land complaint in that year from the original
variable. All the results remain unchanged when the original variable is used.
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different provinces may experience idiosyncratic political and economic shocks that could affect
the reform propensity of subordinate cities, I also estimate a stratified Cox model that includes
province-specific hazard rates.

7.5

Main Results

Table 7.2 displays the main results. I first run a regression with only the socioeconomic controls
and report the results in Column 1. Consistent with prior analysis on vested interests in partial land
commercialization, the reform likelihood is negatively associated with both the number of government employees in a city and the level of concentration in the local real estate sector. Likewise,
local governments’ dependence on own-source revenue is also negatively associated with reform
occurrence, although the standard error is too large to be statistically significant. These patterns
provide empirical support for the claim that local bureaucratic and real estate elites are the major
opponents to the reform.
In Model 2, I add independent variables: the share of land-related complaints in total complaints, the local leaders’ provincial or central work experience, and the interaction term between
the two. The result shows that, holding constant the overall volume of online complaints and a vector of contextual variables, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is consistently positive
and statistically significant, indicating that land complaints have a greater impact on land market
liberalization policy in cities governed by politicians with prior work experience from higher-level
governments. For a one percent increase in the share of land petitions, the odds of land market
reform in cities with autonomous leaders increase by about 7 percent (exp(0.20 − 0.13) − 1, p
value< 0.05). It is also worth noting that the coefficient estimate for autonomous leaders is negative, suggesting that central or provincial experience does not make local leaders more likely to
adopt liberalization policy when land conflict is weak or absent. It also suggests autonomous and
independent leaders learn to reform amid intense land conflicts.
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Table 7.2: Main Results
DV: Permitting transaction of collective land
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

% of land complaints (de-meaned)

-0.1334∗
(0.0637)

-0.1437∗
(0.0718)

-0.1772∗
(0.0847)

City leader w/ higher exp

-0.7438∗∗
(0.2469)

-0.8683∗∗
(0.2502)

-0.9685∗∗
(0.2904)

% of land complaints × City leader w/ higher exp

0.2000∗∗
(0.0635)

0.2593∗∗
(0.0665)

0.3062∗∗
(0.0757)

Total complaints

0.0001
(0.0005)

-0.0003
(0.0011)

-0.0007
(0.0011)

Log GDP

0.9401
(0.6526)

0.7912
(0.6700)

2.8838∗∗
(1.0120)

3.3886∗∗
(1.0978)

Log population

0.6432
(0.6881)

0.8266
(0.6984)

0.2506
(1.2239)

0.2772
(1.2463)

Dependence on own-sourced revenue

-0.2485
(0.6437)

-0.1289
(0.6386)

-1.2222
(1.1443)

-1.2158
(1.2115)

% of urban area

8.1967∗
(3.5556)

11.2327∗∗
(3.9908)

13.0492∗
(6.3225)

15.9022∗
(7.1196)

Log net income of land as % of fiscal revenue

0.4886∗
(0.2295)

0.5080+
(0.2606)

0.8140∗
(0.4033)

0.9738∗
(0.3895)

Log # of government employees (2008)

-1.0092+
(0.5577)

-1.1264+
(0.5879)

-2.7032∗
(1.2698)

-2.5260∗
(1.2644)

Log # of non-government employees (2008)

0.1808
(0.6732)

-0.0370
(0.6615)

0.0815
(1.0180)

-0.1645
(1.0787)

Real estate market concentration

-4.9720∗∗
(1.8056)

-6.0206∗∗
(1.7045)

-17.7484∗∗
(6.0633)

-17.7536∗∗
(6.6110)

Log real estate investment

-0.1789
(0.4948)

-0.1022
(0.4949)

-0.3409
(0.4053)

-0.5130
(0.4428)

X

X
X
0.33
252
1384

Strata: province
Leadership covariates
Pseudo R2
Number of cities
Observation

0.08
253
1386

0.13
252
1384

0.31
252
1384

Note: The model reports the coefficients from Cox proportional hazard regressions with province-specific
hazard. Leadership covariates include the following variables for both the party secretary and the mayor:
Age, Gender, Education, Tenure.
+
p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)

In Model 3, I introduce a more flexible model with provincial stratification. This specification
essentially allows the baseline hazard of the reform to vary across provinces. Model 4 further
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includes a number of additional controls of city leaders’ personal characteristics. In both Model
3 and 4, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is consistently positive and statistically
significant, indicating that land complaints have a greater impact on land market liberalization policy
in localities governed by autonomous and independent leaders. In the most complete Model 5, one
percent increase in the share of land complaints is associated with 14 percent (exp(0.31 − 0.18) − 1,
p value< 0.05) increase in the odds of land market reform in cities with autonomous leaders.

7.6

Robustness Checks

The results above are robust to different ways of coding the dependent or the independent variables.
I examine whether the main finding is sensitive to the specific criteria used to code land policy
change. In the first column of Table 7.3, I use a recoded dependent variable that only considers
policies issued by the prefecture-level city government (25 in total) and excludes those issued by
subordinated county-level governments. In the second column, I further include the policies that
permit market transactions of collective land in urban areas (19 in total) and exclude those that
only permit such transactions in rural areas. This coding criterion is much more restrictive than
the original one, as urban land is typically a much more valuable asset to local governments than
rural land (and therefore less likely to be liberalized). In both models, the coefficient estimate of
the interaction term remains positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the result is not
driven by different coding strategies. It should be noticed that the coefficient estimate becomes less
significant when city leaders issue policies that permit collective land transactions in urban areas,
suggesting that some of them are concerned with potential shocks to the state-owned land market
and only adopt the reform gradually.
I also consider several alternative explanations. Given the way I construct the dependent variable, one potential concern is that it may also be interpreted as reflecting the general receptivity
or transparency of local government to citizens’ information requests. To address this issue, I collected the Open Information Index for all the city government’s websites published by the Ministry
of Commerce, and include this index in the main regression as a control. The first column of Table
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Table 7.3: Tests on Alternative Measures of the Dependent Variable
city-wide

urban area

(1)

(2)

% of land complaints × City leader w/ central or prov exp

0.1977∗
(0.0940)

0.1692+
(0.1015)

% of land complaints (de-meaned)

-0.1162
(0.1059)

-0.0350
(0.1127)

City leader w/ central or prov exp

-0.6196+
(0.3514)

-1.4474+
(0.7791)

X
X
0.35
252
1411

X
X
0.50
252
1426

Strata: province
Economic and leadership covariates
Pseudo R2
Number of cities
Observation

Note: The table reports the results including the control of government information transparency and
using two alternative measures of land market liberalization. The coefficients are from Cox proportional
hazard regressions with province-specific hazard. The specification follows Model 5 of Table 7.2.
+
p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)

7.4 suggests that there is no association between the land market liberalization policy and the open
information index.
Another interpretation of the reform is that city leaders may try to help outside real estate firms
to get access to the local market. To systematically test whether the reform was driven by the
need to curry favor with outside business friends, I construct a new measure, Outside Share, by
matching land buyers’ information from the Land China dataset with all the publicly listed real
estate companies. The measure is the share of land bought by outside public real estate companies
as a percentage of total residential land purchase of a city in a given year.1 I then re-run the baseline
regression with this new variable and its interaction with autonomous leaders. As shown in the
second column of Table 7.4, the coefficients estimates for the main effect and the interaction term
are both quite small and statistically insignificant, and the coefficient for the main interaction term
remains significant. The result rejects the outside lobbying hypothesis.
1

An outside company is one whose headquarter is located outside the city of interest. One limitation of
this measure is that it does not include outside buyers that are not publicly listed. But non-listed companies
are typically much smaller in scale and would probably have even more limited influence on city-level policy.
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Table 7.4: Testing Influence of Information Transparency and Outside Firms
DV: Permitting transfer of collective land

% of land complaints × City leader w/ central or prov exp
Open Information Index

(1)

(2)

0.2892∗∗
(0.0944)
0.6226
(2.2793)

0.2003∗∗
(0.0637)

% land sale to outside firms × City leader w/ central or prov exp

-0.1526
(0.1047)
-0.9728∗
(0.3923)

0.1139
(0.1063)
-0.1855
(0.1141)
-0.1108
(0.0694)
-0.9360∗∗
(0.3436)

X
X
0.33
226
1273

X
X
0.24
256
1426

% land sale to outside firms
% of land complaints (de-meaned)
City leader w/ central or prov exp
Strata: province
Economic and leadership covariates
Pseudo R2
Number of cities
Observation

Note: The model reports the coefficients from Cox proportional hazard regressions with province-specific hazard. The specification is based on Model 5 of Table 7.2 but additionally includes a variable on the percentage of
land taken by outside firms as well as its interaction with the connection indicator.
+
p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)

One may be concerned that the finding is driven by systematic differences between leaders
with higher-level work experience and those without. To address this concern, I create additional
interaction terms between land complaints and some key leader attributes that may be correlated
with work experience, and include them as additional controls. The results are displayed in Table
7.5. From columns 1 to 3, I incrementally add interactions with city leaders’ age, tenure, and the
length of service in the city. Column 4 reports a fully specified regression with all the variables
and interactions included. The estimate for the main interaction remains stable and statistically
significant across all these models.
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Table 7.5: Controlling Confounders to Leaders’ Work Experience
DV: Permitting transactions of collective land
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

% of land complaints × City leader w/ higher exp

0.2337∗∗
(0.0847)

0.2504∗∗
(0.0734)

0.3075∗∗
(0.0842)

0.2806∗∗
(0.0986)

% of land complaints × secretary age

-0.0071
(0.0133)

-0.0044
(0.0145)

% of land complaints × mayor age

-0.0096
(0.0112)

0.0009
(0.0141)

% of land complaints × secretary tenure

-0.0236
(0.0298)

-0.0269
(0.0344)

% of land complaints × mayor tenure

-0.0238
(0.0332)

0.0104
(0.0610)

% of land complaints × secretary local experience

0.0125+
(0.0073)

0.0113
(0.0071)

% of land complaints × mayor local experience

-0.0262∗
(0.0131)

-0.0272
(0.0193)

% of land complaints (de-meaned)

0.7173
(0.9683)

-0.0599
(0.1114)

-0.1998+
(0.1154)

0.0506
(1.1220)

City leader w/ higher exp

-0.8578∗∗
(0.2620)

-0.9108∗∗
(0.2735)

-0.8216∗∗
(0.2898)

-0.8545∗∗
(0.2989)

Total complaints

-0.0004
(0.0010)

-0.0004
(0.0010)

-0.0002
(0.0012)

-0.0004
(0.0010)

X
X
0.32
252
1384

X
X
0.33
252
1384

X
X
0.33
252
1384

X
X
0.35
252
1384

Strata: province
Leadership and economic covariates
Pseudo R2
Number of cities
Observation

Note: The model reports the coefficients from Cox proportional hazard regressions with provincespecific hazard. All the main effects of the interaction terms are included in the regressions. The
specification is based on Model 5 of Table 7.2.
+
p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)

On a related note, the main finding could also be driven by certain preexisting socioeconomic
trends correlated with land complaints and their interactions with city leaders’ work experience.
The level and speed of urbanization, for example, may simultaneously affect villagers’ grievances
about land expropriation and propel the city leaders to adopt reforms that expand land supply. In
this case, although the reform coexists with land complaints, the relationship between the two is not
necessarily causal. To address this issue, I run additional regressions that control for interactions

136

between autonomous leaders and socioeconomic variables, including growth of the service sector,
investment in the real estate sector, and ratio of land lease sales to local fiscal revenue. Due to
the data availability and volatility, I take the three-year average of these variables. As Table 7.6
shows, these potentially confounding interaction terms have little impact on the estimate of the key
interaction term.

Table 7.6: Controlling Confounders to Land Complaints
DV: Permitting transactions of collective land
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

% of land complaints × City leader w/ higher exp

0.2795∗∗
(0.0691)

0.3382∗∗
(0.0700)

0.2507∗∗
(0.0661)

0.3737∗∗
(0.0788)

Service-sector GDP growth × City leader w/ higher exp

-0.2104+
(0.1116)

-0.2865∗
(0.1414)

Service-sector GDP growth

0.2664
(0.1665)

0.3281∗
(0.1461)

Log real estate investment × City leader w/ higher exp

0.4994
(0.3315)

0.7020∗
(0.3547)

Log real estate investment

2.2299+
(1.2831)

2.0938
(1.3209)

Land sale as % of revenue × City leader w/ higher exp

-0.3662
(0.4350)

-0.6115
(0.3932)

Log land conveyance fee as % of fiscal revenue

0.7545+
(0.4300)

1.0268∗
(0.4787)

1.2176+
(0.6929)

1.6832∗
(0.6877)

% of land complaints (de-meaned)

-0.1570∗
(0.0738)

-0.2070∗∗
(0.0747)

-0.1357+
(0.0703)

-0.2244∗∗
(0.0812)

City leader w/ higher exp

22.8428+
(12.6111)

-3.1673∗
(1.4209)

-0.9954∗∗
(0.3115)

28.0427+
(15.2539)

Total complaints

-0.0003
(0.0013)

-0.0008
(0.0013)

-0.0001
(0.0011)

-0.0005
(0.0013)

X
X
0.32
252
1384

X
X
0.35
252
1384

X
X
0.31
252
1384

X
X
0.38
252
1384

Strata: province
Leadership and economic covariates
Pseudo R2
Number of cities
Observation

Note: The model reports the coefficients from Cox proportional hazard regressions with province-specific
hazard. All the main effects of the interaction terms are included in the regressions. The specification is based
on Model 5 of Table 7.2.
+
p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)

Since the CCP has a strong mobilizational power (Dittmer, 1995), another alternative explana-
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tion is that city leaders with central or provincial experience adopted this reform to appease leaders.
While this story is certainly plausible, my interviews with government officials suggest that land
market liberalization was not a high-priority issue in the central government, for it did not give any
specific instruction on reform implementation beyond a few general principles during the period of
interest. To exclude the possibility of central influence, I remove observations of cities with subordinate counties designated to implement the central experiment in 2015. In addition, provincial
leaders are unlikely to mobilize their followers to reform without a strong central mandate. To test
this possibility, I create two variables to measure provincial leaders’ attitudes toward this policy. The
first variable, Provincial Liberalization Policy, is a binary indicator for whether a provincial government has issued any guiding policy document in support of land market liberalization; the second
variable, % of Neighboring Cities Adopting Liberalization, measures the percentage of neighboring
cities in a province that have adopted the reform in a given year. Table 7.7 shows the regression results: the coefficient estimates for the two interactions are both small and statistically insignificant,
suggesting that higher-level preferences are not important consideration in city leaders’ decisions to
initiate reform.

138

Table 7.7: Accounting for Policy Influence from Higher Level Governments
DV: Permitting transaction of collective land
(1)

(2)

(3)

% of land complaints × City leader w/ central or prov exp

0.3330∗∗
(0.0844)

0.2016∗∗
(0.0715)

0.2065∗∗
(0.0686)

Total complaints

-0.0008
(0.0028)

0.0000
(0.0005)

0.0001
(0.0006)

% of land complaints (de-meaned)

-0.1991∗
(0.0914)

-0.1397∗
(0.0698)

-0.1412∗
(0.0680)

City leader w/ central or prov exp

-1.0425∗∗
(0.2710)

-0.6756∗
(0.3351)

-0.8250∗
(0.3618)

Province has land reform policy

0.5452
(0.6580)

Provincial policy × City leader w/ central or prov exp

-0.2085
(0.4975)

# of reformed cities in the province

-0.0474
(0.1086)

% of reformed cities × City leader w/ central or prov exp

0.0312
(0.0907)
X
X
0.38
247
1366

Strata: province
Leadership covariates
Pseudo R2
Number of cities
Observation

X
0.13
252
1384

X
0.13
252
1384

Note: The table reports the coefficients from Cox proportional hazard regressions with province-specific
hazard. Additional interactions between city leader connection and reform policies from the provincial government and neighboring cities are included and the main effects of provincial/neighbor reforms are absorbed
by the province-specific hazard. The specification is based on Model 5 of Table 7.2. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)

Finally, I consider whether the finding is driven by unequal distribution of land-related grievances
between leaders with central or provincial experience and without. It is plausible that all the city
leaders learn from land conflicts, but leaders with central or provincial experience may appear
to be reform-minded because they are systematically assigned to cities with greater land-related
grievances. To test this possibility, I regress land complaints on autonomous leaders, along with
a set of other control variables. The results, displayed in Table 7.8, show that the connected city
leaders are not facing systematically higher levels of land petitions compared to the unconnected
ones. It is therefore unlikely that the former’s higher rate of adopting land market reform is simply
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due to having to deal with more intense land conflicts in their jurisdictions.

Table 7.8: Autonomous Leaders Do Not Experience More
Grievances
DV: % of Land Petition
(1)
Secretary w/ central or prov exp

(2)

0.1421
(0.3474)

Mayor w/ central or prov exp
X
252
1475

Year and city fixed effects
Number of cities
Observation

(3)
0.1412
(0.3449)

-0.0093
(0.2981)

0.0011
(0.3083)

X
252
1475

X
252
1475

Note: The model reports the coefficients from fixed-effect models
with province-specific trends. Standard errors clustered at city level
are reported in parentheses.
+
p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)

7.7

Testing Mechanism

The analysis above shows that land complaints generate a greater impact on land market liberalization in cities governed by autonomous leaders. In this section, I provide evidence on the posited
mechanism, which is sustained land conflict stimulates local leaders’ learning from villagers’ threat
to social stability. The data comes from a unique survey of 348 county-level party leaders conducted
at the Central Party School in Beijing in 2016. During the period of 2015-17, all the 2842 countylevel party secretaries were required to participate in a two-month full-time training program at the
School, as a result of the top party leadership’s decision to strengthen the quality of county governance. According to my interviews, the sampling method was stratified random sampling, with
province and city as strata.
The outcome variable of interest is Land Fiscalization, which measures county leaders’ attitude
towards the fiscalization of land use under the current land regime. The question asks respondents
to evaluate the sustainability of land fiscalization on a scale of 1 to 5. The larger number repre-
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sents a more positive attitude towards the land regime.1 The treatment variable, Town Leadership,
is a binary variable that measures whether a county leader has prior work experience as the party
secretary or head of a town or township. The rationale behind this treatment is that township-level
leaders are responsible for implementing land expropriation and eviction on the ground. According
to my interviews with several township leaders, they are the front-line commanders in dealing with
contentious villagers. Their daily work involves receiving petitioners, coordinating social conflicts,
and ensuring a smooth and successful land expropriation and eviction. While some of them developed a “frienemy” relationship with villagers (personal interview, GD20160310), others got badly
hurt in violent protests.2 Such experience may deepen their understanding of the systemic defects
and stimulate active learning behavior to reform the land regime. Therefore, holding everything else
constant, I expect that county leaders with town leadership experience have a more negative attitude
towards land use fiscalization than others without such experience.
A group of county- and individual-level characteristics are measured in the survey. County-level
variables include the level of economic development (Development), the percentage of private sector
in the county’s GDP (Private Economy), the percentage of central fiscal transfer in the county’s
expenditure (Fiscal Transfer), the percentage of net income of land lease sales in total fiscal revenue
(Land Dependency), the ratio of new debt to total fiscal revenue (Public Debt), the proportion of
collective land in urban areas, ethnic autonomous county (Minority), and county on the national
border (Border). Characteristics of individual leaders include: age, education, gender, term, and
prior work experience at the central, provincial, city, and county level. Table 7.9 and 7.10 provide
more details.
The original purpose of the survey was to understand county leaders’ attitudes on a variety
of social, economic, and political issues and to make policy suggestions for central leadership.
The survey instrument has ten parts, including personal information, county information, industrial
policy, fiscal policy, agricultural and land policy, urban and infrastructure policy, social policy, and
local governance. A general concern regarding survey is that responses were self-reported and could
1

Each scale stands for a different level of sustainability. Scale 1: 1-2 years; Scale 2: 3-5 years; Scale 3:
6-10 years; Scale 4: 11-20 years; Scale 5: over 20 years.
2
See the Chinese news report on a township head attacked by villagers during land expropriation.
https://bit.ly/2O7W69k. Last visited on 9/24/2018.
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Table 7.9: Summary Statistics (County-level Variables)
Variable
Minority
Border
Development
underdeveloped
somewhat underdeveloped
somewhat developed
developed
Private Economy
less than 25 percent
26 to 50 percent
51 to 75 percent
higher than 75 percent
Land Dependency
unknown
less than 25
26 to 50 percent
51 to 75 percent
higher than 75 percent
Fiscal Transfer
none
less than 20 percent
21 to 40 percent
41 to 60 percent
61 to 80 percent
higher than 80 percent
Public Debt to Revenue
less than 1
1 to 2
2 to 5
higher than 5

Obs.
337
338

Mean Std.Dev.
0.2641 0.4415
0.1598 0.3669

Min
0
0

Max
1
1

327
327
327
327

0.0550
0.1927
0.5474
0.2049

0.2284
0.3950
0.4985
0.4042

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

341
341
341
341

0.1349
0.1848
0.2874
0.3930

0.3421
0.3887
0.4532
0.4891

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

341
341
341
341
341

0.0557
0.6393
0.2463
0.0440
0.0147

0.2297
0.4809
0.4315
0.2054
0.1204

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

345
345
345
345
345
345

0.0464
0.1855
0.1739
0.2000
0.1884
0.2058

0.2106
0.3893
0.3796
0.4006
0.3916
0.4049

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1

315
315
315
315

0.8032
0.1556
0.0254
0.0159

0.3982
0.3630
0.1576
0.1252

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

Note: Central Party School Survey of County-level Party Secretaries. Minority
is a dummy variable indicating whether the county is under ethnic minorities’ autonomous governance. Border is a dummy variable indicating whether the county is
located next to the national border. Development is a categorical variable of level of
economic development. Private Economy is a variable indicating the percentage of
private economy in the county’ gross domestic production. Land Dependency indicates the percentage of land premium in the county’ total fiscal revenue in the past
three years on average. Fiscal Transfer is a variable that indicates the percentage of
fiscal transfer in the county’ total fiscal expenditure. Public Debt to Revenue denotes
the ratio of new debts to the county’s annual fiscal revenue.
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Table 7.10: Summary Statistics (Individual-level Variables)
Variable
Land Fiscalization
Town Leadership
County Leadership
County Sectoral Experience
City Sectoral Experience
Provincial Sectoral Experience
Central Sectoral Experience
Male
Age
Education
1
2
3
4
Term
1
2
3
4

Obs.
310
346
348
346
346
346
346
343
346

Mean
2.2194
0.3873
0.9397
0.2948
0.5607
0.0780
0.0087
0.9446
2.8757

Std.Dev.
0.9192
0.4878
0.2385
0.4566
0.4970
0.2686
0.0928
0.2291
0.3869

Min
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2

Max
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4

344
344
344
344

0.0349
0.5465
0.3692
0.0494

0.1838
0.4986
0.4833
0.2171

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

346
346
346
346

0.2254
0.3584
0.3439
0.0723

0.4185
0.4802
0.4757
0.2593

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

Note: Central Party School Survey of County-level Party Secretaries. Land Fiscalization
is a variable that measures county leaders’ attitude towards the fiscalization of land use on a
scale of 1 (least supportive) to 5 (most supportive). Town Leadership is a dummy variable
that indicates whether the subject served as a party secretary or governor of a town or
twonship. County Leadership is a dummy variable that indicates whether the subject served
as a governor or vice party secretary of a county. County Sectoral Experience is a dummy
variable that indicates whether the subject worked in a section of a county government.
City Sectoral Experience is a dummy variable that indicates whether the subject worked
in a section of a city government. Provincial Sectoral Experience is a dummy variable
that indicates whether the subject worked in a section of a provincial government. Central
Sectoral Experience is a dummy variable that indicates whether the subject worked in a
section of the central government. Male takes the value of 1 if the subject is a male and
0 otherwise. Age is a continuous variable that denotes the age group to which the subject
belongs (1: 35 and below; 2: between 36 and 45; 3: between 46 and 55; and 4: 56 and
above). Education is a categorical variable: 1 denotes high school or lower degree, 2
denotes college degree, 3 denotes master’s degree, and 4 denotes doctoral degree. Term is
a categorical variable that indicates the period of duration the subject has been working in
the county’ party secretary: 1 means less than 3 years, 2 means 3 to 5 years, 3 means 5 to
10 years, and 4 means more than 10 years.
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suffer from non-negligible measurement errors. In this case, some county leaders might be more
cautious about reporting their attitudes toward politically sensitive policies. But this concern is less
worrisome with regard to land because land market liberalization has been a part of the central
agenda. In fact, the survey data shows that almost a quarter of the respondents expressed opposition
to the reform. Considering the centralized and hierarchical power structure in Chinese politics, this
is a large number for opponents to central policy agenda.
In addition, a big advantage of conducting survey at the Central Party School is the high response rate. All the selected county leaders answered the survey, with the exception that two did
not participate in the scheduled training program due to urgent local affairs.3 The perfect response
rate is reasonable, for all the county leaders want to avoid bad evaluation from the Party School’s
officials and may also impress central leaders for career advancement. Although some county leaders chose not to answer all the questions, the missing data problem is generally satisfactory in this
survey, as 72% of respondents answered all the questions. It is possible that some missing data on
Land Fiscalization and economic controls may introduce systematic biases. For example, county
leaders who do not report the debt ratio might be those who have recently accumulated a high level
of local debt. But for each variable of interest, the number of observations with missing data is relatively small (less than 10%). Without making further assumptions on the missing data mechanism,
I approach the problem with listwise deletion.
With these caveats in mind, I study the effect of having town leadership experience on county
leaders’ attitude with regard to the land regime. Table 7.11 presents the summary statistics grouped
by the town leadership variable. As we can see, the biggest empirical challenge to causal inference is
that town leadership experience is not randomly assigned. County leaders who have town leadership
experience are less likely to have worked in the city or provincial government and more likely
to have worked in county and provincial governments than those who have no town leadership
experience. To address the selection problem, I estimate the effect of Town Leadership on Land
Fiscalization using matching methods. I first estimate a simple linear model and an ordered logit
3

These two county secretaries were approved by the provincial Party’s Organization Department to delay
their training sessions because they had to deal with important local affairs. They can be seen as random
errors since their absence is unlikely to be associated with our independent variable (i.e., town leadership
experience).
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Table 7.11: Comparing County Leaders with and without Town Leadership Experience
Town Leadership Non-Town Leadership T-test
mean
sd
mean
sd
p-value
Land Fiscalization
2.10
0.87
2.29
0.94
0.08
Male
0.96
0.19
0.93
0.25
0.22
Age
2.87
0.38
2.88
0.39
0.70
Education
2.40
0.59
2.45
0.68
0.48
Development
2.90
0.81
2.90
0.76
0.96
Minority
0.22
0.42
0.29
0.45
0.17
Border
0.12
0.33
0.18
0.39
0.12
Term duration
2.25
0.95
2.27
0.85
0.88
Private Economy
3.03
0.98
2.88
1.10
0.20
Fiscal Transfer
2.97
1.45
2.89
1.59
0.61
Land Dependency
1.36
0.65
1.30
0.75
0.39
Public Debt
1.26
0.60
1.25
0.57
0.97
County Governor
0.81
0.39
0.74
0.44
0.09
County Vice Secretary
0.93
0.26
0.63
0.48
0.00∗∗∗
County Sectoral Experience
0.49
0.50
0.17
0.38
0.00∗∗∗
City Sectoral Experience
0.40
0.49
0.66
0.47
0.00∗∗∗
Provincial Sectoral Experience 0.02
0.15
0.11
0.32
0.00∗∗∗
Central Sectoral Experience
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.12
0.08
Observations
134
212
346
Note: Summary statistics grouped by the experience of town leadership. The third column reports pvalues for two-sided t-test.
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)
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model controlling for the county and individual level covariates discussed above. I then employ
an entropy weighed linear model to get a more comparable control group (Hainmueller, 2012).
To ensure the findings do not depend on a linear and additive parametric model, I use coarsened
exact matching method (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012) to test the robustness. In this matching
specification, county leaders with town leadership experience are matched to others based on the
coarsened scale of the covariates.
The results are reported in Table 7.12. The OLS model estimates a negative correlation between
Town Leadership and Land Fiscalization. Compared with a county leader who has no leadership
experience at the township level, a county leader who was a town leader before reports 0.28 less
on the scale of support to land fiscalization. On average, a county leader reports a scale of 2.22,
so the OLS estimates that a county leader with town leadership experience is 12.6% (=0.28/2.22)
less supportive to the land regime. Since Land Fiscalization is a variable with five ordered values,
I also employ the ordered logit model for estimation. Using the same covariates as those in the
OLS model, the ordered logit model shows that a county leader with town leadership experience is
expected to have a 0.66 decrease in the log odds of selecting a higher scale of Land Fiscalization,
given all of the other variables in the model are held constant. Both results from the OLS and
ordered logit model are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 7.12: Learning Effect of County Party Secretaries with Town Leadership
Experience

Town Leadership
Observation

OLS
(no weights)

Ordered Logit

OLS
(EB weights)

CEM

-0.2761∗∗
(0.1386)

-0.6559∗∗
(0.2961)

-0.2760∗∗
(0.1136)

-0.3172∗∗
(0.1237)

255

255

255

229

Note: The table reports the coefficients and standard errors of Town Leadership from OLS, ordered logit, OLS weighted by entropy balancing and coarsened exact matching. The dependent
variable is Land Fiscalization, measured by county leaders’ attitude towards the sustainability
of the fiscalization of land use. County-level and individual-level variables are either matched
or included as covariates in the models.
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)

To reduce imbalance on covariates and model dependency, I employ the entropy balancing

146

Table 7.13: Entropy Balancing: Covariates Balance

Male
Age
Education
Development
Minority
Border
Term duration
Private Economy
Fiscal Transfer
Land Dependency
Public Debt
County Governor
County Vice Secretary
County Sectoral Experience
City Sectoral Experience
Provincial Sectoral Experience
Central Sectoral Experience
Observations

Treatment Control (before)
mean sd mean
sd
0.96 0.19 0.93
0.25
2.87 0.38 2.88
0.39
2.40 0.59 2.45
0.68
2.90 0.81 2.90
0.76
0.22 0.42 0.29
0.45
0.12 0.33 0.18
0.39
2.25 0.95 2.27
0.85
3.03 0.98 2.88
1.10
2.97 1.45 2.89
1.59
1.36 0.65 1.30
0.75
1.26 0.60 1.25
0.57
0.81 0.39 0.74
0.44
0.93 0.26 0.63
0.48
0.49 0.50 0.17
0.38
0.40 0.49 0.66
0.47
0.02 0.15 0.11
0.32
0.00 0.00 0.01
0.12
134
212

Control (after)
mean
sd
0.96
0.19
2.88
0.45
2.44
0.69
2.89
0.87
0.20
0.40
0.07
0.26
2.26
0.86
3.07
1.04
2.96
1.60
1.39
0.82
1.26
0.56
0.83
0.38
0.92
0.28
0.47
0.50
0.44
0.50
0.03
0.17
0.00
0.02
168

Note: Results of entropy balancing across the treatment group (county party secretaries with town
leadership experience) and the control (other county party secretaries). N=134 in the treatment group.
N=168 in the control group.

method, which balances the marginal distribution of covariates between the treated and control
groups after weighting. In the analysis, with the same set of covariates, entropy balancing achieves
a full balance on the covariate distribution between those who were township leaders and those who
were not. The result of entropy balancing is reported in Table 7.13 I then employ these weights in
OLS regressions and get a result similar to that of the OLS model with an even greater statistical
significance. Finally, I use coarsened exact matching method for estimation. As shown in Figure
7.3, both the point estimates and standard errors are consistent with those from entropy balancing.

7.8

Summary

Although political gridlock and uncertainty delayed land market reform at the center government,
villagers’ sustained grievance pressured local leaders who are autonomous and independent to re-
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Figure 7.3: Effect of Town Leadership Experience on Attitude to Land Regime
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form. They learned from land-related conflicts that the existing land regime created social injustice,
which can only be solved through inclusive market reforms.
The results from large-N analysis and survey in this chapter suggest why it is difficult for reformers to emerge. On the one hand, reformers shall be able to perceive the potential threat from their
hands-on experience of dealing with deep social grievances and conflicts. On the other hand, reformers shall have political power that enable them to be autonomous and independent from vested
interests. In the context of Chinese politics, and maybe authoritarian politics at large, there are very
few politicians with both grassroots and top work experience. Among 3923 city leaders in China,
only 122 (less than 3%) have town leadership experience. The number is even fewer for provincial
or central leaders. Leaders with township leadership experience are more sensitive to social stability,
more capable of understanding the problems, and more likely to find the solutions. Facing different policy options, those with central or provincial experience are more likely to disregard vested
interests and choose fundamental reforms to solve the problems. Therefore, it is the combination
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of bottom-up pressure and top-down authority that creates reformers who actively learn from rather
than simply react or adapt to the status quo.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
When do politicians create efficiency-enhancing institutions that threaten to eliminate rent-seeking
opportunities? Based on the study of China’s land market reform, I argue that autonomous political
leaders in weakly institutionalized regimes learn from the threat of recurring social grievance to
create market-oriented institutions that are inclusive of ordinary citizens. Sustained social grievance
puts pressure on rulers who seek for performance legitimacy to formulate new governing ideology
and policy ideas in addressing people’s grievances. Inclusive ideas motivate political elites to organize in a new coalition competing for the governing authority. When politicians subscribed to
inclusive ideas control the ruling coalition, autonomous to and independent from vested interests,
they are likely to introduce inclusive market reforms that constrain elites’ rent-seeking behavior.

8.1

Towards a General Theory of Inclusive Market Reform

Kohli (1989) once argues that “a temporary condition of state autonomy, the ideology of the rulers,
support of powerful socioeconomic groups, and the capacity to depoliticize some of the economic
issues thus appear to be the main factors that help explain a partial success in liberalizing India’s
economy.” In this study, my theory integrates these factors (i.e., political autonomy, popular sup-
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port, and ideas) into a theory of inclusive economic reform based on political learning. I develop an
eclectic analytical framework that combines elements from rational choice, historical, sociological
school of new institutionalism. From the perspective of sociological institutionalism, I highlight
performance legitimacy as a social convention in guiding politicians to find solutions for governing
challenges. In authoritarian regimes, where procedural legitimacy is lacking, performance legitimacy provides an institutional template for policymaking. Rulers bounded by this cultural practice
and other path-dependent institutional constraints engage in political learning, which results in the
change of governing ideology. A broad ideational change not only directs the course of action in
specific policy reforms, but also coordinates political elites into coalitions. How coalitional politics
play into institutional change is subject to rational choice institutionalism. I integrate these stages in
a modified “spiral of politics” framework, which is built on the logic of historical institutionalism.
There are two important conditions of political learning in my theory: social grievance and ruler
autonomy. First, social grievance serves as an alarm that calls attention to rulers when mass interests
are neglected. But in contrast to major crises, social grievance does not swing policy paradigm from
one extreme to another. It poses certain level of threat to political elites, but does not generate
full-blown chaos that force rulers to resort to outright repression or complete overhaul. Second,
ruler autonomy is necessary to both the formulation of ideology and the translation of ideology into
policy. I operationalize autonomy using resources such as fiscal revenue and political mandate and
capacity of getting these resources. I emphasize autonomy derived from institutional capacity in
my theory, particularly the capacity of a centralized political party that makes party members with
central connections autonomous to local special interests.
To test the theory, I examine three significant institutional changes regarding China’s land market: land ownership, land commercialization, and land market liberalization. The first case is a
macro-historical analysis of constitutionalizing land ownership in the post-Mao period. The reform
involves a significant change (state ownership in urban areas) and non-change (collective ownership
in rural and suburban areas) that define the fundamental social relations to land in the reform era. I
explain it with the ideological change from class struggle to economic reform and opening, followed
by a power transfer from ultra-left Maoists to practical reformers in the critical juncture after Mao’s
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death. The ideological shift is a result of political learning from villagers living in extreme poverty
and consistently resisting collectivization in the Maoist era. Reform leaders were able to put these
new ideas into practice after winning support from political elites such as provincial leaders. They
withheld the pressure from the advocates of state ownership of land, and chose to maintain collective land ownership in rural areas for social stability. Although land privatization was rejected due
to the ideological constraint, the land ownership reform was inclusive to villagers in the sense that
collective ownership reduced the possibility of state involvement in rural and suburban land. Using
Bayesian process-tracing method and newspaper data, I test the autonomous learning hypothesis
and falsify alternative hypotheses based on the predatory state and inter-departmental bargaining.
The second case is a macro-historical study of land commercialization, in which I process-trace
the policy paradigm shift from inclusive to exclusive land market reform. I argue that a key driver
of this change was conservative reformers’ immature learning from the regime crisis in 1989. They
learned to maintain social stability in the fast-growing economy under transformation by strengthening the state capacity of macroeconomic management and throwing away radical reformers’ decentralized developmental strategy. As Djankov et al. (2003) argue, state ownership and regulations are
two most effective ways to control disorder. Among the various recentralized regulations adopted
by Chinese conservative leaders are the restrictions on the use and commercialization of collective
land. Exclusive land commercialization was rationalized as an instrument to inhibit speculative activities, an imperative guarantee of food security, and an important source of fiscal revenue. These
interest-based discourses helped rally a broad support from bureaucratic elites in different parts of
the state. Meanwhile, villagers continued engaging in informal transactions of collective land, as
many local state agencies lacked the capacity and motivation to enforce the exclusive land policy.
Without societal resistance and bureaucratic opposition, autonomous conservative leadership institutionalized exclusive land commercialization. This is a case of autonomous learning from regime
crisis instead of social grievance, leading to an exclusive reform that creates rent-seeking opportunities.
In the third case, I examine land market liberalization, a significant reform in recent years in
response to the rising social grievance on land issues. The spread of land-related conflicts across
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China is an unintended consequence of exclusive land commercialization, which gave rise to rampant rent-seeking behavior in the form of land use fiscalization. A new policy idea gained popular
support, aiming to liberalize the restrictions on collective land for commercial use and market transactions. But the liberalization reform would undermine local bureaucrats’ rent-seeking activities in
the state-owned land market and bring short-term cost to real estate developers with local investment. I argue that this new agenda of inclusive land market reform is rooted in the idea of equity and
fairness, a result of CCP leaders’ political learning from recurring land conflicts. Unfortunately, the
reform has been blocked at the national level because there was not a ruling coalition autonomous to
and independent from the bureaucratic and real estate interests. While conservative reformers still
being powerful in the leadership, the counter-liberalization idea remains strong. Many bureaucrats
hold the view that collective land is the last safe haven for villagers and migrant workers. The lack
of political development at the national level suggests a weak association between social grievance
and market reform with the absence of autonomous leaders.
However, at the subnational level, my fieldwork shows that some local leaders with relative
autonomy support land market liberalization. I find that the provincial government and most local
governments in Guangdong pushed for inclusive land market liberalization because they were constantly challenged by collective villagers and enjoyed great autonomy from bureaucratic and real
estate interests. Villages in Guangdong are cohesive organizations with independent identities due
to the historical legacy of single-family clans, so the collectives are able to mobilize villagers to resist intrusion from the state and business. In addition, the highly developed private sector provides
a large tax base for local governments, leading to a low fiscal dependency on land revenues, so that
landed interests in bureaucracy and real estate sector have less impact on the local leaders, who have
concentrated power in local affairs. Autonomous leaders in Guangdong learned from villagers’ contention the unfairness of the exclusive land regime, so they implement inclusive land market reform
for both development and stability.
In contrast, most local leaders in Shandong implemented land market liberalization partially
or nominally. They responded to the central reform agenda in a way that converts the original
goal of redistribution to uphold the exclusive land regime. I argue that this is because leaders in
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Shandong face a tighter constraint from bureaucratic and real estate interests. Although Shandong
is a developed coastal province like Guangdong (but with less political importance), it has a very
different economic structure, which highly depends on state-led investment. High ratio of fixed asset
investment in infrastructure creates rent-seeking opportunities in land development and a high level
of dependency on land revenues. Moreover, villages in Shandong are divided and dependent on the
state because of the historically weak lineages and clans. Therefore, even though land conflicts are
intense in Shandong, local leaders can prevent or repress violent outbursts by taking advantage of
villagers’ internal conflicts. They did not learn from villagers’ contention. Instead, they adapted to
it with exclusive land market reforms that protect elites’ rent-seeking opportunities.
The final subnational case is Guizhou, an underdeveloped province in western China, where few
investments have led to low land dependency and conflicts. Besides, fragmented villages are incapable of organizing villagers to resist illegal land expropriation in suburban areas. As a result, local
leaders have little pressure to open the access to urban land market for village collectives. Local
policy experiments were conducted as demonstration examples in reaction to the central mandate
or as preferential treatments in adaptation to some troublemakers. But there is no political learning
mechanism in Guizhou that leads to significant policy changes.
While qualitative cases highlight the important of resource-based autonomy, my quantitative
analysis using online complaints and local liberalization policies tests the hypothesis on capacitybased autonomy. I find that there is a higher possibility of land market liberalization when a city
leader facing social grievance have prior work experience in the central or provincial government.
The experience at the higher level of governments make them more autonomous to and less likely to
be captured by local bureaucratic and business interests. Under such condition, the result of political
learning, the idea of fairness, is more likely to be translated into liberalization policy. To validate the
learning mechanism, I use a unique survey data of county-level party secretaries in China. It turns
out that county leaders with prior work experience as township leaders, who are directly responsible
for implementing land expropriation and eviction, have a more negative view on the exclusive land
regime. In addition, most county leaders expressing support for the liberalization reform cited the
reason of fairness to villagers. These findings suggest that local leaders do learn from dealing with
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land conflicts.

8.2

Limitations

My research has several limitations. First of all, I have not addressed the normative dimension of
land market reform. That is, I do not try to answer questions like whether China should adopt private
land ownership or collective land ownership with private rights, or whether China should continue
the fiscalization of land use. These questions are of great importance, but not relevant to the main
research question. A subject that needs a little more explanation is land market liberalization. Since
agricultural land is a major strategic resource of a state, state officials should act with prudence
regarding the issue. Although research finds that land market liberalization has not led to a highlevel concentration of land and has appeared to be good for the rural poor in some countries, the
finding is not conclusive (Deininger, Jin, and Nagarajan, 2009; Olinto, Deininger, and Davis, 2000;
Tsikata and Yaro, 2011). Factors such as international land buyers, underdeveloped credit markets,
and lack of land titling may cause problems. Most importantly, there is no one-size-fits-all solution.
While rural families in some developing countries are vulnerable to expropriation as a result of
ineffective regulation and privatization, Chinese villagers suffer from excessive state regulations on
collective land. Therefore, I do not make a general argument in support of land market liberalization.
Second, the variable of interest in this study is the policy of market reform, so less attention
is given to the actual outcomes of policy reform. One may contend that inclusive policies per se
can be just cheap talks given by authoritarian leaders to coax ordinary citizens into compliance.
This is situation is possible when city leaders experiment with inclusive policies, but less likely
for the party’s central decision because it provides a guiding principle for local agents to follow.
Even for city leaders, policymaking can be time-consuming, and thus involves opportunity cost. In
addition, inclusive policies may be used by citizens as a tool to advance their interests. For example,
villagers can use the liberalization policy to legitimize their claims over collective land and resist
expropriation. The policy is meaningful, but whether it reduces land protests or increases villagers’
income is a totally different question. Policy implementation is a complicated subject that needs to
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be studied in another research. It takes time for villagers to understand the policy and for bureaucrats
to work out all sorts of policy details. Since there are many practical hurdles to overcome, the actual
effects of land market liberalizations are still too early to tell. But there is no doubt the goal of this
policy is using market to fulfill a redistributive purpose.
Third, the cadastre of collective land is lacking and inaccurate in China, since rural and suburban
land was not managed by the state. Land-related data is also quite politically sensitive, so it is almost
impossible to gather a large data set of collective land use and transactions for quantitative research.
This is another reason why I focus on policy reform.
Finally, I recognize that not all authoritarian rulers need performance legitimacy. Some may be
inclined to use repression, whereas some others may resort to theological or nationalist legitimacy
(Geddes, 1999). A prerequisite of political learning is that rulers must be restrained from using
repression in response to social unrest.

8.3

Future Research

In the future, as land market liberalization continues, I will collect more data to study the impact
of this reform on social outcomes such as income and stability. Meanwhile, more research can be
done on the learning mechanism of economic reform in other sectors and institutional contexts. For
example, it would be interesting to see if urban homeowners’ complaints over real estate would
lead to more inclusive reforms under autonomous political leadership. Presumably urban middle
class poses a greater threat to the regime than rural villagers, so political leaders may learn from
their grievances and tolerate the existence of self-governing organizations of homeowners. One may
also look at the variety of privatization programs in postcommunist countries and try to explain the
inclusiveness of these reforms.
An unanswered question of this study is the origin and effect of performance legitimacy in
China. As an underlying factor in my argument, I assume that performance legitimacy is a constraint over central and local leaders. Future research is needed to study how performance legitimacy becomes institutionalized within the CCP and how it affects political leaders’ behavior. So
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far we are still not sure whether cadre evaluation system, as a key instrument of inducing better
performance, has causal impact on local officials’ behavior. One may consider taking advantage of
natural experiment and experiment-in-the-field to study this important question.

8.4

Generalizability

My theory can be applied to other policy areas in China’s economic transformation. Take agriculture reform for example. Agricultural decollectivization started first in Anhui and Sichuan because
of two reasons. One, these two provinces had the largest number of victims from the Great Leap
Famine, and villagers spontaneously abandoned collective farming to resist the central mandate (D.
Yang, 1996). Second, the leaders of the two provinces (i.e., Wan Li and Zhao Ziyang) were autonomous to local bureaucrats because they had close relationship with Deng Xiaoping and were
directly appointed by the paramount leader (Fewsmith, 2000). They learned from the condition
of extreme poverty in rural areas, became deeply shocked by the sufferings of villagers, and then
determined to dismantle the Soviet system. In the 1990s, the privatization of TVEs was pushed
by autonomous leaders in a top-down manner after learning from the macroeconomic crisis that
inefficient TVEs were the main reason for decline of the state-owned enterprises. Overlooking the
positive contribution of rural enterprises, the leaders decided to inhibit rural industrialization instead
of fostering it. In the 2000s, the removal of agricultural tax was a major achievement of Hu Jintao’s harmonious society, a concept learned from recurring farmers’ protests about excessive taxes
and fees. And provinces that collected a large proportion of tax from agriculture (e.g., Shandong)
was the last one that implemented the reform. These cases suggest that political learning is an
appropriate mechanism to explain China’s agriculture reform.
Beyond China, my theory is generalizable to land reform in other countries. In Russia, agricultural land reform (i.e., farmland privatization) can be characterized as an inclusive land market
reform pushed by Yeltsin’s leadership learning from the unproductive collectivization while being autonomous to national legislators and local politicians and state farm managers.1 In South
1

However, the reform failed to create large scale private farms, as a survey shows that only 12 percent
Russian citizens support unrestricted land transactions (Barnes, 2006; Wegren, 2003). In other words, popu-
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Africa, market-based land reform, namely the “willing seller, willing buyer” approach, has been
associated with redressing the injustice of apartheid since Mandela’s leadership in the post-colonial
era. Yet sustained racial disparities in land ownership and economic power at large gave rise to a
more inclusive reform agenda which allows the state to expropriate white landowners’ unused farmland without compensation for public interest. This major shift of land policy paradigm, built on
consensual knowledge about more radical land redistribution, was initiated under Zuma’s pro-poor
leadership of African National Congress, learning from angry black farmers and being autonomous
to white landed elites. In Brazil, land inequality has been a serious social problem for a long time.
Landless workers’ movement has led to waves of violent confrontations, but only won government
support for land reform during the term of President Lula from the leftist party.
My theory is even applicable to a variety of settings in nonauthoritarian regimes. For instance,
participatory budgeting emerged from cities in authoritarian Brazil, where there were strong civil
societies and supportive mayors from left parties (Wampler, 2010). In addition, in the Progressive
Era of American history, the young Franklin D. Roosevelt, with support from his aristocratic family,
learned the demands from civic reform groups and then became one of the earliest politicians who
took on powerful local political machines (Mitgang, 2003). Although social grievances may be
translated directly to political autonomy in democratic politics, the logic of learning is applicable to
the understanding of these episode and beyond.

8.5

Implications

My study on China’s land market reform has several implications for the study of comparative politics and economic reform. First, my theory provides a framework for explaining the market-oriented
institutions with the mechanism of political learning, which is affected by social grievance and ruler
autonomy. Economic transformation can be easily trapped in post-socialist societies because of institutional deficiency, special interests groups, and path-dependent norms (Hellman, 1998; North,
lar support for Yeltsin’s radical economic reform agenda was not strong enough. In addition, Allina-Pisano
(2004) argues that local state officials played an important role in opposing the implementation of privatization reform.
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1990). The key issue is how to create an incentive structure that promotes inclusive market reform
that benefits the majority of ordinary citizens. Unfortunately, existing literature on the politics of
economic reform has not focused on the inclusion of the poor. There have been few researches
studying the role of social grievance in economic transformation partly due to concurrent transformation of political and economic systems in former Soviet republics, Central and East European,
and many developing countries. China’s land market reform shows that market-oriented institutions
were not simply imposed by autonomous central leaders or bargained between bureaucratic and
societal elites. Findings from my empirical analyses suggests that it is autonomous leaders’ learning from the masses that generates exclusive or inclusive governing ideologies, which significantly
change the trajectory of market reform.
Second, my research suggests there are similar mechanisms of political development in authoritarian and democratic regimes. Political learning is a “responsible behavior” (North and Weingast,
1989) that sets a precedent for authoritarian rulers to make credible commitments to market-friendly
institutions. Although authoritarian rulers are not constrained by either constitution or public opinion, they need some kind of legitimacy to govern. Performance legitimacy in China is equivalent to
public mandate in liberal democracies. Social grievance is a functional substitute for civil society.
And the CCP can be seen as an imperfect substitute for representative institutions in democracies
to guide and constrain bureaucratic agents (Shevchenko, 2004). Political learning mechanism links
all these elements together in explaining significant institutional changes in authoritarian regimes.
The goal of achieving performance legitimacy motivates authoritarian rulers to learn from social
grievance and reformulate new policy mandates to mobilize supporters in a cohesive political party
by offering resource and career incentives. Therefore, in spite of institutional differences between
democracies and autocracies, there is a common mechanism hinged on rulers’ fear and learning that
opens pathways to efficiency-enhancing reforms, even if these reforms, which benefit the citizenry
at large, are counterintuitively not in the obvious interest of ruling elites.
Third, an implication for Chinese politics is that, to encourage inclusive market reform, we
should foster political learning by having an incentive structure that rewards politicians’ involvement in low and high politics. While some have noticed the adaptive capacity of the CCP regime
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(Heilmann and Perry, 2011; K. S. Tsai, 2006), many studies on Chinese politics view policymakers as self-interested rent seekers of a fragmented, predatory state, suggesting a dim prospect for
economic and political development without democratization. My investigation into China’s land
market acknowledges the existence of pervasive rent-seeking behaviors, but shows that some of
these are unintended consequences of institutional tinkering and can be adjusted through political
learning. Political learning produces more significant changes than experimentation from adaptation, but it requires more demanding conditions. There are very few CCP leaders at the city level
and above who have long-term work experience at the grassroots level. In other words, the intersection is small between policymakers who are more likely to learn from social grievances and those
who are more likely to be autonomous from special interest groups. Although personal experience
is not required for learning, future research is needed to strengthen political autonomy and learning
simultaneously.
Fourth, China’s land market reform has an implication for the widespread problem of land
grabbing in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (Boone, 2014). Governments in developing countries,
facing powerful foreign investors or landed elites, may adopt or tolerate extractive land grabbing
for economic development. Since legal institutions are not well established and enforced in these
countries, small land owners’ property rights may be infringed by foreign capital or local state.
Chinese villagers’ struggle suggest that sustained popular uprising may turn things around when
there is a political leader autonomous and independent vis-à-vis foreign capital or landed elites.
Finally, the rise of populist leaders in many developed and developing countries highlights the
problem of exclusive economic growth in the age of globalization. There is no easy way to ensure
the benefits of market economy are shared by the majority of population, as my research suggests.
To build inclusive market-oriented institutions, we need mass mobilization and autonomous leaders
who, not only listen to, but also learn from the people’s voices.
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